Andrea Polo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Andrea Polo has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Colin Mayer
University of Oxford
3 shared publications - José-Luis Peydró
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
3 shared publications - Stefano Rossi
Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
3 shared publications Carlo Altavilla
2 shared publicationsEnrico Sette
2 shared publications- Marco Becht
Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (ULB); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 December 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Loan Guarantees, Bank Lending and Credit Risk Reallocation
Do banks extending government-guaranteed loans simultaneously reduce their risk exposure to firms? Using unique euro-area credit register data and the COVID-19 guarantee programs as a laboratory, we find that banks extending guaranteed loans reduced non-guaranteed credit by over 30% relative to other banks lending to the same firm. Substitution was highest for riskier and smaller firms in more affected sectors and for stronger banks. Nevertheless, banks offered cheaper credit and longer maturities to guaranteed loan recipients, especially more fragile ones. This improvement in lending terms is the flipside of credit substitution: the two correlate positively.
- 12 December 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessLoan Guarantees, Bank Lending and Credit Risk Reallocation
Do banks extending government-guaranteed loans simultaneously reduce their risk exposure to firms? Using unique euro-area credit register data and the COVID-19 guarantee programs as a laboratory, we find that banks extending guaranteed loans reduced non-guaranteed credit by over 30% relative to other banks lending to the same firm. Substitution was highest for riskier and smaller firms in more affected sectors and for stronger banks. Nevertheless, banks offered cheaper credit and longer maturities to guaranteed loan recipients, especially more fragile ones. This improvement in lending terms is the flipside of credit substitution: the two correlate positively.
- Open Access
- 27 October 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Climate Risk, Bank Lending and Monetary Policy
Combining euro-area credit register and carbon emission data, we provide evidence of a climate risk-taking channel in banks’ lending policies. Banks charge higher interest rates to firms featuring greater carbon emissions, and lower rates to firms committing to lower emissions, controlling for their probability of default. Both effects are larger for banks committed to decarbonization. Consistently with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, tighter policy induces banks to increase both credit risk premia and carbon emission premia, and reduce lending to high emission firms more than to low emission ones. While restrictive monetary policy increases the cost of credit and reduces lending to all firms, its contractionary effect is milder for firms with low emissions and those that commit to decarbonization.
- 27 October 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessClimate Risk, Bank Lending and Monetary Policy
Combining euro-area credit register and carbon emission data, we provide evidence of a climate risk-taking channel in banks’ lending policies. Banks charge higher interest rates to firms featuring greater carbon emissions, and lower rates to firms committing to lower emissions, controlling for their probability of default. Both effects are larger for banks committed to decarbonization. Consistently with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, tighter policy induces banks to increase both credit risk premia and carbon emission premia, and reduce lending to high emission firms more than to low emission ones. While restrictive monetary policy increases the cost of credit and reduces lending to all firms, its contractionary effect is milder for firms with low emissions and those that commit to decarbonization.
- Open Access
- 8 March 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Should Shareholders Have a Say on Acquisitions?
Shareholders of U.S. corporations have lost billions of dollars in acquisitions they never approved. In the United Kingdom the listing rules give shareholders a binding say when targets are large relative to acquirers. A transatlantic comparison suggests that if U.S. shareholders had a say on acquisitions, they would incur fewer losses. There is a significant difference in the difference in performance between deals subject to a vote in the United Kingdom but not in the United States and deals with no mandatory vote in either country. The United States has given shareholders a mandatory say on pay; shareholders might also wish to have a binding say on corporate acquisitions.
- 8 March 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessShould Shareholders Have a Say on Acquisitions?
Shareholders of U.S. corporations have lost billions of dollars in acquisitions they never approved. In the United Kingdom the listing rules give shareholders a binding say when targets are large relative to acquirers. A transatlantic comparison suggests that if U.S. shareholders had a say on acquisitions, they would incur fewer losses. There is a significant difference in the difference in performance between deals subject to a vote in the United Kingdom but not in the United States and deals with no mandatory vote in either country. The United States has given shareholders a mandatory say on pay; shareholders might also wish to have a binding say on corporate acquisitions.
- Open Access
- 2 December 2020
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Risk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises
We show that risk-mitigating incentives dominate risk-shifting incentives in fragile banks. We study security trading by banks, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. For identification, we exploit different crisis shocks and supervisory ISIN-bank-month-level data. Less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial stress shocks. Results hold within identical regulatory capital risk weights categories. Moreover, additional tests suggest that banks’ own incentives, rather than supervision, are the main drivers. Results hold for the different crisis shocks since 2007/08, including the COVID-19 one. A model of bank behavior rationalizes our findings.
- 2 December 2020
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessRisk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises
We show that risk-mitigating incentives dominate risk-shifting incentives in fragile banks. We study security trading by banks, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. For identification, we exploit different crisis shocks and supervisory ISIN-bank-month-level data. Less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial stress shocks. Results hold within identical regulatory capital risk weights categories. Moreover, additional tests suggest that banks’ own incentives, rather than supervision, are the main drivers. Results hold for the different crisis shocks since 2007/08, including the COVID-19 one. A model of bank behavior rationalizes our findings.
- 18 January 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
An Introduction to Finance and Investment
This chapter reviews the problems of finance and investment confronting European economies and summarizes the approaches that can be adopted to address them. The chapters in this volume provide one of the most comprehensive and thorough analyses of any financial system that has been undertaken to date. They reflect a large body of research using new and existing data sets, employing advanced empirical tools, and exploiting the unique insights provided by the tumultuous events of the financial and sovereign debt crises. Together they therefore comprise an exceptional body of knowledge to guide policy formulation in the future.
- 18 January 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
An Introduction to Finance and Investment
This chapter reviews the problems of finance and investment confronting European economies and summarizes the approaches that can be adopted to address them. The chapters in this volume provide one of the most comprehensive and thorough analyses of any financial system that has been undertaken to date. They reflect a large body of research using new and existing data sets, employing advanced empirical tools, and exploiting the unique insights provided by the tumultuous events of the financial and sovereign debt crises. Together they therefore comprise an exceptional body of knowledge to guide policy formulation in the future.
- 18 January 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Securities Trading and Lending in Banks
Since the beginning of the financial crisis, academics and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have started to debate the implications of securities trading by banks. New regulation limits security trading, fearing that this could crowd out lending to the real economy or could facilitate risk-shifting by financial institutions. On the other hand, banks may use security trading for hedging purposes or, particularly during a crisis, to access public liquidity. Only very recently have researchers begun to have access to micro data at the security level on banks’ trading activities, and they are starting to bring robust evidence on these issues. This chapter reviews the potential costs and benefits of combining traditional intermediation activity with security trading and discusses the recent empirical evidence.
- 18 January 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Securities Trading and Lending in Banks
Since the beginning of the financial crisis, academics and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have started to debate the implications of securities trading by banks. New regulation limits security trading, fearing that this could crowd out lending to the real economy or could facilitate risk-shifting by financial institutions. On the other hand, banks may use security trading for hedging purposes or, particularly during a crisis, to access public liquidity. Only very recently have researchers begun to have access to micro data at the security level on banks’ trading activities, and they are starting to bring robust evidence on these issues. This chapter reviews the potential costs and benefits of combining traditional intermediation activity with security trading and discusses the recent empirical evidence.
- Top Cited Papers
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 52 (4) , 1429-1448
Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets
We study the impact of the enforcement of financial regulation by the United Kingdom’s regulatory authorities on the market price of penalized firms. Existing studies rely on analyses of multiple events that may distort the measurement of reputational losses. In the United Kingdom, the entire enforcement process involves only one public announcement and is accompanied by complete information on legal penalties. We find that reputational losses are nearly nine times the size of fines and are associated with misconduct harming customers or investors but not third parties.
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 52 (4) , 1429-1448
Top Cited PapersRegulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets
We study the impact of the enforcement of financial regulation by the United Kingdom’s regulatory authorities on the market price of penalized firms. Existing studies rely on analyses of multiple events that may distort the measurement of reputational losses. In the United Kingdom, the entire enforcement process involves only one public announcement and is accompanied by complete information on legal penalties. We find that reputational losses are nearly nine times the size of fines and are associated with misconduct harming customers or investors but not third parties.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 122 (1) , 135-154
Double bank runs and liquidity risk management
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 122 (1) , 135-154
Open AccessDouble bank runs and liquidity risk management
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 29 (11) , 3035-3067
Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?
Shareholder voting on corporate acquisitions is controversial. In most countries, acquisition decisions are delegated to boards, and shareholder approval is discretionary, which makes existing empirical studies inconclusive. We study the U.K. setting in which shareholder approval is imposed exogenously via a threshold test that provides strong identification. U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $\$13.6$ billion over 1992–2010 in aggregate; without voting, U.K. shareholders lost $\$3$ billion. Multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis supports a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer chief executive officers.- 1 July 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 29 (11) , 3035-3067
Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?
Shareholder voting on corporate acquisitions is controversial. In most countries, acquisition decisions are delegated to boards, and shareholder approval is discretionary, which makes existing empirical studies inconclusive. We study the U.K. setting in which shareholder approval is imposed exogenously via a threshold test that provides strong identification. U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $\$13.6$ billion over 1992–2010 in aggregate; without voting, U.K. shareholders lost $\$3$ billion. Multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis supports a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer chief executive officers.- Open Access
- 1 May 2014
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?
Shareholder voting on corporate acquisitions is controversial. In most countries acquisition decisions are delegated to boards and shareholder approval is discretionary, which makes existing empirical studies inconclusive. We study the U.K. setting where shareholder approval is imposed exogenously via a threshold test that provides strong identification. U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $13.6 billion over 1992-2010 in aggregate; without voting U.K. shareholders lost $3 billion. Multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis supports a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer CEOs.
- 1 May 2014
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessDoes Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?
Shareholder voting on corporate acquisitions is controversial. In most countries acquisition decisions are delegated to boards and shareholder approval is discretionary, which makes existing empirical studies inconclusive. We study the U.K. setting where shareholder approval is imposed exogenously via a threshold test that provides strong identification. U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $13.6 billion over 1992-2010 in aggregate; without voting U.K. shareholders lost $3 billion. Multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis supports a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer CEOs.