Mila Versteeg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Mila Versteeg has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adam Chilton
University of Chicago Law School
7 shared publications - Pierre-Hugues Verdier
University of Virginia
5 shared publications David S. Law
3 shared publications- Kevin L. Cope
University of Virginia
3 shared publications Adam S. Chilton
University of Chicago Law School
2 shared publicationsEmily Zackin
Johns Hopkins University, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 29 May 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Political Science Quarterly
- Vol. 141 (2) , 445-446
Constitutionalizing the Private Sphere: A Comparative Inquiry by Christina R. Bambrick
- 29 May 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Political Science Quarterly
- Vol. 141 (2) , 445-446
Constitutionalizing the Private Sphere: A Comparative Inquiry by Christina R. Bambrick
- Open Access
- 21 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 207 (1-2) , 115-154
Do constitutional unamendability rules make a difference?
Leaders often try to amend constitutions to remove checks on their powers. To help protect against such democratic erosion, constitutional drafters and jurists sometimes restrict constitutional amendments by: (1) specifying in the constitutional text that certain clauses or principles can never be changed (“Eternity Clauses”); (2) granting apex courts the power to review the procedural validity of amendment processes (“Amendment Review”); or (3) developing judicial doctrines that block amendments that change the constitution’s nature (“Unamendability Doctrines”). But are unamendability rules actually associated with differences in countries’ levels of democracy? We argue that Eternity Clauses are likely to emerge in conditions more conducive to protecting democracy, while court-created doctrines will emerge in conditions when democracy is under threat. We also hypothesize that enforcement is difficult because when would-be autocrats command enough political power to amend their constitution, it is hard for both courts and political actors to resist. We test this argument using data on countries’ unamendability rules and their levels of democracy. Across three research designs—cross-country comparisons, panel regressions, and event studies—we find some evidence that countries that adopt Eternity Clauses subsequently have higher levels of democracy, but this may be due to differences in countries’ democratization trends prior to adopting them. In contrast, we find little evidence that Amendment Review or Unamendability Doctrines are associated with differences in democracy levels. We do find that unamendability rules are associated with higher levels of constitutional replacement, suggesting that when amendments are not possible, undemocratic reforms might be pursued by writing a constitution from scratch. We supplement these quantitative findings with a case study of presidential term limit evasion, which shows that unamendability rules are rarely invoked to halt term limit amendments.
- 21 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 207 (1-2) , 115-154
Open AccessDo constitutional unamendability rules make a difference?
Leaders often try to amend constitutions to remove checks on their powers. To help protect against such democratic erosion, constitutional drafters and jurists sometimes restrict constitutional amendments by: (1) specifying in the constitutional text that certain clauses or principles can never be changed (“Eternity Clauses”); (2) granting apex courts the power to review the procedural validity of amendment processes (“Amendment Review”); or (3) developing judicial doctrines that block amendments that change the constitution’s nature (“Unamendability Doctrines”). But are unamendability rules actually associated with differences in countries’ levels of democracy? We argue that Eternity Clauses are likely to emerge in conditions more conducive to protecting democracy, while court-created doctrines will emerge in conditions when democracy is under threat. We also hypothesize that enforcement is difficult because when would-be autocrats command enough political power to amend their constitution, it is hard for both courts and political actors to resist. We test this argument using data on countries’ unamendability rules and their levels of democracy. Across three research designs—cross-country comparisons, panel regressions, and event studies—we find some evidence that countries that adopt Eternity Clauses subsequently have higher levels of democracy, but this may be due to differences in countries’ democratization trends prior to adopting them. In contrast, we find little evidence that Amendment Review or Unamendability Doctrines are associated with differences in democracy levels. We do find that unamendability rules are associated with higher levels of constitutional replacement, suggesting that when amendments are not possible, undemocratic reforms might be pursued by writing a constitution from scratch. We supplement these quantitative findings with a case study of presidential term limit evasion, which shows that unamendability rules are rarely invoked to halt term limit amendments.
- 14 June 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Law, Culture and the Humanities
- Vol. 22 (2) , 234-249
Crises of Authority
Constitutional scholars have long observed that the term “constitutional crisis” is overused. Pundits and scholars routinely use it to describe constitutional developments that they view as normatively undesirable. But doing so may hurt our ability to recognize them. We use a comparative and historical perspective to call attention to the worst-case scenario of constitutional breakdown. This scenario, which we will refer to as a “constitutional crisis of authority,” is defined by the presence of competing claims to legitimate political or legal authority in a single office—such as the existence of two presidents or two apex courts. Despite their gravity, such episodes of competing authority are not generally the focus of the U.S. literature on constitutional crises, presumably because the federal constitutional system has rarely experienced them. In addition, many of the scenarios that US scholars do describe as crises turn out, upon comparative and/or historical analysis, to be relatively common, both abroad and within the United States. These so-called “constitutional crises” include violations of constitutional rules and norms, the failure of poorly designed provisions to settle legal disputes, and even the failure of constitutional systems to address large problems. All of these are, we argue, less threatening to the survival of a constitutional system than crises of authority.
- 14 June 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Law, Culture and the Humanities
- Vol. 22 (2) , 234-249
Crises of Authority
Constitutional scholars have long observed that the term “constitutional crisis” is overused. Pundits and scholars routinely use it to describe constitutional developments that they view as normatively undesirable. But doing so may hurt our ability to recognize them. We use a comparative and historical perspective to call attention to the worst-case scenario of constitutional breakdown. This scenario, which we will refer to as a “constitutional crisis of authority,” is defined by the presence of competing claims to legitimate political or legal authority in a single office—such as the existence of two presidents or two apex courts. Despite their gravity, such episodes of competing authority are not generally the focus of the U.S. literature on constitutional crises, presumably because the federal constitutional system has rarely experienced them. In addition, many of the scenarios that US scholars do describe as crises turn out, upon comparative and/or historical analysis, to be relatively common, both abroad and within the United States. These so-called “constitutional crises” include violations of constitutional rules and norms, the failure of poorly designed provisions to settle legal disputes, and even the failure of constitutional systems to address large problems. All of these are, we argue, less threatening to the survival of a constitutional system than crises of authority.
- Open Access
- 13 May 2024
- Published by European Society for Empirical Legal Studies (ESELS) in European Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 1 (1) , 19-48
Which Constitutional Provisions Are Most Important?
National constitutions codify provisions on a wide range of topics, ranging from presidential term limits to the country’s flag. But are all constitutional provisions equally important? Some are likely to be particularly consequential for how governments function, while others are likely to be largely symbolic. To date, there has been little research on the relative importance of constitutional provisions. To explore current thinking on this subject, we assembled a group of twelve comparative constitutional scholars to rate the relative importance of 340 constitutional provisions to the functioning of a country’s government. These aggregate ratings make three contributions to constitutional studies: (1) provide evidence on the current state of academic thought on the comparative importance of constitutional provisions; (2) establish an index of constitutional importance to be used in future research projects; and (3) offer a roadmap that could help direct research to provisions that may be more likely to have significant impacts on governance-related outcomes.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by European Society for Empirical Legal Studies (ESELS) in European Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 1 (1) , 19-48
Open AccessWhich Constitutional Provisions Are Most Important?
National constitutions codify provisions on a wide range of topics, ranging from presidential term limits to the country’s flag. But are all constitutional provisions equally important? Some are likely to be particularly consequential for how governments function, while others are likely to be largely symbolic. To date, there has been little research on the relative importance of constitutional provisions. To explore current thinking on this subject, we assembled a group of twelve comparative constitutional scholars to rate the relative importance of 340 constitutional provisions to the functioning of a country’s government. These aggregate ratings make three contributions to constitutional studies: (1) provide evidence on the current state of academic thought on the comparative importance of constitutional provisions; (2) establish an index of constitutional importance to be used in future research projects; and (3) offer a roadmap that could help direct research to provisions that may be more likely to have significant impacts on governance-related outcomes.
- 10 November 2023
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 432-452
The politics of constitutional rights
Since World War II, the median number of rights enshrined in national constitutions has more than doubled. Because scholars have largely cheered on this development for normative reasons, it is easy to overlook the political calculations that motivate the adoption and enforcement of constitutional rights. In this chapter, we survey some of the existing qualitative and quantitative research on three topics related to the politics of constitutional rights: (i) why countries adopt constitutional rights; (ii) whether constitutionally protecting rights increases respect for those rights in practice; and (iii) whether the proliferation of rights in constitutions might decrease the overall protection of rights. In doing so, we hope to paint a more accurate picture of the adoption and enforcement of rights than the one that emerges from constitutional theory alone.
- 10 November 2023
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 432-452
The politics of constitutional rights
Since World War II, the median number of rights enshrined in national constitutions has more than doubled. Because scholars have largely cheered on this development for normative reasons, it is easy to overlook the political calculations that motivate the adoption and enforcement of constitutional rights. In this chapter, we survey some of the existing qualitative and quantitative research on three topics related to the politics of constitutional rights: (i) why countries adopt constitutional rights; (ii) whether constitutionally protecting rights increases respect for those rights in practice; and (iii) whether the proliferation of rights in constitutions might decrease the overall protection of rights. In doing so, we hope to paint a more accurate picture of the adoption and enforcement of rights than the one that emerges from constitutional theory alone.
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Constitutional Law
- Vol. 20 (1) , 141-176
Small-c constitutional rights
Although constitutions establish countries' fundamental laws, identifying which legal materials are constitutional is not a straightforward task. Empirical studies in comparative law have focused on countries' formal, written constitutions-the "large-C" constitutions-while often ignoring the broader body of constitutional rules-the "small-c" constitutions. This oversight occurs because incorporating small-c constitutional law into comparative research requires overcoming the conceptual challenge of identifying which legal sources should be considered constitutional and the practical challenge of quantifying those sources across jurisdictions. In this article, we address both of these challenges. We address the conceptual challenge by outlining three approaches to identifying small-c constitutions: an entrenchment-based approach that emphasizes whether given rules are more deeply entrenched than conventional laws, an external approach that emphasizes exogenously defined core constitutional functions, and an internal approach that emphasizes local understandings of constitutional law. We then partially address the practical challenge by using an internal approach to collect data on one aspect of constitutional law: constitutional rights. We collected this data for 123 countries by conducting an expert survey of constitutional law scholars and practitioners. Our data reveals that although the large-C constitution is the primary source of constitutional rights in a majority of countries, the small-c constitution is still a notable source of rights, especially in older constitutional systems. But although our data offers new evidence about small-c constitutional rights around the world, it also points to several substantial obstacles that any efforts to code small-c constitutions are likely to face.
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Constitutional Law
- Vol. 20 (1) , 141-176
Small-c constitutional rights
Although constitutions establish countries' fundamental laws, identifying which legal materials are constitutional is not a straightforward task. Empirical studies in comparative law have focused on countries' formal, written constitutions-the "large-C" constitutions-while often ignoring the broader body of constitutional rules-the "small-c" constitutions. This oversight occurs because incorporating small-c constitutional law into comparative research requires overcoming the conceptual challenge of identifying which legal sources should be considered constitutional and the practical challenge of quantifying those sources across jurisdictions. In this article, we address both of these challenges. We address the conceptual challenge by outlining three approaches to identifying small-c constitutions: an entrenchment-based approach that emphasizes whether given rules are more deeply entrenched than conventional laws, an external approach that emphasizes exogenously defined core constitutional functions, and an internal approach that emphasizes local understandings of constitutional law. We then partially address the practical challenge by using an internal approach to collect data on one aspect of constitutional law: constitutional rights. We collected this data for 123 countries by conducting an expert survey of constitutional law scholars and practitioners. Our data reveals that although the large-C constitution is the primary source of constitutional rights in a majority of countries, the small-c constitution is still a notable source of rights, especially in older constitutional systems. But although our data offers new evidence about small-c constitutional rights around the world, it also points to several substantial obstacles that any efforts to code small-c constitutions are likely to face.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Legal Studies
- Vol. 51 (2) , 329-70
The Effect of Constitutional Gender Equality Clauses
In the past decades, clauses guaranteeing gender equality have become a common feature of national constitutions. During that time, de facto gender equality also noticeably improved globally. But i...
- 1 June 2022
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Legal Studies
- Vol. 51 (2) , 329-70
The Effect of Constitutional Gender Equality Clauses
In the past decades, clauses guaranteeing gender equality have become a common feature of national constitutions. During that time, de facto gender equality also noticeably improved globally. But i...
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Constitutional Law
- Vol. 19 (5) , 1842-1853
Measurement and causal identification in constitutional law: A reply to Niels Petersen and Konstantin Chatziathanasiou
The past few decades have seen a trend toward empirical constitutional law scholarship. In a new article, Niels Petersen and Konstantin Chatziathanasiou take stock of this emerging field and suggest that this body of research may be all “smoke and mirrors.” They focus on explaining two well-documented potential problems with empirical research using observational data—omitted variable bias and measurement error—and argue that these problems are severe enough to call into question the growing body of cross-national research on the spread and effect of constitutional provisions. But while Petersen and Chatziathanasiou’s article points out genuine obstacles for empirical research in constitutional law, it fails to accurately document the way that these issues have been explained and addressed by the existing literature. In this reply, we make four points about the state of the empirical literature in comparative constitutional studies. First, we explain that the problems identified by Petersen and Chatziathanasiou have already been extensively documented and are the subject of ongoing conversation among those working in the field. Second, we describe the work that researchers have done to address these problems. Third, we argue that the methodological pluralism that Petersen and Chatziathanasiou advocate for as a way forward for the field is already well underway. Finally, we suggest that evaluating an entire literature, like Petersen and Chatziathanasiou seek to do in their article, is best done through the use of a “systematic review,” to ensure that the evaluation will offer a fair characterization of the field.
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Constitutional Law
- Vol. 19 (5) , 1842-1853
Measurement and causal identification in constitutional law: A reply to Niels Petersen and Konstantin Chatziathanasiou
The past few decades have seen a trend toward empirical constitutional law scholarship. In a new article, Niels Petersen and Konstantin Chatziathanasiou take stock of this emerging field and suggest that this body of research may be all “smoke and mirrors.” They focus on explaining two well-documented potential problems with empirical research using observational data—omitted variable bias and measurement error—and argue that these problems are severe enough to call into question the growing body of cross-national research on the spread and effect of constitutional provisions. But while Petersen and Chatziathanasiou’s article points out genuine obstacles for empirical research in constitutional law, it fails to accurately document the way that these issues have been explained and addressed by the existing literature. In this reply, we make four points about the state of the empirical literature in comparative constitutional studies. First, we explain that the problems identified by Petersen and Chatziathanasiou have already been extensively documented and are the subject of ongoing conversation among those working in the field. Second, we describe the work that researchers have done to address these problems. Third, we argue that the methodological pluralism that Petersen and Chatziathanasiou advocate for as a way forward for the field is already well underway. Finally, we suggest that evaluating an entire literature, like Petersen and Chatziathanasiou seek to do in their article, is best done through the use of a “systematic review,” to ensure that the evaluation will offer a fair characterization of the field.
- 11 October 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Journal of International Law
- Vol. 116 (1) , 1-57
The Global Evolution of Foreign Relations Law
The constitutional rules that govern how states engage with international law have profound implications for foreign affairs, yet we lack comprehensive data on the choices countries make and their motivations. We draw on an original dataset that covers 108 countries over a nearly two-hundred-year period to map countries’ foreign relations law choices and trace their evolution. We find that legal origins and colonial legacies continue to account for most foreign relations law choices. A small number of models emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western Europe, subsequently spread through colonial channels, and usually survived decolonization. Departures from received models are rare and usually associated with major political shifts. Prominent political science accounts that emphasize how states design their foreign relations law strategically to enhance their international credibility or entrench democracy or human rights appear to have limited explanatory power over the bulk of foreign relations law today.
- 11 October 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Journal of International Law
- Vol. 116 (1) , 1-57
The Global Evolution of Foreign Relations Law
The constitutional rules that govern how states engage with international law have profound implications for foreign affairs, yet we lack comprehensive data on the choices countries make and their motivations. We draw on an original dataset that covers 108 countries over a nearly two-hundred-year period to map countries’ foreign relations law choices and trace their evolution. We find that legal origins and colonial legacies continue to account for most foreign relations law choices. A small number of models emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western Europe, subsequently spread through colonial channels, and usually survived decolonization. Departures from received models are rare and usually associated with major political shifts. Prominent political science accounts that emphasize how states design their foreign relations law strategically to enhance their international credibility or entrench democracy or human rights appear to have limited explanatory power over the bulk of foreign relations law today.
- 13 October 2019
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Law and Social Science
- Vol. 15 (1) , 155-182
Empirical Studies of Human Rights Law
A growing body of empirical studies has provided important insights into our understanding of the causes and effects of codified human rights. Yet empirical research has treated human rights treaties and constitutional rights as separate domains, even though the two regimes offer many of the same rights protections and can interact and reinforce each other. In this article, we review these two bodies of literature, focusing on two lines of inquiry: studies that ( a) treat rights commitments as the outcome to be explained and ( b) examine the consequences of these commitments for state behavior. Some broad insights emerge from these literatures. First, the literatures adopt different orientations to explaining why states commit themselves to legal rights. Second, the effect of both human rights treaties and constitutions is usually small and contingent on certain legal and political environments. This review concludes by synthesizing debates over the most effective methods for measuring rights performance and for gauging causal effects.
- 13 October 2019
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Law and Social Science
- Vol. 15 (1) , 155-182
Empirical Studies of Human Rights Law
A growing body of empirical studies has provided important insights into our understanding of the causes and effects of codified human rights. Yet empirical research has treated human rights treaties and constitutional rights as separate domains, even though the two regimes offer many of the same rights protections and can interact and reinforce each other. In this article, we review these two bodies of literature, focusing on two lines of inquiry: studies that ( a) treat rights commitments as the outcome to be explained and ( b) examine the consequences of these commitments for state behavior. Some broad insights emerge from these literatures. First, the literatures adopt different orientations to explaining why states commit themselves to legal rights. Second, the effect of both human rights treaties and constitutions is usually small and contingent on certain legal and political environments. This review concludes by synthesizing debates over the most effective methods for measuring rights performance and for gauging causal effects.