Maria Papageorgiou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Interests
Maria Papageorgiou has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira
University of Minho
4 shared publications - Mohammad Eslami
European University Institute
4 shared publications - Daniella da Silva Nogueira de Melo
University of Minho
3 shared publications - Ahmed Bux Jamali
Postdoctoral researcher, Institute of International and Regional Studies, Sun Yat‐sen University, Zhuhai campus, China
1 shared publication Alena Vieira
Department of Political Science, School of Economics and Management, University of Minho, Braga, Portugal
1 shared publication- Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
SOAS University of London
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary China
- p. 1-24
Quantifying Maritime Power: A Systematic Index of China’s Maritime Projection in Six Strategic Regions
For centuries, maritime power has remained a critical component of a state’s ability to project power, control sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and facilitate the deployment of military force bey...
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary China
- p. 1-24
Open AccessQuantifying Maritime Power: A Systematic Index of China’s Maritime Projection in Six Strategic Regions
For centuries, maritime power has remained a critical component of a state’s ability to project power, control sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and facilitate the deployment of military force bey...
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Law & Geoeconomics
- Vol. 2 (1) , 50-82
The Role of Private Companies in Great Powers’ Geoeconomic Competition: the Cases of TSMC and Samsung
This study examines how technology firms navigate geopolitical tensions and geoeconomic policies amid rising competition and state intervention. It assesses whether they exhibit strategic behaviours akin to state actors, such as balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. A new theoretical model and typology are introduced, linking firm behaviour to economic and structural factors within the context of great power competition. To test the theory, an index is developed to provide observable and quantifiable indicators. Data from multiple sources were used, including existing indices and the annual reports of two major semiconductor firms, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company ( TSMC ) and Samsung. The period under analysis covers the entirety of 2023, selected to capture the effects of the US CHIPS Act. The results indicate similar strategies of different intensities: TSMC demonstrates bandwagoning by aligning with the US, while Samsung exhibits soft bandwagoning with the US, with both nonetheless siding with the dominant power.
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Law & Geoeconomics
- Vol. 2 (1) , 50-82
The Role of Private Companies in Great Powers’ Geoeconomic Competition: the Cases of TSMC and Samsung
This study examines how technology firms navigate geopolitical tensions and geoeconomic policies amid rising competition and state intervention. It assesses whether they exhibit strategic behaviours akin to state actors, such as balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. A new theoretical model and typology are introduced, linking firm behaviour to economic and structural factors within the context of great power competition. To test the theory, an index is developed to provide observable and quantifiable indicators. Data from multiple sources were used, including existing indices and the annual reports of two major semiconductor firms, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company ( TSMC ) and Samsung. The period under analysis covers the entirety of 2023, selected to capture the effects of the US CHIPS Act. The results indicate similar strategies of different intensities: TSMC demonstrates bandwagoning by aligning with the US, while Samsung exhibits soft bandwagoning with the US, with both nonetheless siding with the dominant power.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Geoeconomics Press in Journal of Geoeconomics
- Vol. 1, e2673926
Economic Coercion as Foreign Policy Signalling: China’s Punitive Measures Against France, 2008–2009
This case study examines China’s use of informal economic coercion against France during the 2008 Tibet crisis. Drawing on official Chinese statements, trade data, and bilateral agreements, the case study traces events from March 2008 to late 2009 and highlights Beijing’s efforts to enforce political red lines while presenting its actions as a defensive response. Measures included suspending diplomatic engagements, consumer boycotts targeting French companies, and stalled commercial deals. Framed in terms of national sovereignty, these measures illustrate how China leverages trade, market access, and nationalist sentiment to punish target states and deter similar actions by others.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Geoeconomics Press in Journal of Geoeconomics
- Vol. 1, e2673926
Open AccessEconomic Coercion as Foreign Policy Signalling: China’s Punitive Measures Against France, 2008–2009
This case study examines China’s use of informal economic coercion against France during the 2008 Tibet crisis. Drawing on official Chinese statements, trade data, and bilateral agreements, the case study traces events from March 2008 to late 2009 and highlights Beijing’s efforts to enforce political red lines while presenting its actions as a defensive response. Measures included suspending diplomatic engagements, consumer boycotts targeting French companies, and stalled commercial deals. Framed in terms of national sovereignty, these measures illustrate how China leverages trade, market access, and nationalist sentiment to punish target states and deter similar actions by others.
- 25 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1391-1416
Geopolitical Dynamics in the South Atlantic: The Maritime Strategies of Brazil, China, and the European Union
- 25 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1391-1416
Geopolitical Dynamics in the South Atlantic: The Maritime Strategies of Brazil, China, and the European Union
- Open Access
- 25 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- p. 1-21
Alignment as a process: Explaining the trajectory of the Sino–Russian relationship
What factors make aligned relationships possible, and how can we account for transformation of alignments? Alignment patterns and the durability of some aligned relationships above others have often raised questions about factors that influence cooperative arrangements. This article makes a twofold contribution by proposing a tentative process-centred alignment typology as an analytical tool and by empirically applying this tool to examine Sino–Russian alignment (1991–2024). Our conceptual typology differentiates among six primary alignment types: thin strategic partnerships, coalitions, thick strategic partnerships, alliances, non-allied security communities, and allied security communities. We propose that these types become possible due to varying compatibility between prospective or existing alignment partners in their assessment of threats, interpretations of identities, and status expectations. Our empirical analysis focuses on specific upgrades in the Sino–Russian relationship as presented by both states in 1996, 2001, 2011, and 2021 while also discussing more recent developments after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
- 25 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- p. 1-21
Open AccessAlignment as a process: Explaining the trajectory of the Sino–Russian relationship
What factors make aligned relationships possible, and how can we account for transformation of alignments? Alignment patterns and the durability of some aligned relationships above others have often raised questions about factors that influence cooperative arrangements. This article makes a twofold contribution by proposing a tentative process-centred alignment typology as an analytical tool and by empirically applying this tool to examine Sino–Russian alignment (1991–2024). Our conceptual typology differentiates among six primary alignment types: thin strategic partnerships, coalitions, thick strategic partnerships, alliances, non-allied security communities, and allied security communities. We propose that these types become possible due to varying compatibility between prospective or existing alignment partners in their assessment of threats, interpretations of identities, and status expectations. Our empirical analysis focuses on specific upgrades in the Sino–Russian relationship as presented by both states in 1996, 2001, 2011, and 2021 while also discussing more recent developments after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Geopolitics
- Vol. 31 (3) , 1178-1220
The Geopolitics of AI-Driven Arms Races
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Geopolitics
- Vol. 31 (3) , 1178-1220
The Geopolitics of AI-Driven Arms Races
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 14 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 30 (4) , 647-677
The Five Eyes Allies and China: Assessing Threat Perceptions and Power Dynamics
China's expanding role in global affairs, along with its economic, military, and technological capabilities, have increased concerns about it being a potential threat to U.S. hegemony. Consequently, since 2017, threat perceptions have heightened, with China increasingly viewed as a strategic competitor and rival. While the"China threat theory"is widely analyzed, it is often approached from a U.S.-centric perspective, neglecting the viewpoints of other key actors. This study aims to address that gap by examining also the threat perceptions of four US allies—New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom—under the Five Eyes intelligence partnership. By analyzing their national security documents from 2008 to 2024, the study seeks to identify the presence, frequency, and sources of perceived threats. The findings indicate that although China as a threat is a multifaceted concern in issues such as identity, intentions, and geography, these countries primarily perceive China’s capabilities as the main source of threat. Finally, all states have elevated their threat perceptions of China, justifying decisions to counter its power in the Indo-Pacific as the main theatre of competition and to reinforce multilateral and bilateral alliances against Beijing.
- 14 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 30 (4) , 647-677
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe Five Eyes Allies and China: Assessing Threat Perceptions and Power Dynamics
China's expanding role in global affairs, along with its economic, military, and technological capabilities, have increased concerns about it being a potential threat to U.S. hegemony. Consequently, since 2017, threat perceptions have heightened, with China increasingly viewed as a strategic competitor and rival. While the"China threat theory"is widely analyzed, it is often approached from a U.S.-centric perspective, neglecting the viewpoints of other key actors. This study aims to address that gap by examining also the threat perceptions of four US allies—New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom—under the Five Eyes intelligence partnership. By analyzing their national security documents from 2008 to 2024, the study seeks to identify the presence, frequency, and sources of perceived threats. The findings indicate that although China as a threat is a multifaceted concern in issues such as identity, intentions, and geography, these countries primarily perceive China’s capabilities as the main source of threat. Finally, all states have elevated their threat perceptions of China, justifying decisions to counter its power in the Indo-Pacific as the main theatre of competition and to reinforce multilateral and bilateral alliances against Beijing.
- 17 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 133-158
Africa's Geopolitical Landscape
This chapter examines Russia and China's growing influence in Africa in the last decade, and the impact on regional attainment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Despite their enhanced bilateral relationship and shared worldviews, both countries employ distinct strategies in their regional engagement. Russia targets short-term gains through arms deals and political alliances while also using soft power tools that seek not only to have a positive image but also influence domestic politics, while China adopts a broader approach, focusing on infrastructure and economic partnerships securing its interests in the region. Both states have not refrained from collaborating with authoritarian regimes in their attempts to reduce Western influence in the African continent. While there are no extensive joint projects, their efforts to reshape Africa’s geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape hinder the SDGs’ promotion in the region, despite certain initiatives taking these goals into account.
- 17 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 133-158
Africa's Geopolitical Landscape
This chapter examines Russia and China's growing influence in Africa in the last decade, and the impact on regional attainment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Despite their enhanced bilateral relationship and shared worldviews, both countries employ distinct strategies in their regional engagement. Russia targets short-term gains through arms deals and political alliances while also using soft power tools that seek not only to have a positive image but also influence domestic politics, while China adopts a broader approach, focusing on infrastructure and economic partnerships securing its interests in the region. Both states have not refrained from collaborating with authoritarian regimes in their attempts to reduce Western influence in the African continent. While there are no extensive joint projects, their efforts to reshape Africa’s geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape hinder the SDGs’ promotion in the region, despite certain initiatives taking these goals into account.
- 16 December 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
- Vol. 12 (1) , 109-133
Standing in-between— Gulf States in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Under New Security Dynamics: The GCC, Saudi Arabia and Qatar
The addition of Gulf states to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has significantly altered regional dynamics. By examining two Gulf states’ foreign policy motivations for joining the SCO, through the lens of institutional balancing and hedging concepts, we argue that they engage in both hedging through multi-alignment to achieve national objectives and mitigate risks and institutional balancing in order to constrain China’s and Russia’s geopolitical ambitions within the organisation, check their regional rivals and at the same time exclude the United States from an emerging security architecture. Moreover, Gulf states’ priorities focus on strategic autonomy and have avoided taking clear-cut sides in the US–China competition, while not isolating Russia despite capitalising on its deteriorating position in the Middle East since the Ukraine war. Finally, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s reluctant position as a unitary actor in establishing relations with the SCO indicates its strategic neutrality and a cautious stance towards the United States as its security guarantor.
- 16 December 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
- Vol. 12 (1) , 109-133
Standing in-between— Gulf States in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Under New Security Dynamics: The GCC, Saudi Arabia and Qatar
The addition of Gulf states to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has significantly altered regional dynamics. By examining two Gulf states’ foreign policy motivations for joining the SCO, through the lens of institutional balancing and hedging concepts, we argue that they engage in both hedging through multi-alignment to achieve national objectives and mitigate risks and institutional balancing in order to constrain China’s and Russia’s geopolitical ambitions within the organisation, check their regional rivals and at the same time exclude the United States from an emerging security architecture. Moreover, Gulf states’ priorities focus on strategic autonomy and have avoided taking clear-cut sides in the US–China competition, while not isolating Russia despite capitalising on its deteriorating position in the Middle East since the Ukraine war. Finally, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s reluctant position as a unitary actor in establishing relations with the SCO indicates its strategic neutrality and a cautious stance towards the United States as its security guarantor.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Chinese Political Science Review
- Vol. 9 (4) , 441-482
China as a Threat and Balancing Behavior in the Realm of Emerging Technologies
In the last years, China and the United States of America (US) have engaged in unprecedented competition in emerging technologies (ETs), in a context of China’s growing presence and shifting position in the international system. Drawing on data between 2017 and 2023 and strategic decisions, such as bans and export controls directed at China’s companies and the changing alignment posture of Western states, we employ the Balance of Threat (BoT) theory to examine China’s changing aggregate power, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions, while also establishing the vanishing importance of the geographic dimension. We then turn to the behavior of the US and Western states by drawing on the BoT theory, which suggests balancing as a prime strategy to counter the threat and identify instances of the formation of a balancing coalition against China. We demonstrate how the notion of threat in ETs can be approached and conclude with a characterization of balancing in the domain of ETs that resonates with the notion of “gradual balancing”, in addition to outlining suggestions for future studies.
- 10 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Chinese Political Science Review
- Vol. 9 (4) , 441-482
Open AccessChina as a Threat and Balancing Behavior in the Realm of Emerging Technologies
In the last years, China and the United States of America (US) have engaged in unprecedented competition in emerging technologies (ETs), in a context of China’s growing presence and shifting position in the international system. Drawing on data between 2017 and 2023 and strategic decisions, such as bans and export controls directed at China’s companies and the changing alignment posture of Western states, we employ the Balance of Threat (BoT) theory to examine China’s changing aggregate power, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions, while also establishing the vanishing importance of the geographic dimension. We then turn to the behavior of the US and Western states by drawing on the BoT theory, which suggests balancing as a prime strategy to counter the threat and identify instances of the formation of a balancing coalition against China. We demonstrate how the notion of threat in ETs can be approached and conclude with a characterization of balancing in the domain of ETs that resonates with the notion of “gradual balancing”, in addition to outlining suggestions for future studies.