DKDavid Klein

David Klein

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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David Klein has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    In the DOM We Trust: Exploring the Hidden Dangers of Reading from the DOM on the Web

    by Jan Drescher, Sepehr Mirzaei, Soheil Khodayari, David Klein, Thomas Barber, Martin Johns, Giancarlo Pellegrino


  • Open Access

    Making Web Applications GDPR Compliant: A Comparative Evaluation of GDPR-Enforcement Frameworks

    by Felix Kalinowski, David Klein, Martin Johns, Veelasha Moonsamy

    The introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018 marked a pivotal moment in the evolution of data protection within the European Union (EU). Consequently, companies have since been legally obliged to respect users' privacy, and, if found to be in violation, risk incurring fines. While this regulatory change greatly benefits users, software developers, on the other hand, face a tremendous challenge to make their applications compliant, creating a gap between legal requirements and effective software development. Several solutions have been proposed to bridge the gap for web application developers. However, it is unclear to what extent they fulfill the requirements laid out by the GDPR. In this work, we look at three frameworks that aim to aid compliance for web applications. To efficiently assess them, we propose a methodology and several benchmarks to evaluate and compare the frameworks. From the GDPR, we have derived a set of requirements that do not entail institutional changes but have technical implications for software. Leveraging these requirements, we evaluate both the proposed solutions' enforcement capabilities and computational overhead. Our comparison shows that each framework can, if configured correctly, enforce a different subset of GDPR requirements. Finally, based on the insights gained, we provide recommendations for the community on how to make further progress on operationalizing the GDPR.

  • Open Access

    Wemby’s Web: Hunting for Memory Corruption in WebAssembly

    by Oussama Draissi, Tobias Cloosters, David Klein, Michael Rodler, Marius Musch, Martin Johns, Lucas Davi

    WebAssembly enables fast execution of performance-critical in web applications utilizing native code. However, recent research has demonstrated the potential for memory corruption errors within WebAssembly modules to exploit web applications. In this work, we present the first systematic analysis of memory corruption in WebAssembly, unveiling the prevalence of a novel threat model where memory corruption enables code injection on a victim’s browser. Our large-scale analysis across 37797 domains reveals that an alarming 29411 (77.81%) of those fully trust data coming from potentially attacker-controlled sources. As a result, an attacker can exploit memory errors to manipulate the WebAssembly memory, where the data is implicitly trusted and frequently passed into security-sensitive functions such as eval or directly into the DOM via innerHTML. Thus, an attacker can abuse this trust to gain JavaScript code execution, i.e., Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). To tackle this issue, we present Wemby, the first viable approach to efficiently analyze WebAssembly-powered websites holistically. We demonstrate that Wemby is proficient at detecting remotely exposed memory corruption errors in web applications through fuzzing. For this purpose, we implement binary-only WebAssembly instrumentation that provides fine-grained memory corruption oracles. We applied Wemby to different websites, uncovering several memory corruption bugs, including one on the Zoom platform. In terms of performance, our ablation study demonstrates that Wemby outperforms current WebAssembly fuzzers. Specifically, Wemby achieves an average speed improvement of 232 times and delivers 46% greater code coverage compared to the state-of-the-art.


  • Open Access

    Poster: The Risk of Insufficient Isolation of Database Transactions in Web Applications

    by Simon Koch, Malte Wessels, David Klein, Martin Johns

    Web applications utilizing databases for persistence frequently expose security flaws due to race conditions. The commonly accepted remedy to this problem is to envelope related database operations in transactions. Unfortunately, sole trust in transactions to isolate competing sets of database interactions is often misplaced. While the precise isolation properties of transactions depend on the configuration of the database management system (DBMS), the default configuration of common DBMS exposes transactions to anomalies that render their protection worthless. We give a comprehensive overview on the behavior of common DBMSes with respect to transactions and show that their default settings are insufficient to provide comprehensive protection. Furthermore we conduct a preliminary study on how commonly transactions and isolation configuration adjustments are deployed across 4.222 open source PHP applications that use SQL, finding 2.789 transactions and only 418 isolation adjustments indicators. Our findings indicate that race conditions are an underappreciated vulnerability class and adjustments are too rare to for transactions to reliably provide sufficient protection.

  • Open Access

    General Data Protection Runtime: Enforcing Transparent GDPR Compliance for Existing Applications

    by David Klein, Benny Rolle, Thomas Barber, Manuel Karl, Martin Johns

    Recent advances in data protection regulations brings privacy benefits for website users, but also comes at a cost for operators. Retrofitting the privacy requirements of laws such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) onto legacy software requires significant auditing and development effort. In this work we demonstrate that this effort can be minimized by viewing data protection requirements through the lens of information flow tracking. Instead of manual inspections of applications, we propose a lightweight enforcement engine which can reliably prevent unlawful data processing even in the presence of bugs or misconfigured software. Taking GDPR regulations as a starting point, we define twelve software requirements which, if implemented properly, ensure adequate handling of personal data. We go on to show how these requirements can be fulfilled by proposing a metadata structure and enforcement policies for dynamic information flow tracking frameworks. To put this idea into practice, we present Fontus, a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) information flow tracking framework, which can transparently label personal data in existing Java applications in order to aid compliance with data protection regulations. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of our approach by enforcing data protection polices across 7 large, open source web applications, with no changes required to the applications themselves.


  • Open Access

    Accept All Exploits: Exploring the Security Impact of Cookie Banners

    by David Klein, Marius Musch, Thomas Barber, Moritz Kopmann, Martin Johns

    The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and related regulations have had a profound impact on most aspects related to privacy on the Internet. By requiring the user’s consent for e.g., tracking, an affirmative action has to take place before such data collection is lawful, leading to spread of so-called cookie banners across the Web. While the privacy impact and how well companies adhere to those regulations have been studied in detail, an open question is what effect these banners have on the security of netizens. In this work, we systematically investigate the security impact of consenting to a cookie banner. For this, we design an approach to automatically give maximum consent to these banners, enabling us to conduct a large-scale crawl. Thereby, we find that a user who consents to tracking executes 45% more third-party scripts and is exposed to 63% more security sensitive data flows on average. This significantly increased attack surface is not a mere theoretical danger, as our examination of Client-Side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities shows: By consenting, the number of websites vulnerable to our verified XSS exploits increases by 55%. In other words, more than one third of all affected websites are only vulnerable to XSS due to code that requires user consent. This means that users who consent to cookies are browsing a much more insecure and dangerous version of the Web. Beyond this immediate impact, our results also raise the question about the actual state of client-side web security as a whole. As few studies state the vantage point of their measurements, and even fewer take cookie notices into account, they most likely underreport the prevalence of vulnerabilities on the Web at large.


  • Open Access

    LogPicker: Strengthening Certificate Transparency Against Covert Adversaries

    by Alexandra Dirksen, David Klein, Robert Michael, Tilman Stehr, Konrad Rieck, Martin Johns

    HTTPS is a cornerstone of privacy in the modern Web. The public key infrastructure underlying HTTPS, however, is a frequent target of attacks. In several cases, forged certificates have been issued by compromised Certificate Authorities (CA) and used to spy on users at large scale. While the concept of Certificate Transparency (CT) provides a means for detecting such forgeries, it builds on a distributed system of CT logs whose correctness is still insufficiently protected. By compromising a certificate authority and the corresponding log, a covert adversary can still issue rogue certificates unnoticed. We introduce LogPicker, a novel protocol for strengthening the public key infrastructure of HTTPS. LogPicker enables a pool of CT logs to collaborate, where a randomly selected log includes the certificate while the rest witness and testify the certificate issuance process. As a result, CT logs become capable of auditing the log in charge independently without the need for a trusted third party. This auditing forces an attacker to control each participating witness, which significantly raises the bar for issuing rogue certificates. LogPicker is efficient and designed to be deployed incrementally, allowing a smooth transition towards a more secure Web.


  • Implementing Situation Awareness for Car-to-X Applications Using Domain Specific Languages

    by Jorg Schafer, David Klein

    Car-to-X i.e. Car-to-Anything communication based on standardized IEEE 802.11p radio technology is comprised with wireless communication between cars (Car-to-Car) and between vehicles and the environment (Car-to-Infrastructure). In order to develop Car-to-X applications based on this standard one needs to model parameters such as the vehicle's position, velocity, acceleration etc. and parameters of the vehicle's environment. Typically, the underlying domain models are designed in an ad-hoc manner and the domain rules become hard-coded into the source- code of the application software. In this paper we describe an alternative and more flexible approach. The model is described in almost plain English using a Domain Specific Language (DSL) and translated into target code via parser technology based on the ANTLR tool-chain. This provides more flexibility not only in creating and maintaining the domain rules, but also with regards to generating code for entirely different target languages and technology environments. For instance, we demonstrate to generate Java code for a simulation environment and C-code for the embedded device from the same rule definitions.


  • Design for a Brain Revisited: The Neuromorphic Design and Functionality of the Interactive Space 'Ada'

    by K. Eng, D. Klein, A. Babler, U. Bernardet, M. Blanchard, M. Costa, T. Delbrück, R.J. Douglas, K. Hepp, J. Manzolli, et al.

    While much is now known about the operation and organisation of the brain at the neuronal and microcircuit level, we are still some way from understanding it as a complete system from the lowest to the highest levels of description. One way to gain such an integrative understanding of neural systems is to construct them. We have built the largest neuromorphic system yet known, an interactive space called 'Ada' that is able to interact with many people simultaneously using a wide variety of sensory and behavioural modalities. 'She' received 553,700 visitors over 5 months during the Swiss Expo.02 in 2002. In this paper we present the broad motivations, design and technologies behind Ada, and discuss the construction and analysis of the system.