Kevin L. Cope
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Kevin L. Cope has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mila Versteeg
University of Virginia School of Law
3 shared publications Charles Crabtree
Assistant Professor, Dartmouth College Department of Government
1 shared publication- Charles Crabtree
Dartmouth College
1 shared publication Cosette D. Creamer
Department of Political Science and School of Law, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455, USA
1 shared publication- Dane Thorley
School of Law, Brigham Young University
1 shared publication - Daniel Schwarcz
University of Minnesota Twin Cities
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Concept and Measure of Rights
This chapter probes the data-generating processes-both theoretical and actual-of measures of civil and political rights. That is, I identify and analyze the underlying assumptions that drive their development, providing a framework for evaluating any given existing or future rights measure. Specifically, I identify three key characteristics-conceptualization, measurement, and coverage-that together cover the core characteristics of any measure. I then use these three criteria to evaluate seven of the leading country-year-level measures of civil and political rights: CIRI/CIRIGHTS, Fariss (2014), Freedom House's Freedom in the World, Human Rights Measurement Initiative (HRMI), Ill-Treatment and Torture Data Collection Project (ITT), Political Terror Scale (PTS), and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). Based on this framework, I consider to what extent the measures capture the same or different underlying concepts, thus allowing researchers to determine how well a given set of rights data matches their research question.
- 31 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Concept and Measure of Rights
This chapter probes the data-generating processes-both theoretical and actual-of measures of civil and political rights. That is, I identify and analyze the underlying assumptions that drive their development, providing a framework for evaluating any given existing or future rights measure. Specifically, I identify three key characteristics-conceptualization, measurement, and coverage-that together cover the core characteristics of any measure. I then use these three criteria to evaluate seven of the leading country-year-level measures of civil and political rights: CIRI/CIRIGHTS, Fariss (2014), Freedom House's Freedom in the World, Human Rights Measurement Initiative (HRMI), Ill-Treatment and Torture Data Collection Project (ITT), Political Terror Scale (PTS), and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). Based on this framework, I consider to what extent the measures capture the same or different underlying concepts, thus allowing researchers to determine how well a given set of rights data matches their research question.
- Open Access
- 8 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Law & Empirical Analysis
- Vol. 3 (1) , 2-22
Grading Machines: Can AI Exam-Grading Replace Law Professors?
In the past few years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant technical advances, enabling legal-advocacy organizations to adopt them as complements to—or substitutes for—lawyers and other human experts. The role of LLMs in legal education, however, is underexplored. While several studies have examined LLMs’ performance in taking law school exams, finding mixed results, there have been no published studies systematically analyzing LLMs’ competence at one of law professors’ chief responsibilities: grading law school exams. This paper presents results of an analysis of how LLMs perform in evaluating student responses to legal analysis questions of the kind typically contained in law school exams. The data come from exams in four subjects administered at top-30 U.S. law schools. Unlike some projects in computer or data science, our goal is not to design a new LLM that minimizes error or that maximizes agreement with human graders. Rather, we seek to determine whether existing models—which can be straightforwardly applied by most professors and students—are already suitable for law exam evaluation. We find that, when provided with a detailed rubric, the LLM grades correlate with the human grader at Pearson correlation coefficients of up to 0.93. Our findings suggest that, even if they do not fully replace humans in the near future, LLMs could soon be put to valuable tasks by law school professors, such as reviewing and validating professor grading, providing substantive feedback on ungraded midterms, and providing students feedback on self-administered practice exams.
- 8 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Law & Empirical Analysis
- Vol. 3 (1) , 2-22
Open AccessGrading Machines: Can AI Exam-Grading Replace Law Professors?
In the past few years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant technical advances, enabling legal-advocacy organizations to adopt them as complements to—or substitutes for—lawyers and other human experts. The role of LLMs in legal education, however, is underexplored. While several studies have examined LLMs’ performance in taking law school exams, finding mixed results, there have been no published studies systematically analyzing LLMs’ competence at one of law professors’ chief responsibilities: grading law school exams. This paper presents results of an analysis of how LLMs perform in evaluating student responses to legal analysis questions of the kind typically contained in law school exams. The data come from exams in four subjects administered at top-30 U.S. law schools. Unlike some projects in computer or data science, our goal is not to design a new LLM that minimizes error or that maximizes agreement with human graders. Rather, we seek to determine whether existing models—which can be straightforwardly applied by most professors and students—are already suitable for law exam evaluation. We find that, when provided with a detailed rubric, the LLM grades correlate with the human grader at Pearson correlation coefficients of up to 0.93. Our findings suggest that, even if they do not fully replace humans in the near future, LLMs could soon be put to valuable tasks by law school professors, such as reviewing and validating professor grading, providing substantive feedback on ungraded midterms, and providing students feedback on self-administered practice exams.
- Open Access
- 27 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 207 (1-2) , 155-182
The decisional logic of treaty regime-making
This Article develops a positive, decision-theoretical model of the logic that states or sub-national polities use in deciding to delegate sovereignty to a multilateral treaty regime. Rather than solving one or more specific regime-design problems, this Article develops a general framework for analyzing regime creation given a variety of cooperation problems and other assumptions. Perhaps most importantly, it introduces a dual-ideal-point framework for analyzing the creation of regimes with the possibility of opt-in. I first show how these regimes can be modeled spatially, and I then develop a formal decision-theoretical model that explains what factors polities consider in drafting, negotiating, and opting into the regimes. Unlike models of generic non-cooperative bargaining in the economics and political science literatures, this model is developed around the several dynamics unique to supranational regimes, especially, voluntary opt-in rules. The model leads to several findings, pertaining to where a regime creates partial externalities (public goods), no externalities (club or private goods), or only externalities (pure public goods). More practically, the model shows how a rational polity should consider the relative distributions of these regime traits to maximize its utility during the regime’s negotiation and creation processes. Given how many traditional constitutional prerogatives have been transferred to international institutions over the past few decades, the model has theoretical and empirical implications for international and constitutional law alike.
- 27 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 207 (1-2) , 155-182
Open AccessThe decisional logic of treaty regime-making
This Article develops a positive, decision-theoretical model of the logic that states or sub-national polities use in deciding to delegate sovereignty to a multilateral treaty regime. Rather than solving one or more specific regime-design problems, this Article develops a general framework for analyzing regime creation given a variety of cooperation problems and other assumptions. Perhaps most importantly, it introduces a dual-ideal-point framework for analyzing the creation of regimes with the possibility of opt-in. I first show how these regimes can be modeled spatially, and I then develop a formal decision-theoretical model that explains what factors polities consider in drafting, negotiating, and opting into the regimes. Unlike models of generic non-cooperative bargaining in the economics and political science literatures, this model is developed around the several dynamics unique to supranational regimes, especially, voluntary opt-in rules. The model leads to several findings, pertaining to where a regime creates partial externalities (public goods), no externalities (club or private goods), or only externalities (pure public goods). More practically, the model shows how a rational polity should consider the relative distributions of these regime traits to maximize its utility during the regime’s negotiation and creation processes. Given how many traditional constitutional prerogatives have been transferred to international institutions over the past few decades, the model has theoretical and empirical implications for international and constitutional law alike.
- Open Access
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 34 (3) , 488
An Expert-Sourced Measure of Judicial Ideology - ERRATUM
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 34 (3) , 488
Open AccessAn Expert-Sourced Measure of Judicial Ideology - ERRATUM
- Open Access
- 15 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 34 (2) , 258-277
An Expert-Sourced Measure of Judicial Ideology
This article develops the first dynamic method for systematically estimating the ideologies and other traits of nearly the entire federal judiciary. The Jurist-Derived Judicial Ideology Scores (JuDJIS) method derives from computational text analysis of over 20,000 written evaluations by a representative sample of tens of thousands of jurists as part of an ongoing, systematic survey initiative begun in 1985. The resulting data constitute not only the first such comprehensive federal-court measure that is dynamic, but also the only such measure that is based on judging, and the only such measure that is potentially multi-dimensional. The results of empirical validity tests reflect these advantages. Validation on a set of several-thousand appellate decisions indicates that the ideology estimates predict outcomes significantly more accurately than the existing appellate measures, such as the Judicial Common Space. In addition to informing theoretical debates about the nature of judicial ideology and decision-making, the JuDJIS initiative might lead courts scholars to revisit some of the lower-court research findings of the last two decades, which are generally based on static, non-judicial models. Perhaps most importantly, this method could foster breakthroughs in courts research that, until now, were impossible due to data limitations.
- 15 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 34 (2) , 258-277
Open AccessAn Expert-Sourced Measure of Judicial Ideology
This article develops the first dynamic method for systematically estimating the ideologies and other traits of nearly the entire federal judiciary. The Jurist-Derived Judicial Ideology Scores (JuDJIS) method derives from computational text analysis of over 20,000 written evaluations by a representative sample of tens of thousands of jurists as part of an ongoing, systematic survey initiative begun in 1985. The resulting data constitute not only the first such comprehensive federal-court measure that is dynamic, but also the only such measure that is based on judging, and the only such measure that is potentially multi-dimensional. The results of empirical validity tests reflect these advantages. Validation on a set of several-thousand appellate decisions indicates that the ideology estimates predict outcomes significantly more accurately than the existing appellate measures, such as the Judicial Common Space. In addition to informing theoretical debates about the nature of judicial ideology and decision-making, the JuDJIS initiative might lead courts scholars to revisit some of the lower-court research findings of the last two decades, which are generally based on static, non-judicial models. Perhaps most importantly, this method could foster breakthroughs in courts research that, until now, were impossible due to data limitations.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
An Expert-Sourced Measure of Judicial Ideology
This Article introduces the Jurist-Derived Judicial Ideology Scores (JuDJIS), an expert-sourced measure of judicial traits that can locate nearly every Article III judge on a single scale. The measure derives from the text of over ten-thousand written evaluations by a representative sample of thousands of jurists, conducted over three decades and ongoing. The resulting data are interval-level, dynamic, and potentially multi-dimensional. Validation using thousands of appellate decisions indicates that the JuDJIS ideology estimates predict outcomes substantially more accurately than existing appellate ideology measures, including the Judicial Common Space. Using the data, this Article finds evidence of judicial depolarization over time, and explores presidents’ relative success in pushing the judiciary toward their preferred ideology. These pilot studies show how the data sets could open numerous avenues of research in judicial politics that were previously closed due to data limitations.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAn Expert-Sourced Measure of Judicial Ideology
This Article introduces the Jurist-Derived Judicial Ideology Scores (JuDJIS), an expert-sourced measure of judicial traits that can locate nearly every Article III judge on a single scale. The measure derives from the text of over ten-thousand written evaluations by a representative sample of thousands of jurists, conducted over three decades and ongoing. The resulting data are interval-level, dynamic, and potentially multi-dimensional. Validation using thousands of appellate decisions indicates that the JuDJIS ideology estimates predict outcomes substantially more accurately than existing appellate ideology measures, including the Judicial Common Space. Using the data, this Article finds evidence of judicial depolarization over time, and explores presidents’ relative success in pushing the judiciary toward their preferred ideology. These pilot studies show how the data sets could open numerous avenues of research in judicial politics that were previously closed due to data limitations.
- 24 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 20 (4) , 718
Foreword
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Experimental Studies on the Normative Force of Law
An important question in legal theory and policy is when people are willing to put aside their policy preferences to uphold higher-order legal values. That is, when does constitutional or international law have “normative force”? Around two dozen experimental studies have attempted to measure this question empirically, but their designs contain an inherent limitation. Subjects in the treatment group whose priors are strongly contrary to the treatment message on the legality of a policy are effectively “treatment resistant”: it is difficult to successfully treat them because their prior beliefs on the issue are entrenched. Where a significant portion of the treatment and/or control group is not successfully treated, the results will be biased towards a null finding. This article first formally models the mechanism underlying experiments on law's normative force. Using new data from a survey experiment conducted in the United States in spring 2022 among a representative sample of U.S. residents, I then demonstrate a solution to the problem of treatment resistance. The experimental design uses a post-treatment treatment uptake test, which allows me to use the experimental treatment as an instrumental variable, which in turn allows me to measure the effect of the real explanatory variable of interest: a person's true belief about a policy's higher-order lawfulness. My insight implies that the backfire effects documented by some studies do not reflect a negative response against the legal source per se, but instead result from an experimental research design relating to hot-button issues. These findings should lead us to re-evaluate both the existing body of experimental studies on law's normative force, and how we conduct future research in this domain.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessExperimental Studies on the Normative Force of Law
An important question in legal theory and policy is when people are willing to put aside their policy preferences to uphold higher-order legal values. That is, when does constitutional or international law have “normative force”? Around two dozen experimental studies have attempted to measure this question empirically, but their designs contain an inherent limitation. Subjects in the treatment group whose priors are strongly contrary to the treatment message on the legality of a policy are effectively “treatment resistant”: it is difficult to successfully treat them because their prior beliefs on the issue are entrenched. Where a significant portion of the treatment and/or control group is not successfully treated, the results will be biased towards a null finding. This article first formally models the mechanism underlying experiments on law's normative force. Using new data from a survey experiment conducted in the United States in spring 2022 among a representative sample of U.S. residents, I then demonstrate a solution to the problem of treatment resistance. The experimental design uses a post-treatment treatment uptake test, which allows me to use the experimental treatment as an instrumental variable, which in turn allows me to measure the effect of the real explanatory variable of interest: a person's true belief about a policy's higher-order lawfulness. My insight implies that the backfire effects documented by some studies do not reflect a negative response against the legal source per se, but instead result from an experimental research design relating to hot-button issues. These findings should lead us to re-evaluate both the existing body of experimental studies on law's normative force, and how we conduct future research in this domain.
- 11 October 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Journal of International Law
- Vol. 116 (1) , 1-57
The Global Evolution of Foreign Relations Law
The constitutional rules that govern how states engage with international law have profound implications for foreign affairs, yet we lack comprehensive data on the choices countries make and their motivations. We draw on an original dataset that covers 108 countries over a nearly two-hundred-year period to map countries’ foreign relations law choices and trace their evolution. We find that legal origins and colonial legacies continue to account for most foreign relations law choices. A small number of models emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western Europe, subsequently spread through colonial channels, and usually survived decolonization. Departures from received models are rare and usually associated with major political shifts. Prominent political science accounts that emphasize how states design their foreign relations law strategically to enhance their international credibility or entrench democracy or human rights appear to have limited explanatory power over the bulk of foreign relations law today.
- 11 October 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Journal of International Law
- Vol. 116 (1) , 1-57
The Global Evolution of Foreign Relations Law
The constitutional rules that govern how states engage with international law have profound implications for foreign affairs, yet we lack comprehensive data on the choices countries make and their motivations. We draw on an original dataset that covers 108 countries over a nearly two-hundred-year period to map countries’ foreign relations law choices and trace their evolution. We find that legal origins and colonial legacies continue to account for most foreign relations law choices. A small number of models emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western Europe, subsequently spread through colonial channels, and usually survived decolonization. Departures from received models are rare and usually associated with major political shifts. Prominent political science accounts that emphasize how states design their foreign relations law strategically to enhance their international credibility or entrench democracy or human rights appear to have limited explanatory power over the bulk of foreign relations law today.
- 7 October 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 33 (4) , 399-429
The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations: A theory of treatymaking
States negotiate over the specific terms of multilateral treaties because those terms determine states’ willingness to ratify the treaty. In some cases, a state might decline to ratify a treaty it otherwise supports because specific terms are too far from those it prefers. States and inter-governmental organizations negotiating treaties would like to uncover the minimal terms needed to secure the ratification of key states, but under what circumstances will those states candidly reveal those terms? Using a spatial representation of the issues in a treaty negotiation, we use mechanism design to determine what information states will reveal in a treaty negotiation. We find that states are willing to reveal how they would like tradeoffs between different issues to be resolved but not the minimal terms they require for ratification. Further, negotiations cannot always separate types that need concessions to ratify from other types that would like concessions but would ratify the treaty even if they do not receive them. These findings provide insight into how treaty negotiations can succeed or fail, and they lay the theoretical groundwork for a new line of empirical research on how multilateral treaties are negotiated.
- 7 October 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 33 (4) , 399-429
The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations: A theory of treatymaking
States negotiate over the specific terms of multilateral treaties because those terms determine states’ willingness to ratify the treaty. In some cases, a state might decline to ratify a treaty it otherwise supports because specific terms are too far from those it prefers. States and inter-governmental organizations negotiating treaties would like to uncover the minimal terms needed to secure the ratification of key states, but under what circumstances will those states candidly reveal those terms? Using a spatial representation of the issues in a treaty negotiation, we use mechanism design to determine what information states will reveal in a treaty negotiation. We find that states are willing to reveal how they would like tradeoffs between different issues to be resolved but not the minimal terms they require for ratification. Further, negotiations cannot always separate types that need concessions to ratify from other types that would like concessions but would ratify the treaty even if they do not receive them. These findings provide insight into how treaty negotiations can succeed or fail, and they lay the theoretical groundwork for a new line of empirical research on how multilateral treaties are negotiated.