Ángel Luis Pérez del Pozo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ángel Luis Pérez del Pozo has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- María Isabel González Vasco
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
11 shared publications - Carlos E. González-Guillén
Departamento de Matemática Aplicada a la Ingeniería Industrial Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Industriales Universidad Politécnica de Madrid Calle de José Gutiérrez Abascal 28006 Madrid Spain
2 shared publications - Floyd Johnson
Florida Atlantic University
2 shared publications - José Ignacio Escribano Pablos
MACIMTE, U. Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
2 shared publications - José Ignacio Escribano Pablos
Guardedbox
2 shared publications - Misael Enrique Marriaga
Departamento de Matemática Aplicada, Ciencia e Ingeniería de Materiales y Tecnología Electrónica, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 516-546
Anonymous Authenticated Key Exchange
Authenticated Key Exchange ( $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ ) can be used in client-server applications for mutual authentication and key establishment. In scenarios where client authentication is neither feasible nor desirable, One-Sided AKE ( $${\textsf {OS-AKE}}$$ ) allows both parties to establish a key while only the server authenticates to the client. Thus, $${\textsf {OS-AKE}}$$ provides client anonymity with respect to the server, but does not allow the server to enforce any form of access control—that is, the server simply establishes a key with any client. In this paper, we introduce Anonymous AKE ( $${\textsf {A-AKE}}$$ ) to strike a balance between classical client authentication of $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ and client anonymity of $${\textsf {OS-AKE}}$$ . In a nutshell $${\textsf {A-AKE}}$$ is an $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ protocol where (i) the server authenticates to the client, (ii) the server can enforce access control by deciding which clients are authorized to run the key-establishment protocol, (iii) a key is established between the server and the client only if the latter is one of the authorized clients as defined by the server, and (iv) the authorized client remains anonymous (within the set of all authorized clients) with respect to the server. We introduce a security model for $${\textsf {A-AKE}}$$ that extends popular $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ models and design a general framework for instantiating $${\textsf {A-AKE}}$$ protocols based on well-established cryptographic primitives. Finally, we instantiate several $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ protocols aiming at strong security guarantees in the classical and post-quantum settings. We implement a prototype of each instantiation and provide an experimental comparison of their performance.- 22 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 516-546
Open AccessAnonymous Authenticated Key Exchange
Authenticated Key Exchange ( $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ ) can be used in client-server applications for mutual authentication and key establishment. In scenarios where client authentication is neither feasible nor desirable, One-Sided AKE ( $${\textsf {OS-AKE}}$$ ) allows both parties to establish a key while only the server authenticates to the client. Thus, $${\textsf {OS-AKE}}$$ provides client anonymity with respect to the server, but does not allow the server to enforce any form of access control—that is, the server simply establishes a key with any client. In this paper, we introduce Anonymous AKE ( $${\textsf {A-AKE}}$$ ) to strike a balance between classical client authentication of $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ and client anonymity of $${\textsf {OS-AKE}}$$ . In a nutshell $${\textsf {A-AKE}}$$ is an $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ protocol where (i) the server authenticates to the client, (ii) the server can enforce access control by deciding which clients are authorized to run the key-establishment protocol, (iii) a key is established between the server and the client only if the latter is one of the authorized clients as defined by the server, and (iv) the authorized client remains anonymous (within the set of all authorized clients) with respect to the server. We introduce a security model for $${\textsf {A-AKE}}$$ that extends popular $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ models and design a general framework for instantiating $${\textsf {A-AKE}}$$ protocols based on well-established cryptographic primitives. Finally, we instantiate several $${\textsf {AKE}}$$ protocols aiming at strong security guarantees in the classical and post-quantum settings. We implement a prototype of each instantiation and provide an experimental comparison of their performance. - 19 February 2024
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 106-116
Group Key Exchange: Living on the Edge with a Quantum Adversary
- 19 February 2024
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 106-116
Group Key Exchange: Living on the Edge with a Quantum Adversary
- Open Access
- 14 November 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 10, 120951-120983
Design and Implementation of a Post-Quantum Group Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol With the LibOQS Library: A Comparative Performance Analysis From Classic McEliece, Kyber, NTRU, and Saber
Group authenticated key exchange protocols (GAKE) are cryptographic tools enabling a group of several users communicating through an insecure channel to securely establish a common shared high-entropy key. In the last years, the need to design cryptographic tools which provide security in the presence of attackers with access to quantum resources has become unquestionable; the field dealing with these types of protocols is usually referred to as Post-Quantum Cryptography . The U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) launched in 2017 an open call to find suitable post-quantum public-key algorithms for standardization. In this work, we design a GAKE that can be instantiated with any key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that satisfies the strong security notion IND-CCA, matching NIST’s requirements for this primitive. We have implemented our GAKE with the four finalist KEMs from the NIST process: Classic McEliece, Kyber, NTRU, and Saber, making use of the open-source library LibOQS where these algorithms are provided. We have conducted a detailed comparative performance analysis of the resulting GAKE protocols, taking into account all the parameter sets proposed in the submissions. We have also made a performance analysis of all the involved building pieces, including the four finalist KEMs. Finally, we also compare our GAKE with a previous proposal implemented with Kyber.
- 14 November 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 10, 120951-120983
Open AccessDesign and Implementation of a Post-Quantum Group Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol With the LibOQS Library: A Comparative Performance Analysis From Classic McEliece, Kyber, NTRU, and Saber
Group authenticated key exchange protocols (GAKE) are cryptographic tools enabling a group of several users communicating through an insecure channel to securely establish a common shared high-entropy key. In the last years, the need to design cryptographic tools which provide security in the presence of attackers with access to quantum resources has become unquestionable; the field dealing with these types of protocols is usually referred to as Post-Quantum Cryptography . The U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) launched in 2017 an open call to find suitable post-quantum public-key algorithms for standardization. In this work, we design a GAKE that can be instantiated with any key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that satisfies the strong security notion IND-CCA, matching NIST’s requirements for this primitive. We have implemented our GAKE with the four finalist KEMs from the NIST process: Classic McEliece, Kyber, NTRU, and Saber, making use of the open-source library LibOQS where these algorithms are provided. We have conducted a detailed comparative performance analysis of the resulting GAKE protocols, taking into account all the parameter sets proposed in the submissions. We have also made a performance analysis of all the involved building pieces, including the four finalist KEMs. Finally, we also compare our GAKE with a previous proposal implemented with Kyber.
- Open Access
An Attack on Zawadzki’s Quantum Authentication Scheme
Identification schemes are interactive cryptographic protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of their identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decides whether or not it comes from the intended prover. Given the growing interest in quantum computation, it is indeed desirable to have explicit designs for achieving user identification through quantum resources. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki. We discuss the applicability of the theoretical impossibility results from Lo, Colbeck and Buhrman et al. and formally prove that the protocol must necessarily be insecure. Moreover, to better illustrate our insecurity claim, we present an attack on Zawadzki’s protocol and show that by using a simple strategy an adversary may indeed obtain relevant information on the shared identification secret. Specifically, through the use of the principal of conclusive exclusion on quantum measurements, our attack geometrically reduces the key space resulting in the claimed logarithmic security being reduced effectively by a factor of two after only three verification attempts.
Open AccessAn Attack on Zawadzki’s Quantum Authentication Scheme
Identification schemes are interactive cryptographic protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of their identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decides whether or not it comes from the intended prover. Given the growing interest in quantum computation, it is indeed desirable to have explicit designs for achieving user identification through quantum resources. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki. We discuss the applicability of the theoretical impossibility results from Lo, Colbeck and Buhrman et al. and formally prove that the protocol must necessarily be insecure. Moreover, to better illustrate our insecurity claim, we present an attack on Zawadzki’s protocol and show that by using a simple strategy an adversary may indeed obtain relevant information on the shared identification secret. Specifically, through the use of the principal of conclusive exclusion on quantum measurements, our attack geometrically reduces the key space resulting in the claimed logarithmic security being reduced effectively by a factor of two after only three verification attempts.
- Open Access
- 21 October 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 8 (10) , 1853
Compiled Constructions towards Post-Quantum Group Key Exchange: A Design from Kyber
A group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocol allows a set of parties belonging to a certain designated group to agree upon a common secret key through an insecure communication network. In the last few years, many new cryptographic tools have been specifically designed to thwart attacks from adversaries which may have access to (different kinds of) quantum computation resources. However, few constructions for group key exchange have been put forward. Here, we propose a four-round GAKE which can be proven secure under widely accepted assumptions in the Quantum Random Oracle Model. Specifically, we integrate several primitives from the so-called Kyber suite of post-quantum tools in a (slightly modified) compiler from Abdalla et al. (TCC 2007). More precisely, taking as a starting point an IND-CPA encryption scheme from the Kyber portfolio, we derive, using results from Hövelmanns et al. (PKC 2020), a two-party key exchange protocol and an IND-CCA encryption scheme and prove them fit as building blocks for our compiled construction. The resulting GAKE protocol is secure under the Module-LWE assumption, and furthermore achieves authentication without the use of (expensive) post-quantum signatures.
- 21 October 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 8 (10) , 1853
Open AccessCompiled Constructions towards Post-Quantum Group Key Exchange: A Design from Kyber
A group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocol allows a set of parties belonging to a certain designated group to agree upon a common secret key through an insecure communication network. In the last few years, many new cryptographic tools have been specifically designed to thwart attacks from adversaries which may have access to (different kinds of) quantum computation resources. However, few constructions for group key exchange have been put forward. Here, we propose a four-round GAKE which can be proven secure under widely accepted assumptions in the Quantum Random Oracle Model. Specifically, we integrate several primitives from the so-called Kyber suite of post-quantum tools in a (slightly modified) compiler from Abdalla et al. (TCC 2007). More precisely, taking as a starting point an IND-CPA encryption scheme from the Kyber portfolio, we derive, using results from Hövelmanns et al. (PKC 2020), a two-party key exchange protocol and an IND-CCA encryption scheme and prove them fit as building blocks for our compiled construction. The resulting GAKE protocol is secure under the Module-LWE assumption, and furthermore achieves authentication without the use of (expensive) post-quantum signatures.
- Open Access
Concerning Quantum Identification Without Entanglement
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).
Open AccessConcerning Quantum Identification Without Entanglement
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Vilnius University Press in Informatica
- Vol. 31 (4) , 751-768
Group Key Establishment in a Quantum-Future Scenario
In cryptography, key establishment protocols are often the starting point paving the way towards secure execution of different tasks. Namely, the parties seeking to achieve some cryptographic task, often start by establishing a common high-entropy secret that will eventually be used to secure their communication. In this paper, we put forward a security model for group key establishment (GAKE) with an adversary that may execute efficient quantum algorithms, yet only once the execution of the protocol has concluded. This captures a situation in which keys are to be established in the present, while security guarantees must still be provided in the future when quantum resources may be accessible to a potential adversary. Further, we propose a protocol design that can be proven secure in this model. Our proposal uses password authentication and builds upon efficient and reasonably well understood primitives: a message authentication code and a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism. The hybrid structure dodges potential efficiency downsides, like large signatures, of some "true" post-quantum authentication techniques, making our protocol a potentially interesting fit for current applications with long-term security needs.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Vilnius University Press in Informatica
- Vol. 31 (4) , 751-768
Open AccessGroup Key Establishment in a Quantum-Future Scenario
In cryptography, key establishment protocols are often the starting point paving the way towards secure execution of different tasks. Namely, the parties seeking to achieve some cryptographic task, often start by establishing a common high-entropy secret that will eventually be used to secure their communication. In this paper, we put forward a security model for group key establishment (GAKE) with an adversary that may execute efficient quantum algorithms, yet only once the execution of the protocol has concluded. This captures a situation in which keys are to be established in the present, while security guarantees must still be provided in the future when quantum resources may be accessible to a potential adversary. Further, we propose a protocol design that can be proven secure in this model. Our proposal uses password authentication and builds upon efficient and reasonably well understood primitives: a message authentication code and a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism. The hybrid structure dodges potential efficiency downsides, like large signatures, of some "true" post-quantum authentication techniques, making our protocol a potentially interesting fit for current applications with long-term security needs.
- Open Access
The Cracking of WalnutDSA: A Survey
This paper reports on the Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm (WalnutDSA), which is an asymmetric signature scheme recently presented for standardization at the NIST call for post-quantum cryptographic constructions. WalnutDSA is a group theoretical construction, the security of which relies on the hardness of certain problems related to an action of a braid group on a finite set. In spite of originally resisting the typical attacks succeeding against this kind of construction, soon different loopholes were identified rendering the proposal insecure (and finally, resulting in it being excluded from Round 2 of the NIST competition). Some of these attacks are related to the well-structured and symmetric masking of certain secret elements during the signing process. We explain the design principles behind this proposal and survey the main attack strategies that have succeeded, contradicting its claimed security properties, as well as the recently-proposed ideas aimed at overcoming these issues.
Open AccessThe Cracking of WalnutDSA: A Survey
This paper reports on the Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm (WalnutDSA), which is an asymmetric signature scheme recently presented for standardization at the NIST call for post-quantum cryptographic constructions. WalnutDSA is a group theoretical construction, the security of which relies on the hardness of certain problems related to an action of a braid group on a finite set. In spite of originally resisting the typical attacks succeeding against this kind of construction, soon different loopholes were identified rendering the proposal insecure (and finally, resulting in it being excluded from Round 2 of the NIST competition). Some of these attacks are related to the well-structured and symmetric masking of certain secret elements during the signing process. We explain the design principles behind this proposal and survey the main attack strategies that have succeeded, contradicting its claimed security properties, as well as the recently-proposed ideas aimed at overcoming these issues.
- 27 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. PP (15455971) , 1
A key for John Doe: modeling and designing Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange protocols
Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (APAKE) can be seen as the hybrid offspring of standard key-exchange and anonymous password-authentication protocols. APAKE allows a client holding a low-entropy password to establish a session key with a server, provided that the client's password is in the server's set. Moreover, no information about the password input by the client or the set of valid passwords held by the server should leak to the other party -- beyond whether the client's password lies or not in the server's password database. To the best of our knowledge, all \APAKE{} proposals to date either assume client storage or force the client to remember the index assigned to its password in the server's database. Furthermore, earlier works either provide only informal definitions or fail in some sense to properly model the primitive. In this paper, we provide a formal security model for APAKE, capturing security and anonymity provisions for both clients and servers. In addition, we present two APAKE protocols that only require clients to remember a password and that attain our sought key secrecy and anonymity guarantees. Our first protocol leverages oblivious pseudo-random functions, while the second one builds upon a special type of identity-based encryption scheme.
- 27 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. PP (15455971) , 1
A key for John Doe: modeling and designing Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange protocols
Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (APAKE) can be seen as the hybrid offspring of standard key-exchange and anonymous password-authentication protocols. APAKE allows a client holding a low-entropy password to establish a session key with a server, provided that the client's password is in the server's set. Moreover, no information about the password input by the client or the set of valid passwords held by the server should leak to the other party -- beyond whether the client's password lies or not in the server's password database. To the best of our knowledge, all \APAKE{} proposals to date either assume client storage or force the client to remember the index assigned to its password in the server's database. Furthermore, earlier works either provide only informal definitions or fail in some sense to properly model the primitive. In this paper, we provide a formal security model for APAKE, capturing security and anonymity provisions for both clients and servers. In addition, we present two APAKE protocols that only require clients to remember a password and that attain our sought key secrecy and anonymity guarantees. Our first protocol leverages oblivious pseudo-random functions, while the second one builds upon a special type of identity-based encryption scheme.
- 23 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 168-180
An Efficient and Reliable Two-Level Lightweight Authentication Protocol
- 23 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 168-180
An Efficient and Reliable Two-Level Lightweight Authentication Protocol