Floyd Johnson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Floyd Johnson has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Carlos E. González-Guillén
Departamento de Matemática Aplicada a la Ingeniería Industrial Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Industriales Universidad Politécnica de Madrid Calle de José Gutiérrez Abascal 28006 Madrid Spain
2 shared publications - María Isabel González Vasco
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
2 shared publications - Shi Bai
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
2 shared publications - Ángel Luis Pérez del Pozo
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
2 shared publications - Austin Beard
Florida Atlantic University
1 shared publication - Maya-Iggy van Hoof
Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr University Bochum
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 18 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 131-166
Concrete Analysis of Quantum Lattice Enumeration
- 18 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 131-166
Concrete Analysis of Quantum Lattice Enumeration
- Open Access
An Attack on Zawadzki’s Quantum Authentication Scheme
Identification schemes are interactive cryptographic protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of their identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decides whether or not it comes from the intended prover. Given the growing interest in quantum computation, it is indeed desirable to have explicit designs for achieving user identification through quantum resources. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki. We discuss the applicability of the theoretical impossibility results from Lo, Colbeck and Buhrman et al. and formally prove that the protocol must necessarily be insecure. Moreover, to better illustrate our insecurity claim, we present an attack on Zawadzki’s protocol and show that by using a simple strategy an adversary may indeed obtain relevant information on the shared identification secret. Specifically, through the use of the principal of conclusive exclusion on quantum measurements, our attack geometrically reduces the key space resulting in the claimed logarithmic security being reduced effectively by a factor of two after only three verification attempts.
Open AccessAn Attack on Zawadzki’s Quantum Authentication Scheme
Identification schemes are interactive cryptographic protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of their identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decides whether or not it comes from the intended prover. Given the growing interest in quantum computation, it is indeed desirable to have explicit designs for achieving user identification through quantum resources. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki. We discuss the applicability of the theoretical impossibility results from Lo, Colbeck and Buhrman et al. and formally prove that the protocol must necessarily be insecure. Moreover, to better illustrate our insecurity claim, we present an attack on Zawadzki’s protocol and show that by using a simple strategy an adversary may indeed obtain relevant information on the shared identification secret. Specifically, through the use of the principal of conclusive exclusion on quantum measurements, our attack geometrically reduces the key space resulting in the claimed logarithmic security being reduced effectively by a factor of two after only three verification attempts.
- Open Access
Concerning Quantum Identification Without Entanglement
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).
Open AccessConcerning Quantum Identification Without Entanglement
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).