Rongjian Xie
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Rongjian Xie has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dongju Liu
School of Economics and Management, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu, Anhui 241000, China
1 shared publication - Fenglian Wang
School of Management Engineering, Anhui polytechnic university, Wuhu, China
1 shared publication - Peiyun Zhang
Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology
1 shared publication Wengting Hu
School of Economics and Management, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, China
1 shared publication- Yucai Jia
School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2021, 1-14
Influence of We Media Information Dissemination on Public Emotional Cognition and Behavior under Government Responsibility Constraint
In recent years, We Media’s chaotic behavior has emerged one after another. How to properly supervise We Media and effectively manage its violations has become an urgent problem in the process of national governance system and governance capacity building. From the three aspects of opportunity, motivation, and control methods, this paper analyzes the relevant stakeholders and their relationships in the process of We Media information dissemination. It constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, We Media, and public participation, which focuses on the analysis of the equilibrium point of the game model and carries out simulation experiments to explore the influence of government responsibility constraints on the evolution results. The research results show that government regulation plays an important role in restricting We Media’s information release. When the government's willingness to regulate increases, We Media will be punished more if it violates rules. In order to reduce the cost of punishment and other factors, We Media will reduce the willingness to violate the rules. After the occurrence of social hot events, the public is more willing to be guided by positive information from We Media, prompting the government to choose strict supervision strategies, effectively reducing the violations of We Media and achieving the Pareto optimum. According to the research results, this paper puts forward reasonable countermeasures to realize the comprehensive governance pattern of noncompliance of We Media and correct guidance of public emotional cognitive behavior under responsibility constraints. The research results provide theoretical support and decision-making basis for We Media information management and control.
- 30 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2021, 1-14
Open AccessInfluence of We Media Information Dissemination on Public Emotional Cognition and Behavior under Government Responsibility Constraint
In recent years, We Media’s chaotic behavior has emerged one after another. How to properly supervise We Media and effectively manage its violations has become an urgent problem in the process of national governance system and governance capacity building. From the three aspects of opportunity, motivation, and control methods, this paper analyzes the relevant stakeholders and their relationships in the process of We Media information dissemination. It constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, We Media, and public participation, which focuses on the analysis of the equilibrium point of the game model and carries out simulation experiments to explore the influence of government responsibility constraints on the evolution results. The research results show that government regulation plays an important role in restricting We Media’s information release. When the government's willingness to regulate increases, We Media will be punished more if it violates rules. In order to reduce the cost of punishment and other factors, We Media will reduce the willingness to violate the rules. After the occurrence of social hot events, the public is more willing to be guided by positive information from We Media, prompting the government to choose strict supervision strategies, effectively reducing the violations of We Media and achieving the Pareto optimum. According to the research results, this paper puts forward reasonable countermeasures to realize the comprehensive governance pattern of noncompliance of We Media and correct guidance of public emotional cognitive behavior under responsibility constraints. The research results provide theoretical support and decision-making basis for We Media information management and control.
- Open Access
- 31 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2021, 1-12
The Influencing Factors and Promotion Countermeasures of Industrial Generic Technology Diffusion Based on Differential Game
Many factors affect the diffusion of generic technology due to the variety of generic technology and the multiplicity of diffusion carriers. Therefore, it is very urgent to determine the main factors that influence generic technology diffusion. Based on theories of industrial generic technology diffusion, this paper constructs a differential game-based model between government and enterprises. Then, this study explores the key factors that affect the diffusion strategy of industrial generic technology innovation and analyzes the possible method for improving industrial generic technology innovation diffusion. The following conclusions are obtained. Incentive measures, rewards, and penalties play a key role in the diffusion of generic technology, and the costs and benefits incurred by the diffusion are critical to the diffusion of generic technology. Also, the net income of enterprises has a positive impact on the adoption of generic technology diffusion. After that, this paper carries out data simulation for result verification and provides some policy implications.
- 31 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2021, 1-12
Open AccessThe Influencing Factors and Promotion Countermeasures of Industrial Generic Technology Diffusion Based on Differential Game
Many factors affect the diffusion of generic technology due to the variety of generic technology and the multiplicity of diffusion carriers. Therefore, it is very urgent to determine the main factors that influence generic technology diffusion. Based on theories of industrial generic technology diffusion, this paper constructs a differential game-based model between government and enterprises. Then, this study explores the key factors that affect the diffusion strategy of industrial generic technology innovation and analyzes the possible method for improving industrial generic technology innovation diffusion. The following conclusions are obtained. Incentive measures, rewards, and penalties play a key role in the diffusion of generic technology, and the costs and benefits incurred by the diffusion are critical to the diffusion of generic technology. Also, the net income of enterprises has a positive impact on the adoption of generic technology diffusion. After that, this paper carries out data simulation for result verification and provides some policy implications.