ZNZvika Neeman

Zvika Neeman

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Zvika Neeman has a total of 42 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Maximizing Selection of Overlapping Alternatives

    by Erez Eliyahu, Zvika Neeman

    This paper introduces redundancy-aware greedy algorithms for the cardinality- and budget-constrained maximum coverage problems. Unlike classical greedy procedures, our approach identifies and removes previously selected alternatives that become redundant as new selections are added, thereby freeing capacity or budget for additional selection. To demonstrate practical utility, we analyze an Israel-based broadband infrastructure deployment procurement auction. Our results show that the redundancy-aware algorithm increases the number of connected households while reducing redundant households in overlap areas and approaching the LP-relaxation upper bound. Finally, while the general $$1-1/e \approx 0.632$$ 1 - 1 / e ≈ 0.632 approximation ratio remains tight in general environments, we show that in a circle-arc environment with alternative length at most $$k$$ k items, the baseline greedy guarantees $$3/4$$ 3 / 4 , whereas the redundancy-aware algorithm guarantees $$3/4+1/(4k)$$ 3 / 4 + 1 / ( 4 k ) relative to the optimal solution.

  • Open Access

    Adversarial Selection

    by Alma Cohen, Alon Klement, Zvika Neeman, Eilon Solan

    In many institutional settings, k items are selected with the goal of representing the underlying distribution of claims, opinions, or characteristics in a large population. We study environments with two adversarial parties whose preferences over the selected items are commonly known and opposed. We propose the Quantile Mechanism: one party partitions the population into k disjoint subsets, and the other selects one item from each subset. We show that this procedure is optimally representative among all feasible mechanisms, and illustrate its use in jury selection, multi-district litigation, and committee formation.

  • Open Access

    Improving Broadband Subsidy Allocation: Algorithmic and Policy Insights from Israel

    by Erez Eliyahu, Zvika Neeman

    Public broadband subsidy programs increasingly require regulators to allocate limited public funds across many geographically interdependent projects under both informational and computational constraints. When firms may submit bundled offers over clusters of areas, the winner-determination problem becomes combinatorial: the regulator must balance coverage, budget, and overlap across competing offers. We study this problem through the case of broadband deployment procurement in Israel. We compare three allocation rules: (i) a Greedy base-2 algorithm with a worst-case approximation ratio of 1 - e^{-1} ≈ 0.632 relative to the optimal solution, with computational complexity O(n^4); (ii) the algorithm implemented by the Israeli Ministry of Communications (MoC), which runs in O(n^2) time but has no known worst-case bound; and (iii) a Hybrid algorithm that combines elements of both approaches. Using a case study of fiber-optic deployment in Israel, we show that the Ministry’s algorithm and the Hybrid variant achieve broader coverage at lower cost by reducing costly overlap and improving budget efficiency, thus more effectively meeting auction objectives. Benchmarked against the optimal solution on small instances, all three methods perform close to optimal, with a modest advantage for the Hybrid and MoC algorithms.

  • Judging under Public Pressure

    by Alma Cohen, Zvika Neeman, Florian Auferoth

    We study the circumstances under which public pressure affects judging. We show that crowd pressure biases decisions in favor of the crowd for “subjective decisions” with respect to which the judge has more discretion but not for “objective decisions.” The bias is strengthened after a judge's error against the crowd and when errors are costlier to the crowd. We use data about referees' decisions and errors from the Bundesliga. We exploit three regimes where, due to the introduction of Video Assistance Refereeing (VAR) and COVID-19, both crowd pressure and the likelihood of errors vary.


  • Open Access

    Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections

    by Ran Eilat, Zvika Neeman, Eilon Solan

    There are many economic situations in which players compete to identify an uncertain event, or an "opportunity." Once an opportunity appears, seizing it quickly is critical. For example, two firms may consider the introduction of a new technology into a market, which may either be ripe for the technology or not. The first firm to identify that the market is ripe and act benefits greatly. However, acting if the market is not ripe generates large losses, and checking market conditions is costly. Other natural contexts in which competition for opportunities occurs include innovation, patenting, launching new products, selling assets, head hunting, and dating. What is common to all these examples is that the right moment to act depends on identifying an unobservable event, while taking the other player's strategy into account.


  • Open Access

    Why Not Borrow, Invest, and Escape Poverty?

    by Dagmara Celik Katreniak, Alexey Khazanov, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Hosny Zoabi

    Take up of microcredit by the poor for investment in businesses or human capital turned out to be very low. We show that this could be explained by risk aversion, without relying on fixed costs or other forms of non-convexity in the technology, if the investment is aimed at increasing the probability of success. Under this framework, rational risk-averse agents choose corner solutions, unlike in the case of a risky investment with an exogenous probability of success. Our online experiment confirms our theoretical predictions about how agents' choices differ when facing the two types of investments.

  • The rarity of consistent aggregators

    by Eyal Baharad, Zvika Neeman, Anna Rubinchik

  • The benefit of collective reputation

    by Zvika Neeman, Aniko Öry, Jungju Yu

    We study a model of reputation with two long‐lived firms who operate under a collective brand or as two individual brands. Firms' investments in quality are unobserved and can only be sustained through reputational concerns. In a collective brand, consumers cannot distinguish between the two firms. In the long run, this generates incentives to free‐ride on the other firm's investment, but in the short run, it mitigates the temptation to milk a good reputation. The signal structure and consumers' prior beliefs determine which effect dominates. We interpret our findings in light of the type of industry in which the firms operate.


  • Differential Performance in High Versus Low Stakes Tests: Evidence from the Gre Test*

    by Analia Schlosser, Zvika Neeman, Yigal Attali

    We study how different demographic groups respond to incentives by comparing their performance in ‘high’ and ‘low’ stakes situations. The high stakes situation is the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and the low stakes situation is a voluntary experimental section of the GRE. We find that males exhibit a larger drop in performance between the high and low stakes examinations than females, and that whites exhibit a larger drop in performance than minorities. Differences between high and low stakes tests are partly explained by the fact that males and whites exert lower effort in low stakes tests compared with females and minorities.