Yucai Jia
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Yucai Jia has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dongju Liu
School of Economics and Management, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu, Anhui 241000, China
1 shared publication - Liang Yang
Business School, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing, China
1 shared publication - Peiyun Zhang
Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology
1 shared publication - Qianyao Yang
Business School, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing, China
1 shared publication - Rongjian Xie
Business School, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing 210044, China
1 shared publication - Rongjian Xie
Business School, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Economics
- p. 1-44
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Value Co-Creation in Green Innovation Chains Under Revenue-Sharing Contracts
- 24 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Economics
- p. 1-44
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Value Co-Creation in Green Innovation Chains Under Revenue-Sharing Contracts
- Open Access
- 30 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2021, 1-14
Influence of We Media Information Dissemination on Public Emotional Cognition and Behavior under Government Responsibility Constraint
In recent years, We Media’s chaotic behavior has emerged one after another. How to properly supervise We Media and effectively manage its violations has become an urgent problem in the process of national governance system and governance capacity building. From the three aspects of opportunity, motivation, and control methods, this paper analyzes the relevant stakeholders and their relationships in the process of We Media information dissemination. It constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, We Media, and public participation, which focuses on the analysis of the equilibrium point of the game model and carries out simulation experiments to explore the influence of government responsibility constraints on the evolution results. The research results show that government regulation plays an important role in restricting We Media’s information release. When the government's willingness to regulate increases, We Media will be punished more if it violates rules. In order to reduce the cost of punishment and other factors, We Media will reduce the willingness to violate the rules. After the occurrence of social hot events, the public is more willing to be guided by positive information from We Media, prompting the government to choose strict supervision strategies, effectively reducing the violations of We Media and achieving the Pareto optimum. According to the research results, this paper puts forward reasonable countermeasures to realize the comprehensive governance pattern of noncompliance of We Media and correct guidance of public emotional cognitive behavior under responsibility constraints. The research results provide theoretical support and decision-making basis for We Media information management and control.
- 30 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2021, 1-14
Open AccessInfluence of We Media Information Dissemination on Public Emotional Cognition and Behavior under Government Responsibility Constraint
In recent years, We Media’s chaotic behavior has emerged one after another. How to properly supervise We Media and effectively manage its violations has become an urgent problem in the process of national governance system and governance capacity building. From the three aspects of opportunity, motivation, and control methods, this paper analyzes the relevant stakeholders and their relationships in the process of We Media information dissemination. It constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, We Media, and public participation, which focuses on the analysis of the equilibrium point of the game model and carries out simulation experiments to explore the influence of government responsibility constraints on the evolution results. The research results show that government regulation plays an important role in restricting We Media’s information release. When the government's willingness to regulate increases, We Media will be punished more if it violates rules. In order to reduce the cost of punishment and other factors, We Media will reduce the willingness to violate the rules. After the occurrence of social hot events, the public is more willing to be guided by positive information from We Media, prompting the government to choose strict supervision strategies, effectively reducing the violations of We Media and achieving the Pareto optimum. According to the research results, this paper puts forward reasonable countermeasures to realize the comprehensive governance pattern of noncompliance of We Media and correct guidance of public emotional cognitive behavior under responsibility constraints. The research results provide theoretical support and decision-making basis for We Media information management and control.