TBThomas Barber

Thomas Barber

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Thomas Barber has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    In the DOM We Trust: Exploring the Hidden Dangers of Reading from the DOM on the Web

    by Jan Drescher, Sepehr Mirzaei, Soheil Khodayari, David Klein, Thomas Barber, Martin Johns, Giancarlo Pellegrino


  • Load-and-Act: Increasing Page Coverage of Web Applications

    by Nico Weidmann, Thomas Barber, Christian Wressnegger


  • Open Access

    General Data Protection Runtime: Enforcing Transparent GDPR Compliance for Existing Applications

    by David Klein, Benny Rolle, Thomas Barber, Manuel Karl, Martin Johns

    Recent advances in data protection regulations brings privacy benefits for website users, but also comes at a cost for operators. Retrofitting the privacy requirements of laws such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) onto legacy software requires significant auditing and development effort. In this work we demonstrate that this effort can be minimized by viewing data protection requirements through the lens of information flow tracking. Instead of manual inspections of applications, we propose a lightweight enforcement engine which can reliably prevent unlawful data processing even in the presence of bugs or misconfigured software. Taking GDPR regulations as a starting point, we define twelve software requirements which, if implemented properly, ensure adequate handling of personal data. We go on to show how these requirements can be fulfilled by proposing a metadata structure and enforcement policies for dynamic information flow tracking frameworks. To put this idea into practice, we present Fontus, a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) information flow tracking framework, which can transparently label personal data in existing Java applications in order to aid compliance with data protection regulations. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of our approach by enforcing data protection polices across 7 large, open source web applications, with no changes required to the applications themselves.


  • Open Access

    Accept All Exploits: Exploring the Security Impact of Cookie Banners

    by David Klein, Marius Musch, Thomas Barber, Moritz Kopmann, Martin Johns

    The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and related regulations have had a profound impact on most aspects related to privacy on the Internet. By requiring the user’s consent for e.g., tracking, an affirmative action has to take place before such data collection is lawful, leading to spread of so-called cookie banners across the Web. While the privacy impact and how well companies adhere to those regulations have been studied in detail, an open question is what effect these banners have on the security of netizens. In this work, we systematically investigate the security impact of consenting to a cookie banner. For this, we design an approach to automatically give maximum consent to these banners, enabling us to conduct a large-scale crawl. Thereby, we find that a user who consents to tracking executes 45% more third-party scripts and is exposed to 63% more security sensitive data flows on average. This significantly increased attack surface is not a mere theoretical danger, as our examination of Client-Side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities shows: By consenting, the number of websites vulnerable to our verified XSS exploits increases by 55%. In other words, more than one third of all affected websites are only vulnerable to XSS due to code that requires user consent. This means that users who consent to cookies are browsing a much more insecure and dangerous version of the Web. Beyond this immediate impact, our results also raise the question about the actual state of client-side web security as a whole. As few studies state the vantage point of their measurements, and even fewer take cookie notices into account, they most likely underreport the prevalence of vulnerabilities on the Web at large.