Hao Xue
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Hao Xue has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jonathan C. Glover
Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027
4 shared publications - Christine Cuny
Stern School of Business New York University
1 shared publication Jonathan Glover
1 shared publication- Ronghuo Zheng
The University of Texas at Austin
1 shared publication - Stephanie F. Cheng
Freeman School of Business, Tulane University, New Orleans, USA
1 shared publication Tim Baldenius
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
In-House Innovation Rivalry
This paper develops a model in which headquarters (HQ) improves an existing product while an autonomous R&D unit explores an innovative alternative with breakthrough potential through experiments. We show that the two project-development activities are strategic substitutes when it is easy to improve the existing product, and strategic complements when it is difficult. This contrast arises because the R&D unit is more tempted to stop experimentation after unfavorable versus favorable early evidence across these environments. When the existing product is hard to improve, a prisoner’s dilemma arises in which both projects are underdeveloped. One solution is for HQ to adopt a “hands-on” approach, actively monitoring and incentivizing the R&D unit to prevent premature termination of the experiment. Interestingly, a biased evaluation system that favors HQ’s status quo, albeit inducing incorrect project selection in equilibrium, can outperform the hands-on approach by exploiting strategic complementarity between the rivalry.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIn-House Innovation Rivalry
This paper develops a model in which headquarters (HQ) improves an existing product while an autonomous R&D unit explores an innovative alternative with breakthrough potential through experiments. We show that the two project-development activities are strategic substitutes when it is easy to improve the existing product, and strategic complements when it is difficult. This contrast arises because the R&D unit is more tempted to stop experimentation after unfavorable versus favorable early evidence across these environments. When the existing product is hard to improve, a prisoner’s dilemma arises in which both projects are underdeveloped. One solution is for HQ to adopt a “hands-on” approach, actively monitoring and incentivizing the R&D unit to prevent premature termination of the experiment. Interestingly, a biased evaluation system that favors HQ’s status quo, albeit inducing incorrect project selection in equilibrium, can outperform the hands-on approach by exploiting strategic complementarity between the rivalry.
- Top Cited Papers
- 29 July 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 100 (5) , 439-467
ESG Disclosure, Market Forces, and Investment Efficiency
This paper examines the impact of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure on firm investment. The analysis characterizes the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that channels investors’ tastes for ESG into firm investment. Although it is tempting to think that the optimal ESG disclosure becomes more precise when investors care more about ESG, I show this intuition is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that stronger tastes for ESG change how investors use information. Applying the analysis to a large economy, I show that mandating more precise climate disclosure than would be voluntarily provided motivates self-interested firms to act on common interests in reducing emissions. That is, a regulator can leverage market forces and a disclosure mandate to achieve a similar result as a Pigovian tax in motivating firms to internalize the externalities created by their climate-related investments. JEL Classifications: D82; G14; M41.
- 29 July 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 100 (5) , 439-467
Top Cited PapersESG Disclosure, Market Forces, and Investment Efficiency
This paper examines the impact of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure on firm investment. The analysis characterizes the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that channels investors’ tastes for ESG into firm investment. Although it is tempting to think that the optimal ESG disclosure becomes more precise when investors care more about ESG, I show this intuition is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that stronger tastes for ESG change how investors use information. Applying the analysis to a large economy, I show that mandating more precise climate disclosure than would be voluntarily provided motivates self-interested firms to act on common interests in reducing emissions. That is, a regulator can leverage market forces and a disclosure mandate to achieve a similar result as a Pigovian tax in motivating firms to internalize the externalities created by their climate-related investments. JEL Classifications: D82; G14; M41.
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 30 (1) , 776-812
Investors’ information acquisition and the manager’s value-risk tradeoff
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 30 (1) , 776-812
Investors’ information acquisition and the manager’s value-risk tradeoff
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Hold-Up, Relational Contracting, and Reporting Bias
A problem that arises in buyer-supplier relationships is that a supplier may be reluctant to undertake costly up-front innovations fearing he will be held up at the time of price negotiations with the buyer. In our model of a repeated hold-up problem, trust that emerges between the buyer and supplier leads the buyer to employ a relational contract to mitigate the hold-up problem. The optimal relational contract has the buyer rewarding the supplier both directly with discretionary payments and indirectly via information. Trust facilitates both larger discretionary rewards and the use of an information system that creates a larger information asymmetry between the buyer and the supplier in order to provide the supplier with greater information rents and, hence, greater incentives for innovation. The optimal information system is downward-biased: the supplier's profitability is sometimes under-reported but is never over-reported. While the optimal information system's informativeness is always decreasing in the discount factor (which captures the relational focus), its bias may be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the discount factor, depending on the relative efficiency of direct rewards vs. information rents in motivating innovation.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHold-Up, Relational Contracting, and Reporting Bias
A problem that arises in buyer-supplier relationships is that a supplier may be reluctant to undertake costly up-front innovations fearing he will be held up at the time of price negotiations with the buyer. In our model of a repeated hold-up problem, trust that emerges between the buyer and supplier leads the buyer to employ a relational contract to mitigate the hold-up problem. The optimal relational contract has the buyer rewarding the supplier both directly with discretionary payments and indirectly via information. Trust facilitates both larger discretionary rewards and the use of an information system that creates a larger information asymmetry between the buyer and the supplier in order to provide the supplier with greater information rents and, hence, greater incentives for innovation. The optimal information system is downward-biased: the supplier's profitability is sometimes under-reported but is never over-reported. While the optimal information system's informativeness is always decreasing in the discount factor (which captures the relational focus), its bias may be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the discount factor, depending on the relative efficiency of direct rewards vs. information rents in motivating innovation.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (7) , 4312-4330
Disclosure and Competition for Capital
Ownership segmentation in the municipal bond market gives rise to competition among local issuers for a limited supply of capital. We consider the disclosure implications of this competition for capital, using Moody’s 2010 recalibration of the municipal rating scale. The recalibration placed lowly upgraded issuers at a disadvantage relative to their highly upgraded peers within the same market segment. We develop a model in which two municipal bond issuers compete for investors’ capital by choosing bond yields. The model predicts the issuer that is disadvantaged by the recalibration is more likely to improve its disclosure to better compete with its advantaged peer if (i) the rating upgrade that its peer receives is higher and (ii) competition for capital is fiercer. Empirically, we find that the disadvantaged issuers provide more and timelier financial disclosures after the recalibration. This improvement in disclosure quality increases in the extent of the issuer’s disadvantage, arises only if we consider peers with whom the issuer directly competes for capital, and is pronounced when the local capital supply is constrained. Our analytical and empirical analyses support the idea that a competitive disadvantage in raising capital in segmented markets can motivate issuers to improve disclosure quality. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4525 .
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (7) , 4312-4330
Disclosure and Competition for Capital
Ownership segmentation in the municipal bond market gives rise to competition among local issuers for a limited supply of capital. We consider the disclosure implications of this competition for capital, using Moody’s 2010 recalibration of the municipal rating scale. The recalibration placed lowly upgraded issuers at a disadvantage relative to their highly upgraded peers within the same market segment. We develop a model in which two municipal bond issuers compete for investors’ capital by choosing bond yields. The model predicts the issuer that is disadvantaged by the recalibration is more likely to improve its disclosure to better compete with its advantaged peer if (i) the rating upgrade that its peer receives is higher and (ii) competition for capital is fiercer. Empirically, we find that the disadvantaged issuers provide more and timelier financial disclosures after the recalibration. This improvement in disclosure quality increases in the extent of the issuer’s disadvantage, arises only if we consider peers with whom the issuer directly competes for capital, and is pronounced when the local capital supply is constrained. Our analytical and empirical analyses support the idea that a competitive disadvantage in raising capital in segmented markets can motivate issuers to improve disclosure quality. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4525 .
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
ESG Disclosure, Market Forces, and Investment Efficiency
This paper examines the role of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure in changing firm investment when investors value both financial and ESG implications of the investment. We identify conditions under which ESG disclosure is needed for channeling investors' tastes for ESG into firm investment. We also characterize the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that sustains efficient investment. While it is tempting to think that more precise ESG disclosure is desirable when investors care more about ESG, we show the intuition is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that stronger tastes for ESG change how investors use information. Analyzing interactions between ESG disclosure and the price effect of tastes sheds light on the demand for and the design of ESG disclosure.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessESG Disclosure, Market Forces, and Investment Efficiency
This paper examines the role of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure in changing firm investment when investors value both financial and ESG implications of the investment. We identify conditions under which ESG disclosure is needed for channeling investors' tastes for ESG into firm investment. We also characterize the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that sustains efficient investment. While it is tempting to think that more precise ESG disclosure is desirable when investors care more about ESG, we show the intuition is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that stronger tastes for ESG change how investors use information. Analyzing interactions between ESG disclosure and the price effect of tastes sheds light on the demand for and the design of ESG disclosure.
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 76 (1)
Accounting conservatism and relational contracting
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 76 (1)
Accounting conservatism and relational contracting
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 71 (1)
Word-of-mouth communication, noise-driven volatility, and public disclosure
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 71 (1)
Word-of-mouth communication, noise-driven volatility, and public disclosure
- 28 February 2020
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 95 (6) , 181-212
Team Incentives and Bonus Floors in Relational Contracts
Teamwork and team incentives are increasingly prevalent in modern organizations. Performance measures used to evaluate individuals' contributions to teamwork are often non-verifiable. We study a principal-multi-agent model of relational (self-enforcing) contracts in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required to pay out to the agents, and gives the principal discretion to use non-verifiable performance measures to both increase the size of the pool and to allocate the pool to the agents. The joint bonus floor is useful because of its role in motivating the agents to mutually monitor each other by facilitating a strategic complementarity in their payoffs. In an extension section, we introduce a verifiable team performance measure that is a noisy version of the individual non-verifiable measures, and show that the verifiable measure is either ignored or used to create a conditional bonus floor.
- 28 February 2020
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 95 (6) , 181-212
Team Incentives and Bonus Floors in Relational Contracts
Teamwork and team incentives are increasingly prevalent in modern organizations. Performance measures used to evaluate individuals' contributions to teamwork are often non-verifiable. We study a principal-multi-agent model of relational (self-enforcing) contracts in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required to pay out to the agents, and gives the principal discretion to use non-verifiable performance measures to both increase the size of the pool and to allocate the pool to the agents. The joint bonus floor is useful because of its role in motivating the agents to mutually monitor each other by facilitating a strategic complementarity in their payoffs. In an extension section, we introduce a verifiable team performance measure that is a noisy version of the individual non-verifiable measures, and show that the verifiable measure is either ignored or used to create a conditional bonus floor.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Team Incentives and Bonus Floors in Relational Contracts
A common means of incorporating non-verifiable performance measures in compensation contracts is via bonus pools. We study a principal-multi-agent relational contracting model in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required to pay out to the agents and gives the principal discretion to use non-verifiable performance measures to both increase the size of the pool and to allocate the pool to the agents. The joint bonus floor is useful because of its role in motivating the agents to mutually monitor each other (team incentives). In an extension section, we introduce a verifiable team performance measure. The broader message that emerges is that "paying for poor performance" -- verifiable team performance and/or non-verifiable individual performance -- can be optimal in a relational (self-enforcing) contracting setting because it creates the trust needed for the principal to tailor other promised payments to motivate mutual monitoring.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTeam Incentives and Bonus Floors in Relational Contracts
A common means of incorporating non-verifiable performance measures in compensation contracts is via bonus pools. We study a principal-multi-agent relational contracting model in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required to pay out to the agents and gives the principal discretion to use non-verifiable performance measures to both increase the size of the pool and to allocate the pool to the agents. The joint bonus floor is useful because of its role in motivating the agents to mutually monitor each other (team incentives). In an extension section, we introduce a verifiable team performance measure. The broader message that emerges is that "paying for poor performance" -- verifiable team performance and/or non-verifiable individual performance -- can be optimal in a relational (self-enforcing) contracting setting because it creates the trust needed for the principal to tailor other promised payments to motivate mutual monitoring.