Axel K.-D. Schulz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Axel K.-D. Schulz has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Stephen B. Salter
Middle Tennessee State University
3 shared publications Alan Webb
The University of Waterloo , Waterloo , Ontario , Canada
2 shared publications- Anne Wu
National Chengchi University
2 shared publications - Dennis D. Fehrenbacher
University of St. Gallen
2 shared publications - Kristian Rotaru
Monash Business School, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
2 shared publications - Mandy M. Cheng
UNSW Sydney
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 341-363
New Technologies for Behavioural Accounting Experiments
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the neuropsychological tools that have entered or are about to enter the accounting research field. The chapter focuses on how these technologies may assist in identifying neurophysiological correlates associated with various decision-making conditions or cognitive states of individual decision-makers. In addition to providing potentially more accurate measures for processes or states that decision-makers are cognizant of, neurophysiological assessment devices can also measure judgment and decision processes that are beyond the decision-maker’s conscious control. For example, neurophysiological data may be used to overcome unconscious biases resulting from bioregulatory processes that are expressed as emotions and feelings. Relevant accounting studies are included in this discussion, although the majority of studies are from related fields, which reflects the recent entry of accounting research in this area. The limitations of the technologies facilitating the acquisition of neurophysiological measures are also highlighted along with suggestions for future research. We conclude that for accounting research, the availability of a multimodal measurement of the judgment and decision process facilitated by these technologies has the potential to provide substantial advantages over current approaches based on input and output measures in combination with self-reported measures.
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 341-363
New Technologies for Behavioural Accounting Experiments
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the neuropsychological tools that have entered or are about to enter the accounting research field. The chapter focuses on how these technologies may assist in identifying neurophysiological correlates associated with various decision-making conditions or cognitive states of individual decision-makers. In addition to providing potentially more accurate measures for processes or states that decision-makers are cognizant of, neurophysiological assessment devices can also measure judgment and decision processes that are beyond the decision-maker’s conscious control. For example, neurophysiological data may be used to overcome unconscious biases resulting from bioregulatory processes that are expressed as emotions and feelings. Relevant accounting studies are included in this discussion, although the majority of studies are from related fields, which reflects the recent entry of accounting research in this area. The limitations of the technologies facilitating the acquisition of neurophysiological measures are also highlighted along with suggestions for future research. We conclude that for accounting research, the availability of a multimodal measurement of the judgment and decision process facilitated by these technologies has the potential to provide substantial advantages over current approaches based on input and output measures in combination with self-reported measures.
- Open Access
- 5 November 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 38 (4) , 191-206
Can Thinking about Alternative Explanations Promote Professional Skepticism?
SYNOPSIS: We conduct an experiment with practicing Big 4 audit seniors and demonstrate that generating counterexplanations for an event in an unrelated task prior to completing audit planning tasks activates a counterfactual mindset that enhances auditors’ professional skepticism. This approach to activating professional skepticism can be implemented without auditor training and can be deployed across many different audit tasks. Overall, the experiment indicates that activation of a counterfactual mindset has significant potential to enhance audit quality.
- 5 November 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 38 (4) , 191-206
Open AccessCan Thinking about Alternative Explanations Promote Professional Skepticism?
SYNOPSIS: We conduct an experiment with practicing Big 4 audit seniors and demonstrate that generating counterexplanations for an event in an unrelated task prior to completing audit planning tasks activates a counterfactual mindset that enhances auditors’ professional skepticism. This approach to activating professional skepticism can be implemented without auditor training and can be deployed across many different audit tasks. Overall, the experiment indicates that activation of a counterfactual mindset has significant potential to enhance audit quality.
- Open Access
- 31 January 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (1) , 55-71
The Influence of Controllability and Outcome Valence on Cost-Shifting
In a setting that considers both operational and accounting decentralization, we propose that controllability and outcome valence effects (i.e., positive versus negative contractual outcomes for managers) interact to affect managers’ misreporting behavior. Experimental results show that the level of cost-shifting under negative outcome valence is relatively invariant to the amount of control over a project’s results, whereas the decision to engage in cost-shifting under positive outcome valence is contingent upon whether the manager had control or not. We contribute to the management accounting literature on contract framing and misreporting and extend research on how decentralization choices affect managers’ use of private information, with direct implications for practice. Our results suggest that limiting individual managers’ operational control primarily to constrain misreporting may only be beneficial when contracts stipulate positive outcomes for managers.
- 31 January 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (1) , 55-71
Open AccessThe Influence of Controllability and Outcome Valence on Cost-Shifting
In a setting that considers both operational and accounting decentralization, we propose that controllability and outcome valence effects (i.e., positive versus negative contractual outcomes for managers) interact to affect managers’ misreporting behavior. Experimental results show that the level of cost-shifting under negative outcome valence is relatively invariant to the amount of control over a project’s results, whereas the decision to engage in cost-shifting under positive outcome valence is contingent upon whether the manager had control or not. We contribute to the management accounting literature on contract framing and misreporting and extend research on how decentralization choices affect managers’ use of private information, with direct implications for practice. Our results suggest that limiting individual managers’ operational control primarily to constrain misreporting may only be beneficial when contracts stipulate positive outcomes for managers.
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 41, 1-10
The moderating role of decision mode in subjective performance evaluation
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 41, 1-10
The moderating role of decision mode in subjective performance evaluation
- 14 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 53 (4) , 633-668
Are Employee Selection and Incentive Contracts Complements or Substitutes?
There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement to incentive contracting. We argue that incentive contracts and selection can be both complements and substitutes conditional on the contracting difficulty faced by the firm. We examine these control choices in a setting where contracting difficulties arise due to the firm's choice of strategy and from the volatility created by the firm's external environment. We select a firm's commitment to organizational learning (OL) as our strategic choice variable as this provides a useful proxy for identifying settings where explicit incentive contracting is difficult. The results show that, as firms become increasingly committed to OL, incentive contracts and employee selection operate as complements. However, with a high commitment to OL and an increasing level of external volatility, contracting on performance measures will become less effective. In this context, our results indicate that there is a substitution effect toward employee selection.
- 14 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 53 (4) , 633-668
Are Employee Selection and Incentive Contracts Complements or Substitutes?
There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement to incentive contracting. We argue that incentive contracts and selection can be both complements and substitutes conditional on the contracting difficulty faced by the firm. We examine these control choices in a setting where contracting difficulties arise due to the firm's choice of strategy and from the volatility created by the firm's external environment. We select a firm's commitment to organizational learning (OL) as our strategic choice variable as this provides a useful proxy for identifying settings where explicit incentive contracting is difficult. The results show that, as firms become increasingly committed to OL, incentive contracts and employee selection operate as complements. However, with a high commitment to OL and an increasing level of external volatility, contracting on performance measures will become less effective. In this context, our results indicate that there is a substitution effect toward employee selection.
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Organizational Behavior Management
- Vol. 32 (3) , 221-241
The Performance Effects of an Ability-Based Approach to Goal Assignment
Some organizations have begun to target their goal-setting method more closely to the ability levels of their employees. In this article, we report the results of a laboratory study of 138 undergraduate students, which shows that these “ability-based” goals are more effective at improving performance than a “one goal for all” approach, where everyone is assigned the same performance target. Results from repeated measure tests and other analysis of variance tests show that lower-ability individuals in the ability-based goal condition outperform those in the one goal for all condition. Lower- and moderate-ability participants in the one goal for all condition also experienced larger decreases in performance in later rounds.
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Organizational Behavior Management
- Vol. 32 (3) , 221-241
The Performance Effects of an Ability-Based Approach to Goal Assignment
Some organizations have begun to target their goal-setting method more closely to the ability levels of their employees. In this article, we report the results of a laboratory study of 138 undergraduate students, which shows that these “ability-based” goals are more effective at improving performance than a “one goal for all” approach, where everyone is assigned the same performance target. Results from repeated measure tests and other analysis of variance tests show that lower-ability individuals in the ability-based goal condition outperform those in the one goal for all condition. Lower- and moderate-ability participants in the one goal for all condition also experienced larger decreases in performance in later rounds.
- 1 April 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 17 (1) , 17-39
Environmental Uncertainty, Comprehensive Performance Measurement Systems, Performance-Based Compensation, and Organizational Performance
This study explores firms' use of comprehensive performance measures and performance-based compensation in response to the increasingly uncertain competitive environment. Data from a sample of 84 Taiwanese high-tech manufacturing firms revealed an increased use of such systems among firms facing higher perceived environmental uncertainty. We also found performance-based pay to fully mediate the relationship between comprehensive performance measures and employee effort. Finally, employee effort is significantly and positively associated with organizational performance and fully explains the effect of performance-based compensation in increasing organizational performance.
- 1 April 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 17 (1) , 17-39
Environmental Uncertainty, Comprehensive Performance Measurement Systems, Performance-Based Compensation, and Organizational Performance
This study explores firms' use of comprehensive performance measures and performance-based compensation in response to the increasingly uncertain competitive environment. Data from a sample of 84 Taiwanese high-tech manufacturing firms revealed an increased use of such systems among firms facing higher perceived environmental uncertainty. We also found performance-based pay to fully mediate the relationship between comprehensive performance measures and employee effort. Finally, employee effort is significantly and positively associated with organizational performance and fully explains the effect of performance-based compensation in increasing organizational performance.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 22 (1) , 209-232
Factors Affecting Goal Difficulty and Performance When Employees Select Their Own Performance Goals: Evidence from the Field
This study examines factors influencing the difficulty of self-set goals and performance in a setting where employees were able to choose their performance goal from a menu of three choices established by management. Rewards for goal attainment were increasing in the difficulty of the goal. We develop a behavioral model of the factors expected to affect employees’ goal choices and performance. Anticipated influences on goal difficulty include employees’ impression management intentions, past performance, experience, and prior eligibility for rewards. We also expect performance to be related to goal difficulty. We use a unique combination of archival and questionnaire data from 476 employees at several call centers of a financial services company to test our hypotheses. All predictions are supported: the difficulty of self-set goals is negatively associated with employees’ impression management intentions; employees with better past performance set more difficult goals; and both prior performance and goal difficulty are positively associated with current period performance. We conduct supplementary analysis examining the extent to which employees selected attainable goals and the impact this had on performance. We also analyze the extent to which ratcheting concerns may have influenced actual performance for those employees who attained their goal. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 22 (1) , 209-232
Factors Affecting Goal Difficulty and Performance When Employees Select Their Own Performance Goals: Evidence from the Field
This study examines factors influencing the difficulty of self-set goals and performance in a setting where employees were able to choose their performance goal from a menu of three choices established by management. Rewards for goal attainment were increasing in the difficulty of the goal. We develop a behavioral model of the factors expected to affect employees’ goal choices and performance. Anticipated influences on goal difficulty include employees’ impression management intentions, past performance, experience, and prior eligibility for rewards. We also expect performance to be related to goal difficulty. We use a unique combination of archival and questionnaire data from 476 employees at several call centers of a financial services company to test our hypotheses. All predictions are supported: the difficulty of self-set goals is negatively associated with employees’ impression management intentions; employees with better past performance set more difficult goals; and both prior performance and goal difficulty are positively associated with current period performance. We conduct supplementary analysis examining the extent to which employees selected attainable goals and the impact this had on performance. We also analyze the extent to which ratcheting concerns may have influenced actual performance for those employees who attained their goal. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.
- 30 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 49 (1) , 75-93
Knowledge transfer in project reviews: the effect of self‐justification bias and moral hazard
- 30 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 49 (1) , 75-93
Knowledge transfer in project reviews: the effect of self‐justification bias and moral hazard
- 1 January 2009
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of International Accounting Research
- Vol. 8 (1) , 57-65
Revaluating Face: A Note on Differences in Private Information Sharing Between Two Communitarian Societies
This study closes the circle on a series of studies which have examined cross-cultural differences in the likelihood of sharing information in a situation where an error has been made. Building on the work of Chow et al. (1999), Chow et al. (2000), Salter and Schulz (2005), and Salter et al. (2008) it seeks to control for collectivism and test the effect of face by using nations that are quite similar in terms of collectivism, but at opposite ends of the face dimension. It finds that Chinese managers are less willing to share negative information when the supervisor is present than Chilean managers. Once the supervisor is removed there is no significant difference in the information sharing pattern of these two cultures. We attribute the results to the effect of “face” in the Chinese culture, which suppresses information sharing willingness in Chinese managers when the supervisor is present and is not a facet of the Chilean culture.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of International Accounting Research
- Vol. 8 (1) , 57-65
Revaluating Face: A Note on Differences in Private Information Sharing Between Two Communitarian Societies
This study closes the circle on a series of studies which have examined cross-cultural differences in the likelihood of sharing information in a situation where an error has been made. Building on the work of Chow et al. (1999), Chow et al. (2000), Salter and Schulz (2005), and Salter et al. (2008) it seeks to control for collectivism and test the effect of face by using nations that are quite similar in terms of collectivism, but at opposite ends of the face dimension. It finds that Chinese managers are less willing to share negative information when the supervisor is present than Chilean managers. Once the supervisor is removed there is no significant difference in the information sharing pattern of these two cultures. We attribute the results to the effect of “face” in the Chinese culture, which suppresses information sharing willingness in Chinese managers when the supervisor is present and is not a facet of the Chilean culture.