AAAvinash Ayalasomayajula

Avinash Ayalasomayajula

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Avinash Ayalasomayajula has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    LASP: LLM Assisted Security Property Generation for SoC Verification

    by Avinash Ayalasomayajula, Rui Guo, Jingbo Zhou, Sujan Kumar Saha, Farimah Farahmandi

    As the complexity of System-on-Chips (SoCs) increases, ensuring their security presents escalating challenges. Formal property verification is one of the most robust methods to model and check security behaviors using model checkers. However, the generation of these security properties is a labor-intensive endeavor. Large language models (LLMs) have been applied in multiple fields due to their excellent ability to understand natural language. Hence, this paper presents a novel framework that utilizes LLMs to automate the generation of security properties directly from Register Transfer Level (RTL) designs. By extracting critical features and security assets from both the design specifications and RTL, the framework systematically produces tailored security properties for specific hardware designs. These properties are systematically cataloged in a security property database, providing an essential resource for ongoing and future hardware verification efforts. The effectiveness of this innovative framework is validated through its application to various open-source hardware designs, confirming its ability to significantly improve SoC security verification by efficiently generating robust security properties.


  • Automatic Asset Identification for Assertion-Based SoC Security Verification

    by Avinash Ayalasomayajula, Nusrat Farzana Dipu, Mark M. Tehranipoor, Farimah Farahmandi

    The ubiquitous presence and utilization of System-on-Chips (SoCs) have made them critical to our daily lives. As SoCs become more complex, their susceptibility to security threats has also increased. The comprehensive security assurance of an SoC system requires a deep knowledge of the design and security-critical assets that must be protected. As SoC applications vary, the assets vary in number, type, importance level, and form based on the various hardware blocks that construct the SoC and their complex interactions. Some assets are distinctive in their definition and characteristics, making them easily identifiable, such as encryption/decryption keys, logic locking keys, etc. However, other assets, such as system bus control registers that are internal to the design, require a more complex design analysis. Automatic identification of these security assets at the presilicon stage can help designers take the necessary precautions to protect them. Equipped with the security assets, designers can then incorporate techniques to protect these security assets against various threats. This article presents the variation among security assets based on hardware design and defines attributes to help classify them. Then, we introduce security asset identification framework (SAIF), an automated framework that can help identify security assets for a design at the register-transfer level (RTL). We introduce a set of metrics into SAIF to perform comprehensive vulnerability analysis and identify security assets that are prone to specific vulnerabilities. Finally, we report our findings on the effectiveness of SAIF for various open-source hardware designs and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lightweight crypto designs. We show that SAIF can automatically identify critical security assets in a design with high accuracy and performance. Moreover, we analyze the security implications of the identified secondary assets to show their importance in presilicon security verification.


  • AGILE: Automated Assertion Generation to Detect Information Leakage Vulnerabilities

    by Nusrat Farzana Dipu, Avinash Ayalasomayajula, Mark M. Tehranipoor, Farimah Farahmandi

    The globalization of the System-on-Chip (SoC) design process has made hardware designs prone to many security vulnerabilities. One of the most critical security vulnerabilities is information leakage (IL), which allows an attacker to gain access to a design’s secret information. IL vulnerabilities can result from unintended design flaws or the intentional insertion of malicious functionality into the design. Such vulnerabilities should be identified at the early design stages to secure a hardware design. Property-driven security verification has emerged as a promising method of verifying that such security vulnerabilities do not exist. This verification technique requires developing an appropriate set of assertions to formally represent the properties. However, forming a comprehensive set of assertions that can cover all potential vulnerabilities in design is challenging. Assertion generation cannot be done manually due to the large complexity of designs, lack of security experts as well as the existence of untrusted observable points in the design. In this work, we propose AGILE, a framework to automatically generate security assertions for property-driven verification to identify IL-based vulnerabilities. The experimental results show that the assertions provided by AGILE can detect both intentional and unintentional IL paths in the input design. We demonstrate the effectiveness of AGILE on the NIST standard, Trust-Hub, and OpenCores benchmarks. Moreover, we use code coverage analysis to evaluate the accessibility of the generated assertions to the source code. The analytical result indicates that by utilizing the assertions generated by AGILE, security coverage of the design under verification (DUV) can be improved significantly.