BLBenjamin Leidorf-Tidå

Benjamin Leidorf-Tidå

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Benjamin Leidorf-Tidå has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Citizens’ Support for EU AI Sovereignty Policy

    by Pascal König, B.J.A. Leidorf-Tidå

    This article examines EU citizens’ support for EU policy to attain digital sovereignty regarding Artificial intelligence (AI). Promoting domestic industries in AI is crucially important for attaining AI sovereignty. Yet, AI sovereignty policy ultimately hinges on support by the European public, and protective policy intervening in the EU AI market may be felt directly – and negatively – by citizens. Using survey data from Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, we examine how much citizens support AI sovereignty policy even if this comes with costs and study how political and AI attitudes are associated with this trade-off evaluation. The analysis shows that EU-centrism is positively associated with support for AI sovereignty policy whereas positive attitudes toward AI and higher trust in US and Chinese tech companies show negative associations. The results have important consequences for the EU’s possibilities to garner public support for an AI sovereignty policy agenda.

  • Open Access

    Independent Agencies, Regulation‐Compliant Citizens? Evidence From a Survey Experiment on Vaccine Authorization in the EU

    by Benjamin Leidorf‐Tidå, Saar Alon‐Barkat, Madalina Busuioc, Thijs de Boer

    The effectiveness of regulatory policy in many areas is contingent on citizens adhering to the scientific advice of regulatory bodies. This in turn depends on whether they perceive this advice as credible . One of the biggest threats to regulatory credibility is the concern that regulatory policy can be tainted by short‐term political interests. Consequently, regulation literature points to agency independence as a crucial resource to securing regulatory credibility, which in turn fosters citizen compliance. We test this assumption both observationally and experimentally in the case of the European Medicines Agency's (EMA) risk assessment for the first COVID‐19 vaccine—a prime example of reliance on credibility in regulation under conditions of controversy and concerns over political interference. We conducted a pre‐registered survey experiment with 4000 EU citizens from four countries timed shortly after the vaccine's approval and before its mass distribution. The results provide partial support that independence is beneficial to regulatory credibility and by extension, to regulatory compliance. Citizens who perceive the EMA as more independent found its risk assessment to be more credible and were more willing to take the vaccine. However, our experimental evidence is less conclusive. Thus, while independence might not in and of itself be a “silver bullet” to ensure regulatory credibility and compliance, it does play an important role, and its real‐life substantive significance would scale up considerably at population levels.

  • Open Access

    Citizen Trust in AI Regulatory Regimes in Four EU Countries

    by B.J.A. Leidorf-Tidå, Pascal König

    Trust in artificial intelligence (AI) applications is deemed crucial for uptake of the technology and the development of an AI market. In the present article, we argue that the institutional design of regulatory regimes matters for whether citizens trust AI systems. We study how trust in AI systems depends on who the responsible regulator is, the scope of the regulator’s scrutiny of AI systems, and the involvement of external stakeholders in regulatory oversight. Based on a conjoint design, we examine how respondents value these institutional design choices for the case of high-risk AI systems used in health care. Using samples from Lithuania, Romania, Sweden, and the Netherlands, with 4001 respondents overall, the pre-registered experiment shows that citizens have more trust in AI systems if vendors, civil society and especially independent researchers are involved in oversight, and if regulators actively scrutinize AI systems rather than relying solely on self-reporting. At least in two countries, citizens also seem to have more trust in AI systems if the sectoral health care regulator is the responsible regulator instead of a cross-sectoral regulator such as the national Data Protection Authority or a specific AI regulator.

  • Open Access

    Who benefits from stakeholder consultations? Fire alarms or procedural politicking?

    by Rik Joosen, Benjamin Leidorf-Tidå, Madalina Busuioc

    It is not an overstatement to say that stakeholder consultations are a ‘staple’ of modern regulatory governance. The practice of engaging stakeholders in regulatory processes has become well-establ...

  • Open Access

    Reputational drivers and deterrents of accountability: why are some EU agencies subject to more intense account-holding than others?

    by Benjamin Leidorf-Tidå

    Empirical studies have shown how some (semi-)independent agencies are intensely scrutinised by various public account-holders, while others are overlooked. Such variations in account-holding intensity have also been observed for EU agencies. This article aims to explain variations in the account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to. To this end, the account-holding that EU agencies experience from six major institutional EU account-holders has been measured based on a novel conceptualisation of ‘account-holding intensity’ as a combination of both the ‘frequency’ and the ‘diligence’ of account-holding. Based on a reputational perspective on accountability, public visibility and salience is hypothesised to drive account-holding intensity, and reputational strength and reputation-sourced authority is hypothesised to deter account-holding intensity. While reputational strength is not found to deter the overall account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to, results provide support for the hypothesis that public visibility and salience drive account-holding intensity.


  • Open Access

    Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape: A Comprehensive Review of EU agencies' Institutional Accountability Relationships*

    by Benjamin Leidorf‐Tidå, Thijs de Boer

    In this article, we propose a novel conceptualization of account‐holding intensity – defined as both the frequency and diligence of account‐holding – as an instrument for analysing the behaviour of account‐holders in the accountability landscape of EU agencies. We examine the account‐holding intensity of six major institutional EU account‐holders through a complementary mixed‐methods approach that combines quantitative survey data and qualitative interview data collected from directors and senior managers of EU agencies. Account‐holding intensity is measured through the survey data, with the interview data providing detailed insight into why some account‐holders are more/less active and/or diligent than others. The survey and interview data are furthermore triangulated with in‐depth interviews with account‐holders and unobtrusive indicators of account‐holding intensity. This amounts to a comprehensive empirical review of the EU agencies' institutional accountability relationships, which reveals how different account‐holders are driven by different institutional logics that are associated with different account‐holding intensities.


  • Open Access

    Seeking the spotlight: How reputational considerations shape the European Court of Auditor's shifting account‐holding role

    by Benjamin Tidå

    The behavior of account‐holders has been a blind spot in the accountability literature. Relatively little is known about why account‐holders prioritize certain aspects of their account‐holding mandates and emphasize certain account‐holding tasks over others. A reputational perspective has the potential to fill this knowledge gap. This article illustrates how reputational considerations shape the ways in which account‐holders manage their account‐holding roles through a critical case study of the European Court of Auditor's shifting focus toward a more salient account‐holding role. Amid concerns about a lack of visibility, generating audience attention is found to be a central characteristic of this shift. The study demonstrates how reputational strategies for managing account‐holding roles depend on the reputational threats and audience expectations that account‐holders face in their environments. With a lack of visibility being a pressing reputational threat, the European Court of Auditors is accordingly shifting its account‐holding focus toward the spotlight.