Jingbo Zhou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Jingbo Zhou has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Farimah Farahmandi
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
3 shared publications - Xinmiao Zhang
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
3 shared publications - Mark Tehranipoor
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
2 shared publications - Avinash Ayalasomayajula
University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
1 shared publication - Azim Uddin
Univ. of Florida, Gainesville, USA
1 shared publication - Galib Ibne Haidar
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 338-344
CHSM-Guard: Secure Boot and In-Field Firmware Updates for Chiplet-Based SiPs
- 22 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 338-344
Open AccessCHSM-Guard: Secure Boot and In-Field Firmware Updates for Chiplet-Based SiPs
- Open Access
- 20 January 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 788-793
NoXLock: SiP Activation and Licensing through Obfuscated on-Chip Network and Fuzzy Traffic
Countermeasures designed to protect system-on-chip (SoC) from intellectual property (IP) counterfeiting are inadequate for heterogeneously integrated systems-in-packages (SiP) due to shifts in manufacturing flow. Additionally, traditional obfuscation methods are now compromised by emerging deobfuscation techniques. This paper introduces network-on-chip (NoC) obfuscation, NoXLock, to effectively safeguard the IP of SiP designs. By obfuscating the routing algorithm, the performance of unauthorized SiPs, including throughput and packet loss, is effectively constrained. To securely activate the system, a novel method utilizing dynamic traffic patterns is proposed. Extensive security analyses and experimental results in this paper demonstrate that NoXLock resists state-of-the-art attacks, including oracle-guided SAT, oracle-less removal, and probing-based methods, without imposing a significant penalty on power, performance, and area (PPA) overheads.
- 20 January 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 788-793
Open AccessNoXLock: SiP Activation and Licensing through Obfuscated on-Chip Network and Fuzzy Traffic
Countermeasures designed to protect system-on-chip (SoC) from intellectual property (IP) counterfeiting are inadequate for heterogeneously integrated systems-in-packages (SiP) due to shifts in manufacturing flow. Additionally, traditional obfuscation methods are now compromised by emerging deobfuscation techniques. This paper introduces network-on-chip (NoC) obfuscation, NoXLock, to effectively safeguard the IP of SiP designs. By obfuscating the routing algorithm, the performance of unauthorized SiPs, including throughput and packet loss, is effectively constrained. To securely activate the system, a novel method utilizing dynamic traffic patterns is proposed. Extensive security analyses and experimental results in this paper demonstrate that NoXLock resists state-of-the-art attacks, including oracle-guided SAT, oracle-less removal, and probing-based methods, without imposing a significant penalty on power, performance, and area (PPA) overheads.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
LASP: LLM Assisted Security Property Generation for SoC Verification
As the complexity of System-on-Chips (SoCs) increases, ensuring their security presents escalating challenges. Formal property verification is one of the most robust methods to model and check security behaviors using model checkers. However, the generation of these security properties is a labor-intensive endeavor. Large language models (LLMs) have been applied in multiple fields due to their excellent ability to understand natural language. Hence, this paper presents a novel framework that utilizes LLMs to automate the generation of security properties directly from Register Transfer Level (RTL) designs. By extracting critical features and security assets from both the design specifications and RTL, the framework systematically produces tailored security properties for specific hardware designs. These properties are systematically cataloged in a security property database, providing an essential resource for ongoing and future hardware verification efforts. The effectiveness of this innovative framework is validated through its application to various open-source hardware designs, confirming its ability to significantly improve SoC security verification by efficiently generating robust security properties.
- 9 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
Open AccessLASP: LLM Assisted Security Property Generation for SoC Verification
As the complexity of System-on-Chips (SoCs) increases, ensuring their security presents escalating challenges. Formal property verification is one of the most robust methods to model and check security behaviors using model checkers. However, the generation of these security properties is a labor-intensive endeavor. Large language models (LLMs) have been applied in multiple fields due to their excellent ability to understand natural language. Hence, this paper presents a novel framework that utilizes LLMs to automate the generation of security properties directly from Register Transfer Level (RTL) designs. By extracting critical features and security assets from both the design specifications and RTL, the framework systematically produces tailored security properties for specific hardware designs. These properties are systematically cataloged in a security property database, providing an essential resource for ongoing and future hardware verification efforts. The effectiveness of this innovative framework is validated through its application to various open-source hardware designs, confirming its ability to significantly improve SoC security verification by efficiently generating robust security properties.
- 5 June 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 42 (12) , 4518-4527
Joint Protection Scheme for Deep Neural Network Hardware Accelerators and Models
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are utilized in numerous image processing, object detection, and video analysis tasks and need to be implemented using hardware accelerators to achieve practical speed. Logic locking is one of the most popular methods for preventing chip counterfeiting. Nevertheless, existing logic-locking schemes need to sacrifice the number of input patterns leading to wrong output under incorrect keys to resist the powerful satisfiability (SAT)-attack. Furthermore, the DNN model inference is fault tolerant. Hence, using a wrong key for those SAT-resistant logic-locking schemes may not affect the accuracy of DNNs. This makes the previous SAT-resistant logic-locking scheme ineffective on protecting DNN accelerators. Besides, to prevent DNN models from being illegally used, the models need to be obfuscated by the designers before they are provided to end-users. Previous obfuscation methods either require a long time to retrain the model or leak information about the model. This article proposes a joint protection scheme for DNN hardware accelerators and models. The DNN accelerator is modified using a hardware key (Hkey) and a model key (Mkey). Different from previous logic locking, the Hkey, which is used to protect the accelerator, does not affect the output when it is wrong. As a result, the SAT attack can be effectively resisted. On the other hand, a wrong Hkey leads to substantial increase in memory accesses, inference time, and energy consumption and makes the accelerator unusable. A correct Mkey can recover the DNN model that is obfuscated by the proposed method. Compared to previous model obfuscation schemes, our proposed method avoids model retraining and does not leak model information.
- 5 June 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 42 (12) , 4518-4527
Joint Protection Scheme for Deep Neural Network Hardware Accelerators and Models
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are utilized in numerous image processing, object detection, and video analysis tasks and need to be implemented using hardware accelerators to achieve practical speed. Logic locking is one of the most popular methods for preventing chip counterfeiting. Nevertheless, existing logic-locking schemes need to sacrifice the number of input patterns leading to wrong output under incorrect keys to resist the powerful satisfiability (SAT)-attack. Furthermore, the DNN model inference is fault tolerant. Hence, using a wrong key for those SAT-resistant logic-locking schemes may not affect the accuracy of DNNs. This makes the previous SAT-resistant logic-locking scheme ineffective on protecting DNN accelerators. Besides, to prevent DNN models from being illegally used, the models need to be obfuscated by the designers before they are provided to end-users. Previous obfuscation methods either require a long time to retrain the model or leak information about the model. This article proposes a joint protection scheme for DNN hardware accelerators and models. The DNN accelerator is modified using a hardware key (Hkey) and a model key (Mkey). Different from previous logic locking, the Hkey, which is used to protect the accelerator, does not affect the output when it is wrong. As a result, the SAT attack can be effectively resisted. On the other hand, a wrong Hkey leads to substantial increase in memory accesses, inference time, and energy consumption and makes the accelerator unusable. A correct Mkey can recover the DNN model that is obfuscated by the proposed method. Compared to previous model obfuscation schemes, our proposed method avoids model retraining and does not leak model information.
- 13 May 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 42 (2) , 371-383
Algorithmic Obfuscation for LDPC Decoders
In order to protect intellectual properties against untrusted foundry, many logic-locking schemes have been developed. The idea of logic locking is to insert a key-controlled block into the circuit to make the circuit function incorrectly or go through redundant states without right keys. However, in the case that the algorithm implemented by the circuit is self-correcting, existing logic-locking schemes do not affect the system performance much even if a wrong key is used and hence do not effectively protect the circuit. One example is low-density parity-check (LDPC) error-correcting decoders, which are used in numerous digital communication and storage systems. This article proposes two algorithmic-level obfuscation methods for LDPC decoders. By modifying the decoding process and locking the stopping criterion, our new designs substantially degrade the decoder throughput and/or error-correcting performance, and make the decoder unusable when a wrong key is applied. For an example of the LDPC decoder, our proposed methods reduce the throughput to less than 1/3 and/or increase the decoder error rate by at least two orders of magnitude with at most 0.55% area overhead. Besides, our designs are also resistant to the SAT, AppSAT, and removal attacks.
- 13 May 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 42 (2) , 371-383
Algorithmic Obfuscation for LDPC Decoders
In order to protect intellectual properties against untrusted foundry, many logic-locking schemes have been developed. The idea of logic locking is to insert a key-controlled block into the circuit to make the circuit function incorrectly or go through redundant states without right keys. However, in the case that the algorithm implemented by the circuit is self-correcting, existing logic-locking schemes do not affect the system performance much even if a wrong key is used and hence do not effectively protect the circuit. One example is low-density parity-check (LDPC) error-correcting decoders, which are used in numerous digital communication and storage systems. This article proposes two algorithmic-level obfuscation methods for LDPC decoders. By modifying the decoding process and locking the stopping criterion, our new designs substantially degrade the decoder throughput and/or error-correcting performance, and make the decoder unusable when a wrong key is applied. For an example of the LDPC decoder, our proposed methods reduce the throughput to less than 1/3 and/or increase the decoder error rate by at least two orders of magnitude with at most 0.55% area overhead. Besides, our designs are also resistant to the SAT, AppSAT, and removal attacks.
- 12 February 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 16 (15566013) , 2581-2592
Generalized SAT-Attack-Resistant Logic Locking
Logic locking is used to protect integrated circuits (ICs) from piracy and counterfeiting. An encrypted IC implements the correct function only when the right key is input. Many existing logic-locking methods are subject to the powerful satisfiability (SAT)-based attack. Recently, an Anti-SAT scheme has been developed. By adopting two complementary logic blocks that consist of AND/NAND trees, it makes the number of iterations needed by the SAT attack exponential to the number of input bits. Nevertheless, the Anti-SAT scheme is vulnerable to the later AppSAT and removal attacks. This article proposes a generalized (G-)Anti-SAT scheme. Different from the Anti-SAT scheme, a variety of complementary or non-complementary functions can be adopted for the two blocks in our G-Anti-SAT scheme. The Anti-SAT scheme is just a special case of our proposed design. Our design can achieve higher output corruptibility, which is also tunable, so that better resistance to the AppSAT and removal attacks is achieved. Meanwhile, unlike existing AppSAT-resilient designs, our design does not sacrifice the resistance to the SAT attack.
- 12 February 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 16 (15566013) , 2581-2592
Generalized SAT-Attack-Resistant Logic Locking
Logic locking is used to protect integrated circuits (ICs) from piracy and counterfeiting. An encrypted IC implements the correct function only when the right key is input. Many existing logic-locking methods are subject to the powerful satisfiability (SAT)-based attack. Recently, an Anti-SAT scheme has been developed. By adopting two complementary logic blocks that consist of AND/NAND trees, it makes the number of iterations needed by the SAT attack exponential to the number of input bits. Nevertheless, the Anti-SAT scheme is vulnerable to the later AppSAT and removal attacks. This article proposes a generalized (G-)Anti-SAT scheme. Different from the Anti-SAT scheme, a variety of complementary or non-complementary functions can be adopted for the two blocks in our G-Anti-SAT scheme. The Anti-SAT scheme is just a special case of our proposed design. Our design can achieve higher output corruptibility, which is also tunable, so that better resistance to the AppSAT and removal attacks is achieved. Meanwhile, unlike existing AppSAT-resilient designs, our design does not sacrifice the resistance to the SAT attack.