IPIñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra

Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Knowledge, Competence, and the Establishment of Warrant

    by Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra

    Ernest Sosa sees the establishment of warrant for our knowledge in part as an a priori mode of establishing externalist warrant for our beliefs and their underlying competences. I clarify the place of this a priori warrant in Sosa’s understanding of the aptness hierarchy — i.e., how knowledge progresses to better knowledge — by showing that it makes sense of the attainment of better knowledge through a tight connection between the a priori mode of warrant establishment and another mode, called the dispositional , representing the brute reliability of our disposition to take our apt first-order beliefs at face value.

  • Open Access

    Justification, Excuse, and Dispositions to Follow Norms

    by Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra

    Out of all the candidates for a norm of justified belief, knowledge is not commonly viewed as favorably as others. Recently, however, those sympathetic to the knowledge norm have lodged various indirect defenses thereof by appropriating the concept of excuse, as part of a broader account of justification, to explain away intuitions that beliefs falling short of knowledge can be justified. I analyze how Williamson's externalist Derivative Norms Framework (DNF) can be modified to resist a common criticism often lodged at this way of viewing the normative significance of excuse, that excuse, once viewed through a DNF‐friendly lens, is too coarse a category to employ to properly discriminate between different normative dimensions of belief. A significant benefit of my analysis is that it can also avoid the worry that, in aiming to remove the charge of normative indiscrimination, the DNF defender inadvertently undermines their very capacity to employ the category of excuse in explaining away intuitions anathema to the knowledge norm. I show how the DNF defender can avoid this by preventing falsification of a principle that ought to be part of their account of excuse if it is to do the explanatory work they desire for it to do.

  • Open Access

    Fallibility and Infallibility in Heidegger's and Aristotle's Conception of Phronesis

    by Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra

    In a recent paper, Dimitris Vardoulakis (2022b) criticises Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotelian phronesis by explaining how it conflates several important distinctions Aristotle makes concerning phronesis and techne and thus how it glosses over phronesis' intrinsic fallibility. My main contention with Vardoulakis' critique is that it is not entirely sensitive to Heidegger's own epistemological leanings that may be informing said interpretation, and to how they are not necessarily anathema to a differently construed kind of phronetic fallibility, one based not on a fallible calculability of final ends by instrumental ones but on a categorical distinction between different kinds of disclosures. So even if Vardoulakis is accurate in assessing that Heideggerian phronesis requires the calculability of ends to be the sole jurisdiction of techne, this fails to show that phronetic fallibility itself requires a calculability of its own ends.

  • Open Access

    Gadamer's Historically Effected and Effective Consciousness

    by Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra

    Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that consciousness not only historically constrains experience but also allows strangeness to intelligibly speak to it. This historically effected and effective consciousness features in Gadamer's idea that a common language is unearthed for the interpretive horizons of those involved in dialogue with each other through a logic of question and answer. I argue, however, that this reveals a conceptual uncertainty about evaluating progress in interpretive understanding. Gadamer's failure to escape from this uncertainty risks the possibility of a problematic relativism. Effectively, even if sufficient interpretation occurs when horizons are infinitely structured, this does not preclude incoherence between a horizon's elements. RésuméHans-Georg Gadamer soutient que la conscience non seulement contraint historiquement l'expérience, mais permet également à ce qui est étranger de lui parler intelligiblement. Cette conscience historiquement effectuée et effective figure dans l'idée de Gadamer selon laquelle un langage commun se dégage, par une logique de question et de réponse, pour les horizons interprétatifs de ceux qui dialoguent entre eux. Je soutiens, cependant, que cela révèle une incertitude conceptuelle quant à l’évaluation des progrès dans la compréhension interprétative. L'incapacité de Gadamer à sortir de cette incertitude risque d'engendrer un relativisme problématique. En effet, même si une interprétation suffisante se produit lorsque les horizons sont infiniment structurés, cela n'exclut pas l'incohérence entre les éléments d'un horizon.