Hua Chen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Hua Chen has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jia Li
School of Business, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
1 shared publication Kevin Chung
University of Wisconsin-Madison
1 shared publication- Kevin Chung
Wisconsin School of Business, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, Wisconsin 53706
1 shared publication - Noah Lim
Wisconsin School of Business, University of Wisconsin–Madison
1 shared publication - Noah Lim
NUS Global Asia Institute, Singapore 117602, Singapore; and NUS Business School, Singapore 117602, Singapore
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 June 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
Contest design for a multi-tier organization: Leveraging informational environment to motivate downstream agents
This study examines contests within a multi-tier organization, where the owner offers a prize for subordinate branches to compete, and branch managers subsequently set rewards to motivate their agents. Our main goal is to explore how the owner can steer managerial decisions to better align with her overarching objectives—maximizing agent effort—without undermining managerial autonomy. Drawing on behavioral economics, we propose that the owner can strategically disclose contest-related information to agents to trigger their fairness concerns, prompting managers to voluntarily offer higher rewards and thereby motivating greater effort. Our experimental results largely support this behavioral prediction. Compared to the baseline where agents observe only their own reward, revealing one additional piece of contest information, opponent's reward or managers’ prize, prompts managers to offer larger rewards. However, disclosing both pieces of information does not lead to a further increase in rewards. For agents, receiving a reward higher than their opponent's boosts effort, whereas a perceived unfair reward relative to managers’ prize leads to a significant effort decline. Moreover, when agents know both the prize and the opponent's reward, the vertical fairness concern (tied to the prize) exerts a stronger influence on effort than the horizontal fair concern (based on the opponent's reward).
- 6 June 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
Contest design for a multi-tier organization: Leveraging informational environment to motivate downstream agents
This study examines contests within a multi-tier organization, where the owner offers a prize for subordinate branches to compete, and branch managers subsequently set rewards to motivate their agents. Our main goal is to explore how the owner can steer managerial decisions to better align with her overarching objectives—maximizing agent effort—without undermining managerial autonomy. Drawing on behavioral economics, we propose that the owner can strategically disclose contest-related information to agents to trigger their fairness concerns, prompting managers to voluntarily offer higher rewards and thereby motivating greater effort. Our experimental results largely support this behavioral prediction. Compared to the baseline where agents observe only their own reward, revealing one additional piece of contest information, opponent's reward or managers’ prize, prompts managers to offer larger rewards. However, disclosing both pieces of information does not lead to a further increase in rewards. For agents, receiving a reward higher than their opponent's boosts effort, whereas a perceived unfair reward relative to managers’ prize leads to a significant effort decline. Moreover, when agents know both the prize and the opponent's reward, the vertical fairness concern (tied to the prize) exerts a stronger influence on effort than the horizontal fair concern (based on the opponent's reward).
- 25 June 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing Research
- Vol. 58 (4) , 662-685
Increasing Team Performance by Sharing Success
When using group-based commission plans to motivate their sales force, should firms always compensate salespeople based on the average of team members’ sales outcomes? The theory suggests that when team members are heterogeneous in sales abilities, the proposed maximum contract (where the team output is set by the largest individual sales output) dominates the average contract (where the team output is determined by the average output of team members) in terms of overall team effort. This is because the stronger team member will exert higher effort under the maximum contract compared with the average contract, and this increase exceeds the decrease in the weaker team member’s effort. The authors validate the theoretical predictions by employing two laboratory experiments to provide a causal test of the theory and two randomized field experiments to deliver additional corroborating evidence. Overall, the experimental results are consistent and broadly confirm the theoretical predictions, pointing to the substantial gains from implementing the maximum contract when team members are heterogeneous in abilities. Interestingly, the weaker team members exert similar effort across the maximum and average contracts, although the theory predicts higher effort under the latter.
- 25 June 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing Research
- Vol. 58 (4) , 662-685
Increasing Team Performance by Sharing Success
When using group-based commission plans to motivate their sales force, should firms always compensate salespeople based on the average of team members’ sales outcomes? The theory suggests that when team members are heterogeneous in sales abilities, the proposed maximum contract (where the team output is set by the largest individual sales output) dominates the average contract (where the team output is determined by the average output of team members) in terms of overall team effort. This is because the stronger team member will exert higher effort under the maximum contract compared with the average contract, and this increase exceeds the decrease in the weaker team member’s effort. The authors validate the theoretical predictions by employing two laboratory experiments to provide a causal test of the theory and two randomized field experiments to deliver additional corroborating evidence. Overall, the experimental results are consistent and broadly confirm the theoretical predictions, pointing to the substantial gains from implementing the maximum contract when team members are heterogeneous in abilities. Interestingly, the weaker team members exert similar effort across the maximum and average contracts, although the theory predicts higher effort under the latter.
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1122-1141
Examining Salesperson Effort Allocation in Teams: A Randomized Field Experiment
Using a field experiment, this paper examines how salespeople adjust their effort when coworker's ability changes, under different compensation contracts in a retailing context.
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1122-1141
Examining Salesperson Effort Allocation in Teams: A Randomized Field Experiment
Using a field experiment, this paper examines how salespeople adjust their effort when coworker's ability changes, under different compensation contracts in a retailing context.
- 1 February 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing Research
- Vol. 54 (1) , 44-60
How Does Team Composition Affect Effort in Contests? A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
When companies organize salespeople into teams to compete with one another, how does the ability composition of team members affect effort? And how may the effect of team composition on effort depend on the type of contest the teams are competing in? Using a game-theoretic model, we derive the very sharp predictions that when winning the contest depends on the average team sales, the ability composition of a team has no effect on team effort, and the stronger and weaker members will expend identical effort levels. However, when the contest winner is determined by the minimum or maximum output contribution within the team, heterogeneity in team composition exerts a deleterious effect on team effort, with the stronger and weaker members expending unequal effort. Our model also shows that in a contest between two symmetric teams, when team members are homogeneous, all three contest metrics yield identical team effort; however, when team members are heterogeneous, the average metric elicits the highest team effort. We also discuss cases when the minimum and maximum metrics are optimal. We test the model's empirical validity using two incentive-aligned experiments in which participants make effort decisions strategically. The experimental results exhibit broad support for the theoretical predictions.
- 1 February 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing Research
- Vol. 54 (1) , 44-60
How Does Team Composition Affect Effort in Contests? A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
When companies organize salespeople into teams to compete with one another, how does the ability composition of team members affect effort? And how may the effect of team composition on effort depend on the type of contest the teams are competing in? Using a game-theoretic model, we derive the very sharp predictions that when winning the contest depends on the average team sales, the ability composition of a team has no effect on team effort, and the stronger and weaker members will expend identical effort levels. However, when the contest winner is determined by the minimum or maximum output contribution within the team, heterogeneity in team composition exerts a deleterious effect on team effort, with the stronger and weaker members expending unequal effort. Our model also shows that in a contest between two symmetric teams, when team members are homogeneous, all three contest metrics yield identical team effort; however, when team members are heterogeneous, the average metric elicits the highest team effort. We also discuss cases when the minimum and maximum metrics are optimal. We test the model's empirical validity using two incentive-aligned experiments in which participants make effort decisions strategically. The experimental results exhibit broad support for the theoretical predictions.