Victor Menaldo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Victor Menaldo has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Michael Albertus
University of Chicago - Department of Political Science
5 shared publications- Michael Albertus
University of Chicago
2 shared publications - Aseem Prakash
University of Washington
1 shared publication - Beatrice Magistro
Department of Political Science School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs Northeastern University Boston Massachusetts USA
1 shared publication Jorge Rojas-Vallejos
Universidad Andres Bello
1 shared publicationNicolas Wittstock
Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Evolutionary Economics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 553-586
How populism harms prosperity: Unified populist rule reduces investment, innovation, and productivity
- 17 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Evolutionary Economics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 553-586
How populism harms prosperity: Unified populist rule reduces investment, innovation, and productivity
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Why Elites Sometimes Undo Their Own Constitutional Privileges
Most new democracies begin operating under an authoritarian constitution from the past that favors elites connected to the previous era. While these constitutions are designed to be difficult to change, important changes nonetheless sometimes occur, occasionally at the behest of the very elites that these constitutions were meant to protect and favor. Why do elites support these changes? We develop a dynamic imperfect information bandwagoning model of reform to explain shifts in elite-biased constitutions. Unanticipated shocks can make constitutional changes overwhelmingly popular, encouraging moderate constitutional opponents and supporters to join a radical opposition in voting for reform. This encourages a president who supports the status quo to join the bandwagon by refraining from vetoing the reform, attempting to gain concessions in the meantime. We demonstrate the utility of the model in the context of reforms to the Chilean pension system in 2021.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhy Elites Sometimes Undo Their Own Constitutional Privileges
Most new democracies begin operating under an authoritarian constitution from the past that favors elites connected to the previous era. While these constitutions are designed to be difficult to change, important changes nonetheless sometimes occur, occasionally at the behest of the very elites that these constitutions were meant to protect and favor. Why do elites support these changes? We develop a dynamic imperfect information bandwagoning model of reform to explain shifts in elite-biased constitutions. Unanticipated shocks can make constitutional changes overwhelmingly popular, encouraging moderate constitutional opponents and supporters to join a radical opposition in voting for reform. This encourages a president who supports the status quo to join the bandwagon by refraining from vetoing the reform, attempting to gain concessions in the meantime. We demonstrate the utility of the model in the context of reforms to the Chilean pension system in 2021.
- 22 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Resources Policy
- Vol. 78
To rent or not to rent? Mechanics, causes and consequences of Ricardian and Quasi-rents in the oil industry
- 22 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Resources Policy
- Vol. 78
To rent or not to rent? Mechanics, causes and consequences of Ricardian and Quasi-rents in the oil industry
- 24 June 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic and Political Studies
- Vol. 9 (4) , 417-446
Does technology transfer from the US to China harm American firms, workers, and consumers? A historical and analytic investigation
Decades of spectacular economic growth have made China into an important geopolitical player. As Chinese companies improve their capabilities across several areas of advanced technology, including artificial intelligence, some US policymakers and pundits lament the country’s ‘unfair trade practices’ and serial ‘theft of American intellectual property’, particularly through so-called forced technology transfer. China hawks claim these practices hurt US companies, workers, and consumers. Do Chinese technology practices harm economic efficiency? What are their distributional consequences? To address these questions, we explore the different modalities of international technology transfer and flesh out their economic consequences. We also investigate the recent history of technology transfer, providing examples from the industrialisation experiences of European countries and the Asian Tigers. We surmise that current Chinese processes are neither novel nor alarming from the standpoint of either economic efficiency or distribution: US firms are collecting record royalty payments for their intellectual property from China and generating gangbuster profits due to their access to Chinese labour, suppliers, and the country’s growing consumer market. American consumers benefit from US-China economic interdependence and so do some workers. The consequences for the US economy as a whole are positive. While we are agnostic about whether these practices threaten America’s national security, we offer ideas for how to prevent China from acquiring its most sensitive military technology.
- 24 June 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic and Political Studies
- Vol. 9 (4) , 417-446
Does technology transfer from the US to China harm American firms, workers, and consumers? A historical and analytic investigation
Decades of spectacular economic growth have made China into an important geopolitical player. As Chinese companies improve their capabilities across several areas of advanced technology, including artificial intelligence, some US policymakers and pundits lament the country’s ‘unfair trade practices’ and serial ‘theft of American intellectual property’, particularly through so-called forced technology transfer. China hawks claim these practices hurt US companies, workers, and consumers. Do Chinese technology practices harm economic efficiency? What are their distributional consequences? To address these questions, we explore the different modalities of international technology transfer and flesh out their economic consequences. We also investigate the recent history of technology transfer, providing examples from the industrialisation experiences of European countries and the Asian Tigers. We surmise that current Chinese processes are neither novel nor alarming from the standpoint of either economic efficiency or distribution: US firms are collecting record royalty payments for their intellectual property from China and generating gangbuster profits due to their access to Chinese labour, suppliers, and the country’s growing consumer market. American consumers benefit from US-China economic interdependence and so do some workers. The consequences for the US economy as a whole are positive. While we are agnostic about whether these practices threaten America’s national security, we offer ideas for how to prevent China from acquiring its most sensitive military technology.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Business and Politics
- Vol. 18 (4) , 435-465
The fiscal roots of urban bias
Why do some countries indulge in urban bias, potentially harming economic development in the process, while others promote a vibrant agricultural sector? Two main explanations have been put forth. On the one hand, market failures, due to information asymmetries, mean that farmers who dearly require credit to succeed are shut out of lending markets, even if lenders could potentially benefit from making loans more readily available. On the other hand, political failures, due to state capture, mean that farmers will be subject to implicit taxes as a way of generating rents for politically powerful, industrial interests in the city. This paper builds on the latter view and corroborates [Bates, Robert. 1981.Markets and States in Tropical Africa.Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.] insight that the state might have its own fiscal reasons for indulging in urban bias since both infant industries in the manufacturing sector and monopsony endowing marketing boards in the agricultural sector potentially provide easy-to-collect revenues. I adduce cross-national empirical support for the fiscal roots view that is robust across measures of state capacity and instrumental variables. A case study of Mexico also provides supporting evidence.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Business and Politics
- Vol. 18 (4) , 435-465
The fiscal roots of urban bias
Why do some countries indulge in urban bias, potentially harming economic development in the process, while others promote a vibrant agricultural sector? Two main explanations have been put forth. On the one hand, market failures, due to information asymmetries, mean that farmers who dearly require credit to succeed are shut out of lending markets, even if lenders could potentially benefit from making loans more readily available. On the other hand, political failures, due to state capture, mean that farmers will be subject to implicit taxes as a way of generating rents for politically powerful, industrial interests in the city. This paper builds on the latter view and corroborates [Bates, Robert. 1981.Markets and States in Tropical Africa.Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.] insight that the state might have its own fiscal reasons for indulging in urban bias since both infant industries in the manufacturing sector and monopsony endowing marketing boards in the agricultural sector potentially provide easy-to-collect revenues. I adduce cross-national empirical support for the fiscal roots view that is robust across measures of state capacity and instrumental variables. A case study of Mexico also provides supporting evidence.
- 25 July 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Trade Journal
- Vol. 30 (5) , 366-377
(Ignoring) the Prosperity Playbook
Why are some countries poor? It comes down to good governance: secure property rights and policies that reduce transaction costs. In turn, this means the rule of law: limits on executive authority and a government that impartially enforces contracts, and thus abstains from picking winners. It also means a government that solves market failures. Yet the governments of developing countries often do the opposite. The proximate reasons are the endurance of state monopolies, policies that cripple the rural sector, and an over-dependence on natural resources. The deeper reason is rulers’ need to raise revenues in short order to survive.
- 25 July 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Trade Journal
- Vol. 30 (5) , 366-377
(Ignoring) the Prosperity Playbook
Why are some countries poor? It comes down to good governance: secure property rights and policies that reduce transaction costs. In turn, this means the rule of law: limits on executive authority and a government that impartially enforces contracts, and thus abstains from picking winners. It also means a government that solves market failures. Yet the governments of developing countries often do the opposite. The proximate reasons are the endurance of state monopolies, policies that cripple the rural sector, and an over-dependence on natural resources. The deeper reason is rulers’ need to raise revenues in short order to survive.
- 11 May 2016
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Political Science
- Vol. 19 (1) , 49-66
Capital in the Twenty-First Century—in the Rest of the World
Recent work has documented an upward trend in inequality since the 1970s that harks back to the Gilded Age: the inegalitarian pre–World War I world. Most prominently, Thomas Piketty argues in Capital in the Twenty-First Century that this is partially due to the fact that capitalism is hardwired to exacerbate the gap between the rich and poor. By critically evaluating recent literature on this topic, this article offers three big contributions. First, we advance an alternative explanation for the long-term U-shaped nature of inequality that Piketty examines. Political regime types and the social groups they empower, rather than war and globalization, can account for the sharp fall and then sharp rise in inequality over the long 20th century. Second, we demonstrate that this U-shaped pattern only really holds for a handful of industrialized economies and a subset of developing countries. Finally, we provide a unified framework centered on two unorthodox assumptions that can explain inequality patterns beyond the U-shaped one. Capitalists and landholders actually prefer democracy if they can first strike a deal that protects them after transition. This is because dictators are not the loyal servants of the economic elite they are portrayed to be—in fact, they are often responsible for soaking, if not destroying, the rich under autocracy.
- 11 May 2016
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Political Science
- Vol. 19 (1) , 49-66
Capital in the Twenty-First Century—in the Rest of the World
Recent work has documented an upward trend in inequality since the 1970s that harks back to the Gilded Age: the inegalitarian pre–World War I world. Most prominently, Thomas Piketty argues in Capital in the Twenty-First Century that this is partially due to the fact that capitalism is hardwired to exacerbate the gap between the rich and poor. By critically evaluating recent literature on this topic, this article offers three big contributions. First, we advance an alternative explanation for the long-term U-shaped nature of inequality that Piketty examines. Political regime types and the social groups they empower, rather than war and globalization, can account for the sharp fall and then sharp rise in inequality over the long 20th century. Second, we demonstrate that this U-shaped pattern only really holds for a handful of industrialized economies and a subset of developing countries. Finally, we provide a unified framework centered on two unorthodox assumptions that can explain inequality patterns beyond the U-shaped one. Capitalists and landholders actually prefer democracy if they can first strike a deal that protects them after transition. This is because dictators are not the loyal servants of the economic elite they are portrayed to be—in fact, they are often responsible for soaking, if not destroying, the rich under autocracy.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Latin American Politics and Society
- Vol. 57 (1) , 163-173
The New Political Economy of Natural Resources in Latin America
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Latin American Politics and Society
- Vol. 57 (1) , 163-173
The New Political Economy of Natural Resources in Latin America
- 23 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Policy Sciences
- Vol. 48 (2) , 181-205
Foreign aid, economic globalization, and pollution
- 23 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Policy Sciences
- Vol. 48 (2) , 181-205
Foreign aid, economic globalization, and pollution