JRJens Ringsmose

Jens Ringsmose

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Jens Ringsmose has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Hedging their bets? The case for a European pillar in NATO

    by Jens Ringsmose, Mark Webber

    President Donald Trump has adopted a critical position on NATO, raising concerns of an American abandonment of its obligations to Europe’s defence. The severity of Trump’s position is unusual, but some of his concerns are of long-standing and likely to be voiced in some form by his successor in the White House. American criticism and equivocation has led the European allies to engage in various forms of hedging. Some of these strategies are designed to keep the US attached to NATO; others bypass the alliance – cultivating either bilateral links to the US or a strengthening of EU defence cooperation. Hedging, whatever its form, is potentially damaging to alliance effectiveness and cohesion. In that light, NATO’s interests are better served by a strategy which builds upon the NATO-EU relationship and which advertises the benefits of European effort within NATO itself. To that end, we argue in favour of a reformulation of an old but much misunderstood idea – that of NATO’s “European pillar.” Here, existing contributions to European defence provided by the allies through NATO are crucial. Such an arrangement need not, therefore, entail any elaborate institutional engineering, but it does require political and strategic clarity.


  • The NATO Response Force

    by Jens Ringsmose, Sten Rynning

    This chapter discusses the history of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and take stock of its current incarnation. It examines how the force developed from being predominantly associated with out-of-area operations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization role in crisis management to becoming a tool for regional security and deterrence. The chapter assesses the major obstacles for the NRF, in regards to fulfilling its promises so far. It looks at the future and point to some of the dynamics and factors that will be decisive for the success of the force in the years to come. The chapter deals with more practical matters and focuses on to bigger issues of culture and deterrence policy. The root cause is the renewed Russian threat and the willingness of allies to provide necessary force contributions for deterrence. The core purposes of the NRF have thus been modified in the direction of deterrence.

  • Top Cited Papers

    Prestige-seeking small states: Danish and Norwegian military contributions to US-led operations

    by Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose, Håkon Lunde Saxi

    In this article we broaden the conventional understanding of prestige and show that prestige-seeking played a major role in the Danish and Norwegian decisions to provide military support to post-Cold War US-led wars. Both countries made costly military contributions in the hope of increasing their standing and prestige in Washington. Both governments regarded prestige as a form of soft power, which they could later convert into access, influence, and US support. Our findings are far from trivial. They make a theoretical contribution by demonstrating that small powers understand and seek prestige in ways that differ fundamentally from the ways great powers do. They also help to explain why smaller US allies made costly contributions to the Balkan, Afghan, Iraq, and Libyan wars at a time when there was no direct threat to their national security and their security dependence on the United States was low. The high value that small US allies attach to their visibility and prestige in Washington suggests that it is far easier for the United States to obtain military support from smaller allies than Realist studies of burden-sharing and collective action problems would lead us to expect.


  • Victim of its own success: how NATO’s difficulties are caused by the absence of a unifying existential threat

    by Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose

    NATO is neither in deep trouble nor destined to fall apart. The ‘NATO-in-crisis perspective’, which has gained currency in recent years, correctly identifies three centrifugal forces that threaten to undermine the Alliance: strategic divergence, a declining ability to act militarily and fading public support. These problems are partly of NATO’s own making because they stem from the creation of a generally benign security environment devoid of clear and present existential threats. While the absence of a clear, unifying existential threat has made it impossible for the Alliance to agree on a common core purpose, this does not mean that NATO will fall apart. Three centripetal forces that will continue to keep it together trumps the three centrifugal forces identified by the NATO-in-crisis perspective: converging national security interests, a strong sense of community and US leadership.


  • Open Access

    “We’re America, Bitch!”: Europæisk og dansk sikkerhed under Trump

    by Anders Henriksen, Jens Ringsmose

    Artiklen argumenterer for, at den uforudsigelighed, der har omgærdet USA’s udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitiske kurs siden valget af Donald J. Trump som amerikansk præsident, ikke forsvinder foreløbig, og at den vil have stor betydning for NATO. Trump forstærker presset på Europa i forhold til byrdedeling ligesom det amerikanske lederskab i alliancen vil være for nedadgående. NATO-Europa forventes at påtage sig et større ansvar, især i forhold til terrorbekæmpelse. Usikkerheden om Trumps opbakning til NATO betyder, at flere af alliancens medlemmer begynder at styrke deres bilaterale relationer og udvise tidlige tegn på strategisk hedging. Det er bl.a. kommet til udtryk i fornyet luft til debatten om en styrkelse af den fælleseuropæiske forsvarsdimension – CSDP. Danmark udfordres på en række punkter af valget af Trump. Det skyldes bl.a. at de danske forsvarsbudgetter er lave, og at Trump kan true den traditionelt brede parlamentariske opbakning til den danske aktivisme. Den aktuelle usikkerhed nødvendiggør en dansk debat om behovet for supplerende sikkerhedsarrangementer.


  • The NATO Response Force: A qualified failure no more?

    by Jens Ringsmose, Sten Rynning

    With much fanfare, NATO declared its rapid reaction force—the NATO Response Force (NRF)—an Initial Operational Capability in 2004. This article addresses four questions: Where did the NRF come from? What does it look like in 2017? What have been the major obstacles for the NRF fulfilling its promises? And where is the NRF likely to go? The article holds two main arguments. First, due to inadequate fill-rates and disagreements as to the force’s operational role, the NRF was for many years a “qualified failure.” The force failed to become the operational tool envisioned by the allies in 2002. While not without effect, it fell hostage to the harsh reality of the expeditionary wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the NRF is off to a fresh beginning and will likely be considered at least a partial success by the allies in the years to come.


  • Cyber-bombing ISIS: why disclose what is better kept secret?

    by Jeppe Teglskov Jacobsen, Jens Ringsmose

    It has become a conventional wisdom in strategic studies that the development and use of cyber weapons should be kept secret, as the effectiveness of these tools is dependent on opponents being unaware of a particular cyber weapon’s characteristics. Why, then, has the US military repeatedly publicized its cyber operations against ISIS in Syria and Iraq? Why reveal what is supposedly better conducted in the dark? In this essay, we provide four answers to this puzzle. We argue that the Pentagon aims to (1) legitimize major investments in the cyber domain to a domestic audience, (2) undermine the enemy’s trust in his own IT-infrastructure, and command and control systems, (3) signal “cyber strength” to third parties, and (4) establish norms regarding how to use cyber weapons in accordance with International Humanitarian Law.


  • Open Access

    Slagmarkens moral og risikofri krig med droner

    by Anders Henriksen, Jens Ringsmose

    The article examines the instinctive uneasiness many feel about the use of armed drones. Why is it, we ask, that so many people – including members of the armed forces – acknowledge that armed drones offer an expedient and legally defensible solution to pressing security challenges and yet feel uncomfortable about them? The main argument of the article is that much of the criticism of drone warfare is associated with an underlying ethically conditioned discomfort with so-called ‘riskless warfare.’ The very feature that makes drones so attractive to policy-makers and military commanders – their risk free deployment – is, paradoxically, also one of the primary causes why many feel fundamentally uncomfortable with them. To make this argument, we build on the works of Martin van Creveld and Paul W. Kahn.


  • Open Access

    Can NATO’s new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force deter?

    by Jens Ringsmose, Sten Rynning

    Chief among the Welsh summit initiatives was the decision to set up a new multinational 'spearhead' force - the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) - as part of an enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF) and within the framework of a Readiness Action Plan (RAP). The VJFT was announced an operational capacity at NATO's summit in Warsaw in July 2016 - indicating a serious approach to deterrence. Credible deterrence requires not only adequate military capacities, such as the VJTF: it also requires a proper doctrine that can pull the capacities credibly together, and then a culture of decision-making and communication to establish NATO's reputation for resolve. Capacities, doctrine and culture - these are key dimensions of NATO's deterrence posture. The politically convenient option for NATO is 'deterrence by denial'-which would entail denying Russia access to NATO territory and riches. The political appeal lies in the promise of upholding the inviolability - the sanctity - of all NATO territory.