Mohsen Ghaderi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Mohsen Ghaderi has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kian Gheitasi
Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering (CIISE), Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada
2 shared publications - Walter Lucia
Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering (CIISE), Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 16 September 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 8 (1) , 168-176
A Blended Active Detection Strategy for False Data Injection Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems
In recent years, different solutions have been proposed to detect advanced stealthy cyber-attacks against networked control systems. In this manuscript, we propose a blended detection scheme that properly leverages and combines two existing detection ideas, namely watermarking and moving target. In particular, a watermarked signal and a nonlinear static auxiliary function are combined to both limit the attacker's disclosure resources and obtain an unidentifiable moving target. The proposed scheme is capable of detecting a broad class of false data injection attacks, including zero-dynamics, replay, and covert attacks. Moreover, it is shown that the proposed approach mitigates the drawbacks of standard moving target and watermarking defense strategies. Finally, an extensive simulation study is reported to contrast the proposed detector with recent competitor schemes and provide tangible evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
- 16 September 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 8 (1) , 168-176
A Blended Active Detection Strategy for False Data Injection Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems
In recent years, different solutions have been proposed to detect advanced stealthy cyber-attacks against networked control systems. In this manuscript, we propose a blended detection scheme that properly leverages and combines two existing detection ideas, namely watermarking and moving target. In particular, a watermarked signal and a nonlinear static auxiliary function are combined to both limit the attacker's disclosure resources and obtain an unidentifiable moving target. The proposed scheme is capable of detecting a broad class of false data injection attacks, including zero-dynamics, replay, and covert attacks. Moreover, it is shown that the proposed approach mitigates the drawbacks of standard moving target and watermarking defense strategies. Finally, an extensive simulation study is reported to contrast the proposed detector with recent competitor schemes and provide tangible evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
- 23 June 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 66 (5) , 2332-2338
Setpoint Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems
In this paper, we face the problem of detecting setpoint attacks in networked control systems. We consider a setup where the reference signal (also known as setpoint) is generated by a control center remotely located with respect to a standard feedback controller. In this scenario, an attacker with sufficient resources can exploit the communication channel to alter the setpoint signal and ultimately affect the tracking performance of the control system. With respect to this problem, we propose a novel distributed control architecture that, taking advantage of peculiar capabilities of the Command Governor (CG) control paradigm, enables the detection of reference attacks. We formally prove that for constrained linear systems such detector exists. Moreover, by limiting the attacker's disclosure resources with superimposed cryptographically secure pseudo-random signals, we show that the absence of advanced stealthy attacks is also ensured. Finally, a solid numerical simulation investigating setpoint attacks on the flight control system of a single-engine fighter is presented to provide tangible evidence of the features of the presented methodology.
- 23 June 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 66 (5) , 2332-2338
Setpoint Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems
In this paper, we face the problem of detecting setpoint attacks in networked control systems. We consider a setup where the reference signal (also known as setpoint) is generated by a control center remotely located with respect to a standard feedback controller. In this scenario, an attacker with sufficient resources can exploit the communication channel to alter the setpoint signal and ultimately affect the tracking performance of the control system. With respect to this problem, we propose a novel distributed control architecture that, taking advantage of peculiar capabilities of the Command Governor (CG) control paradigm, enables the detection of reference attacks. We formally prove that for constrained linear systems such detector exists. Moreover, by limiting the attacker's disclosure resources with superimposed cryptographically secure pseudo-random signals, we show that the absence of advanced stealthy attacks is also ensured. Finally, a solid numerical simulation investigating setpoint attacks on the flight control system of a single-engine fighter is presented to provide tangible evidence of the features of the presented methodology.