Benjamin Leidorf-Tidå
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Benjamin Leidorf-Tidå has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Madalina Busuioc
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
3 shared publications - Thijs de Boer
Institute of Security and Global Affairs Leiden University The Hague The Netherlands
3 shared publications - Pascal David König
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
2 shared publications - Rik Joosen
Politics & Public Governance, University of Antwerp
1 shared publication - Saar Alon-Barkat
School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Citizens’ Support for EU AI Sovereignty Policy
This article examines EU citizens’ support for EU policy to attain digital sovereignty regarding Artificial intelligence (AI). Promoting domestic industries in AI is crucially important for attaining AI sovereignty. Yet, AI sovereignty policy ultimately hinges on support by the European public, and protective policy intervening in the EU AI market may be felt directly – and negatively – by citizens. Using survey data from Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, we examine how much citizens support AI sovereignty policy even if this comes with costs and study how political and AI attitudes are associated with this trade-off evaluation. The analysis shows that EU-centrism is positively associated with support for AI sovereignty policy whereas positive attitudes toward AI and higher trust in US and Chinese tech companies show negative associations. The results have important consequences for the EU’s possibilities to garner public support for an AI sovereignty policy agenda.
- 20 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessCitizens’ Support for EU AI Sovereignty Policy
This article examines EU citizens’ support for EU policy to attain digital sovereignty regarding Artificial intelligence (AI). Promoting domestic industries in AI is crucially important for attaining AI sovereignty. Yet, AI sovereignty policy ultimately hinges on support by the European public, and protective policy intervening in the EU AI market may be felt directly – and negatively – by citizens. Using survey data from Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, we examine how much citizens support AI sovereignty policy even if this comes with costs and study how political and AI attitudes are associated with this trade-off evaluation. The analysis shows that EU-centrism is positively associated with support for AI sovereignty policy whereas positive attitudes toward AI and higher trust in US and Chinese tech companies show negative associations. The results have important consequences for the EU’s possibilities to garner public support for an AI sovereignty policy agenda.
- Open Access
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 20 (4) , 2315-2332
Independent Agencies, Regulation‐Compliant Citizens? Evidence From a Survey Experiment on Vaccine Authorization in the EU
The effectiveness of regulatory policy in many areas is contingent on citizens adhering to the scientific advice of regulatory bodies. This in turn depends on whether they perceive this advice as credible . One of the biggest threats to regulatory credibility is the concern that regulatory policy can be tainted by short‐term political interests. Consequently, regulation literature points to agency independence as a crucial resource to securing regulatory credibility, which in turn fosters citizen compliance. We test this assumption both observationally and experimentally in the case of the European Medicines Agency's (EMA) risk assessment for the first COVID‐19 vaccine—a prime example of reliance on credibility in regulation under conditions of controversy and concerns over political interference. We conducted a pre‐registered survey experiment with 4000 EU citizens from four countries timed shortly after the vaccine's approval and before its mass distribution. The results provide partial support that independence is beneficial to regulatory credibility and by extension, to regulatory compliance. Citizens who perceive the EMA as more independent found its risk assessment to be more credible and were more willing to take the vaccine. However, our experimental evidence is less conclusive. Thus, while independence might not in and of itself be a “silver bullet” to ensure regulatory credibility and compliance, it does play an important role, and its real‐life substantive significance would scale up considerably at population levels.
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 20 (4) , 2315-2332
Open AccessIndependent Agencies, Regulation‐Compliant Citizens? Evidence From a Survey Experiment on Vaccine Authorization in the EU
The effectiveness of regulatory policy in many areas is contingent on citizens adhering to the scientific advice of regulatory bodies. This in turn depends on whether they perceive this advice as credible . One of the biggest threats to regulatory credibility is the concern that regulatory policy can be tainted by short‐term political interests. Consequently, regulation literature points to agency independence as a crucial resource to securing regulatory credibility, which in turn fosters citizen compliance. We test this assumption both observationally and experimentally in the case of the European Medicines Agency's (EMA) risk assessment for the first COVID‐19 vaccine—a prime example of reliance on credibility in regulation under conditions of controversy and concerns over political interference. We conducted a pre‐registered survey experiment with 4000 EU citizens from four countries timed shortly after the vaccine's approval and before its mass distribution. The results provide partial support that independence is beneficial to regulatory credibility and by extension, to regulatory compliance. Citizens who perceive the EMA as more independent found its risk assessment to be more credible and were more willing to take the vaccine. However, our experimental evidence is less conclusive. Thus, while independence might not in and of itself be a “silver bullet” to ensure regulatory credibility and compliance, it does play an important role, and its real‐life substantive significance would scale up considerably at population levels.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Citizen Trust in AI Regulatory Regimes in Four EU Countries
Trust in artificial intelligence (AI) applications is deemed crucial for uptake of the technology and the development of an AI market. In the present article, we argue that the institutional design of regulatory regimes matters for whether citizens trust AI systems. We study how trust in AI systems depends on who the responsible regulator is, the scope of the regulator’s scrutiny of AI systems, and the involvement of external stakeholders in regulatory oversight. Based on a conjoint design, we examine how respondents value these institutional design choices for the case of high-risk AI systems used in health care. Using samples from Lithuania, Romania, Sweden, and the Netherlands, with 4001 respondents overall, the pre-registered experiment shows that citizens have more trust in AI systems if vendors, civil society and especially independent researchers are involved in oversight, and if regulators actively scrutinize AI systems rather than relying solely on self-reporting. At least in two countries, citizens also seem to have more trust in AI systems if the sectoral health care regulator is the responsible regulator instead of a cross-sectoral regulator such as the national Data Protection Authority or a specific AI regulator.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessCitizen Trust in AI Regulatory Regimes in Four EU Countries
Trust in artificial intelligence (AI) applications is deemed crucial for uptake of the technology and the development of an AI market. In the present article, we argue that the institutional design of regulatory regimes matters for whether citizens trust AI systems. We study how trust in AI systems depends on who the responsible regulator is, the scope of the regulator’s scrutiny of AI systems, and the involvement of external stakeholders in regulatory oversight. Based on a conjoint design, we examine how respondents value these institutional design choices for the case of high-risk AI systems used in health care. Using samples from Lithuania, Romania, Sweden, and the Netherlands, with 4001 respondents overall, the pre-registered experiment shows that citizens have more trust in AI systems if vendors, civil society and especially independent researchers are involved in oversight, and if regulators actively scrutinize AI systems rather than relying solely on self-reporting. At least in two countries, citizens also seem to have more trust in AI systems if the sectoral health care regulator is the responsible regulator instead of a cross-sectoral regulator such as the national Data Protection Authority or a specific AI regulator.
- Open Access
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-23
Who benefits from stakeholder consultations? Fire alarms or procedural politicking?
It is not an overstatement to say that stakeholder consultations are a ‘staple’ of modern regulatory governance. The practice of engaging stakeholders in regulatory processes has become well-establ...
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-23
Open AccessWho benefits from stakeholder consultations? Fire alarms or procedural politicking?
It is not an overstatement to say that stakeholder consultations are a ‘staple’ of modern regulatory governance. The practice of engaging stakeholders in regulatory processes has become well-establ...
- Open Access
- 28 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1337-1365
Legislative oversight of EU agencies through hearings: police patrols versus fire alarms?
- 28 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1337-1365
Open AccessLegislative oversight of EU agencies through hearings: police patrols versus fire alarms?
- Open Access
- 12 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 32 (1) , 235-263
From accountability victim to accountability entrepreneur: testing reputation-informed explanations of voluntary accountability among European Union agencies
- 12 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 32 (1) , 235-263
Open AccessFrom accountability victim to accountability entrepreneur: testing reputation-informed explanations of voluntary accountability among European Union agencies
- Open Access
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 30 (12) , 2739-2763
Reputational drivers and deterrents of accountability: why are some EU agencies subject to more intense account-holding than others?
Empirical studies have shown how some (semi-)independent agencies are intensely scrutinised by various public account-holders, while others are overlooked. Such variations in account-holding intensity have also been observed for EU agencies. This article aims to explain variations in the account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to. To this end, the account-holding that EU agencies experience from six major institutional EU account-holders has been measured based on a novel conceptualisation of ‘account-holding intensity’ as a combination of both the ‘frequency’ and the ‘diligence’ of account-holding. Based on a reputational perspective on accountability, public visibility and salience is hypothesised to drive account-holding intensity, and reputational strength and reputation-sourced authority is hypothesised to deter account-holding intensity. While reputational strength is not found to deter the overall account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to, results provide support for the hypothesis that public visibility and salience drive account-holding intensity.
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 30 (12) , 2739-2763
Open AccessReputational drivers and deterrents of accountability: why are some EU agencies subject to more intense account-holding than others?
Empirical studies have shown how some (semi-)independent agencies are intensely scrutinised by various public account-holders, while others are overlooked. Such variations in account-holding intensity have also been observed for EU agencies. This article aims to explain variations in the account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to. To this end, the account-holding that EU agencies experience from six major institutional EU account-holders has been measured based on a novel conceptualisation of ‘account-holding intensity’ as a combination of both the ‘frequency’ and the ‘diligence’ of account-holding. Based on a reputational perspective on accountability, public visibility and salience is hypothesised to drive account-holding intensity, and reputational strength and reputation-sourced authority is hypothesised to deter account-holding intensity. While reputational strength is not found to deter the overall account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to, results provide support for the hypothesis that public visibility and salience drive account-holding intensity.
- Open Access
- 20 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 61 (1) , 215-235
Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape: A Comprehensive Review of EU agencies' Institutional Accountability Relationships*
In this article, we propose a novel conceptualization of account‐holding intensity – defined as both the frequency and diligence of account‐holding – as an instrument for analysing the behaviour of account‐holders in the accountability landscape of EU agencies. We examine the account‐holding intensity of six major institutional EU account‐holders through a complementary mixed‐methods approach that combines quantitative survey data and qualitative interview data collected from directors and senior managers of EU agencies. Account‐holding intensity is measured through the survey data, with the interview data providing detailed insight into why some account‐holders are more/less active and/or diligent than others. The survey and interview data are furthermore triangulated with in‐depth interviews with account‐holders and unobtrusive indicators of account‐holding intensity. This amounts to a comprehensive empirical review of the EU agencies' institutional accountability relationships, which reveals how different account‐holders are driven by different institutional logics that are associated with different account‐holding intensities.
- 20 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 61 (1) , 215-235
Open AccessAccount‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape: A Comprehensive Review of EU agencies' Institutional Accountability Relationships*
In this article, we propose a novel conceptualization of account‐holding intensity – defined as both the frequency and diligence of account‐holding – as an instrument for analysing the behaviour of account‐holders in the accountability landscape of EU agencies. We examine the account‐holding intensity of six major institutional EU account‐holders through a complementary mixed‐methods approach that combines quantitative survey data and qualitative interview data collected from directors and senior managers of EU agencies. Account‐holding intensity is measured through the survey data, with the interview data providing detailed insight into why some account‐holders are more/less active and/or diligent than others. The survey and interview data are furthermore triangulated with in‐depth interviews with account‐holders and unobtrusive indicators of account‐holding intensity. This amounts to a comprehensive empirical review of the EU agencies' institutional accountability relationships, which reveals how different account‐holders are driven by different institutional logics that are associated with different account‐holding intensities.
- Open Access
- 12 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 100 (3) , 692-710
Seeking the spotlight: How reputational considerations shape the European Court of Auditor's shifting account‐holding role
The behavior of account‐holders has been a blind spot in the accountability literature. Relatively little is known about why account‐holders prioritize certain aspects of their account‐holding mandates and emphasize certain account‐holding tasks over others. A reputational perspective has the potential to fill this knowledge gap. This article illustrates how reputational considerations shape the ways in which account‐holders manage their account‐holding roles through a critical case study of the European Court of Auditor's shifting focus toward a more salient account‐holding role. Amid concerns about a lack of visibility, generating audience attention is found to be a central characteristic of this shift. The study demonstrates how reputational strategies for managing account‐holding roles depend on the reputational threats and audience expectations that account‐holders face in their environments. With a lack of visibility being a pressing reputational threat, the European Court of Auditors is accordingly shifting its account‐holding focus toward the spotlight.
- 12 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 100 (3) , 692-710
Open AccessSeeking the spotlight: How reputational considerations shape the European Court of Auditor's shifting account‐holding role
The behavior of account‐holders has been a blind spot in the accountability literature. Relatively little is known about why account‐holders prioritize certain aspects of their account‐holding mandates and emphasize certain account‐holding tasks over others. A reputational perspective has the potential to fill this knowledge gap. This article illustrates how reputational considerations shape the ways in which account‐holders manage their account‐holding roles through a critical case study of the European Court of Auditor's shifting focus toward a more salient account‐holding role. Amid concerns about a lack of visibility, generating audience attention is found to be a central characteristic of this shift. The study demonstrates how reputational strategies for managing account‐holding roles depend on the reputational threats and audience expectations that account‐holders face in their environments. With a lack of visibility being a pressing reputational threat, the European Court of Auditors is accordingly shifting its account‐holding focus toward the spotlight.