APAndrea Polo

Andrea Polo

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Andrea Polo has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Loan Guarantees, Bank Lending and Credit Risk Reallocation

    by Carlo Altavilla, Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano, Andrea Polo, Thomas Vlassopoulos

    Do banks extending government-guaranteed loans simultaneously reduce their risk exposure to firms? Using unique euro-area credit register data and the COVID-19 guarantee programs as a laboratory, we find that banks extending guaranteed loans reduced non-guaranteed credit by over 30% relative to other banks lending to the same firm. Substitution was highest for riskier and smaller firms in more affected sectors and for stronger banks. Nevertheless, banks offered cheaper credit and longer maturities to guaranteed loan recipients, especially more fragile ones. This improvement in lending terms is the flipside of credit substitution: the two correlate positively.

  • Open Access

    Climate Risk, Bank Lending and Monetary Policy

    by Carlo Altavilla, Miguel Boucinha, Marco Pagano, Andrea Polo

    Combining euro-area credit register and carbon emission data, we provide evidence of a climate risk-taking channel in banks’ lending policies. Banks charge higher interest rates to firms featuring greater carbon emissions, and lower rates to firms committing to lower emissions, controlling for their probability of default. Both effects are larger for banks committed to decarbonization. Consistently with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, tighter policy induces banks to increase both credit risk premia and carbon emission premia, and reduce lending to high emission firms more than to low emission ones. While restrictive monetary policy increases the cost of credit and reduces lending to all firms, its contractionary effect is milder for firms with low emissions and those that commit to decarbonization.


  • Open Access

    Should Shareholders Have a Say on Acquisitions?

    by Marco Becht, Andrea Polo, Stefano Rossi

    Shareholders of U.S. corporations have lost billions of dollars in acquisitions they never approved. In the United Kingdom the listing rules give shareholders a binding say when targets are large relative to acquirers. A transatlantic comparison suggests that if U.S. shareholders had a say on acquisitions, they would incur fewer losses. There is a significant difference in the difference in performance between deals subject to a vote in the United Kingdom but not in the United States and deals with no mandatory vote in either country. The United States has given shareholders a mandatory say on pay; shareholders might also wish to have a binding say on corporate acquisitions.

  • Open Access

    Risk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises

    by José-Luis Peydró, Andrea Polo, Enrico Sette, Victoria Vanasco

    We show that risk-mitigating incentives dominate risk-shifting incentives in fragile banks. We study security trading by banks, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. For identification, we exploit different crisis shocks and supervisory ISIN-bank-month-level data. Less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial stress shocks. Results hold within identical regulatory capital risk weights categories. Moreover, additional tests suggest that banks’ own incentives, rather than supervision, are the main drivers. Results hold for the different crisis shocks since 2007/08, including the COVID-19 one. A model of bank behavior rationalizes our findings.

  • An Introduction to Finance and Investment

    by Colin Mayer, Stefano Micossi, Marco Onado, Marco Pagano, Andrea Polo

    This chapter reviews the problems of finance and investment confronting European economies and summarizes the approaches that can be adopted to address them. The chapters in this volume provide one of the most comprehensive and thorough analyses of any financial system that has been undertaken to date. They reflect a large body of research using new and existing data sets, employing advanced empirical tools, and exploiting the unique insights provided by the tumultuous events of the financial and sovereign debt crises. Together they therefore comprise an exceptional body of knowledge to guide policy formulation in the future.

  • Securities Trading and Lending in Banks

    by José Luis Peydró, Andrea Polo, Enrico Sette

    Since the beginning of the financial crisis, academics and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have started to debate the implications of securities trading by banks. New regulation limits security trading, fearing that this could crowd out lending to the real economy or could facilitate risk-shifting by financial institutions. On the other hand, banks may use security trading for hedging purposes or, particularly during a crisis, to access public liquidity. Only very recently have researchers begun to have access to micro data at the security level on banks’ trading activities, and they are starting to bring robust evidence on these issues. This chapter reviews the potential costs and benefits of combining traditional intermediation activity with security trading and discusses the recent empirical evidence.

  • Top Cited Papers

    Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets

    by John Armour, Colin Mayer, Andrea Polo

    We study the impact of the enforcement of financial regulation by the United Kingdom’s regulatory authorities on the market price of penalized firms. Existing studies rely on analyses of multiple events that may distort the measurement of reputational losses. In the United Kingdom, the entire enforcement process involves only one public announcement and is accompanied by complete information on legal penalties. We find that reputational losses are nearly nine times the size of fines and are associated with misconduct harming customers or investors but not third parties.


  • Open Access

    Double bank runs and liquidity risk management

    by Filippo Ippolito, José-Luis Peydró, Andrea Polo, Enrico Sette


  • Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?

    by Marco Becht, Andrea Polo, Stefano Rossi

    Shareholder voting on corporate acquisitions is controversial. In most countries, acquisition decisions are delegated to boards, and shareholder approval is discretionary, which makes existing empirical studies inconclusive. We study the U.K. setting in which shareholder approval is imposed exogenously via a threshold test that provides strong identification. U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $\$13.6$ billion over 1992–2010 in aggregate; without voting, U.K. shareholders lost $\$3$ billion. Multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis supports a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer chief executive officers.


  • Open Access

    Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?

    by Marco Becht, Andrea Polo, Stefano Rossi

    Shareholder voting on corporate acquisitions is controversial. In most countries acquisition decisions are delegated to boards and shareholder approval is discretionary, which makes existing empirical studies inconclusive. We study the U.K. setting where shareholder approval is imposed exogenously via a threshold test that provides strong identification. U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $13.6 billion over 1992-2010 in aggregate; without voting U.K. shareholders lost $3 billion. Multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis supports a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer CEOs.