Gerhard Oskar Orosel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Gerhard Oskar Orosel has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zvika Neeman
Tel Aviv University
3 shared publications - Lise Vesterlund
University of Pittsburgh
2 shared publications - Marco Ottaviani
Bocconi University - Department of Economics
2 shared publications - Subir Bose
Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, USA
2 shared publications - Klaus G. Zauner
Department of Economics City University London London UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 20 (3) , 709-738
Quality Diversity and Prices in Markets for Experience Goods
We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good’s quality is unobservable to customers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels is technologically feasible, and minimum quality is supplied by a competitive fringe of firms. After purchase the true quality of the good is revealed. To provide firms with incentives to actually deliver promised quality, prices must exceed unit variable costs. We show that for a large class of customer preferences there is “quality polarization,” that is, only minimum and maximum feasible quality are available in the market. For the case without quality polarization we derive sufficient conditions for the incentive constraints to completely determine equilibrium prices, regardless of demand, for all intermediate quality levels.
- 22 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 20 (3) , 709-738
Open AccessQuality Diversity and Prices in Markets for Experience Goods
We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good’s quality is unobservable to customers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels is technologically feasible, and minimum quality is supplied by a competitive fringe of firms. After purchase the true quality of the good is revealed. To provide firms with incentives to actually deliver promised quality, prices must exceed unit variable costs. We show that for a large class of customer preferences there is “quality polarization,” that is, only minimum and maximum feasible quality are available in the market. For the case without quality polarization we derive sufficient conditions for the incentive constraints to completely determine equilibrium prices, regardless of demand, for all intermediate quality levels.
- 23 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 37 (2) , 203-241
Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
- 23 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 37 (2) , 203-241
Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 37 (4) , 910-928
Dynamic monopoly pricing and herding
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 37 (4) , 910-928
Dynamic monopoly pricing and herding
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (4) , 536-556
On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (4) , 536-556
On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests
- 17 January 2004
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-20
Contestable Licensing
- 17 January 2004
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-20
Contestable Licensing
- 1 December 2001
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 1 (1)
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis
We analyze the behavior of foreign banks who sequentially provide credit to finance projects in an emerging market. The foreign banks are exposed to both project-risks and the macro-economic risk of a currency crisis, and there are no bailout guarantees. Nevertheless, we show that it is often the case that banks provide too much credit too easily and that this behavior may precipitate the onset of a currency crisis. We demonstrate how the imposition of capital controls in the form of taxes and subsidies on foreign investment may improve the situation. Whereas most of the literature on currency crises focuses its analysis on debtor countries and thus on the borrowers' side, our paper illustrates that the lenders' side also deserves attention.
- 1 December 2001
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 1 (1)
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis
We analyze the behavior of foreign banks who sequentially provide credit to finance projects in an emerging market. The foreign banks are exposed to both project-risks and the macro-economic risk of a currency crisis, and there are no bailout guarantees. Nevertheless, we show that it is often the case that banks provide too much credit too easily and that this behavior may precipitate the onset of a currency crisis. We demonstrate how the imposition of capital controls in the form of taxes and subsidies on foreign investment may improve the situation. Whereas most of the literature on currency crises focuses its analysis on debtor countries and thus on the borrowers' side, our paper illustrates that the lenders' side also deserves attention.
- 1 January 2001
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 331-345
Stock Prices When Risk Attitudes Fluctuate