Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Floyd Johnson has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Concrete Analysis of Quantum Lattice Enumeration

    by Shi Bai, Maya-Iggy van Hoof, Floyd B. Johnson, Tanja Lange, Tran Ngo


  • Fiat-Shamir Signatures Based on Module-NTRU

    by Shi Bai, Austin Beard, Floyd Johnson, Sulani K. B. Vidhanalage, Tran Ngo


  • Open Access

    An Attack on Zawadzki’s Quantum Authentication Scheme

    by Carlos E. González-Guillén, María Isabel González Vasco, Floyd Johnson, Ángel L. Pérez del Pozo

    Identification schemes are interactive cryptographic protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of their identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decides whether or not it comes from the intended prover. Given the growing interest in quantum computation, it is indeed desirable to have explicit designs for achieving user identification through quantum resources. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki. We discuss the applicability of the theoretical impossibility results from Lo, Colbeck and Buhrman et al. and formally prove that the protocol must necessarily be insecure. Moreover, to better illustrate our insecurity claim, we present an attack on Zawadzki’s protocol and show that by using a simple strategy an adversary may indeed obtain relevant information on the shared identification secret. Specifically, through the use of the principal of conclusive exclusion on quantum measurements, our attack geometrically reduces the key space resulting in the claimed logarithmic security being reduced effectively by a factor of two after only three verification attempts.


  • Open Access

    Concerning Quantum Identification Without Entanglement

    by Carlos E. González-Guillén, María Isabel González Vasco, Floyd Johnson, Ángel L. Pérez del Pozo

    Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).