Thijs de Boer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Thijs de Boer has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Benjamin Leidorf-Tidå
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
3 shared publications Brendan Carroll
Leiden University
1 shared publication- Kutsal Yesilkagit
Leiden University
1 shared publication - Madalina Busuioc
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
1 shared publication - Saar Alon-Barkat
School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
1 shared publication Sanneke Kuipers
Leiden University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 20 (4) , 2315-2332
Independent Agencies, Regulation‐Compliant Citizens? Evidence From a Survey Experiment on Vaccine Authorization in the EU
The effectiveness of regulatory policy in many areas is contingent on citizens adhering to the scientific advice of regulatory bodies. This in turn depends on whether they perceive this advice as credible . One of the biggest threats to regulatory credibility is the concern that regulatory policy can be tainted by short‐term political interests. Consequently, regulation literature points to agency independence as a crucial resource to securing regulatory credibility, which in turn fosters citizen compliance. We test this assumption both observationally and experimentally in the case of the European Medicines Agency's (EMA) risk assessment for the first COVID‐19 vaccine—a prime example of reliance on credibility in regulation under conditions of controversy and concerns over political interference. We conducted a pre‐registered survey experiment with 4000 EU citizens from four countries timed shortly after the vaccine's approval and before its mass distribution. The results provide partial support that independence is beneficial to regulatory credibility and by extension, to regulatory compliance. Citizens who perceive the EMA as more independent found its risk assessment to be more credible and were more willing to take the vaccine. However, our experimental evidence is less conclusive. Thus, while independence might not in and of itself be a “silver bullet” to ensure regulatory credibility and compliance, it does play an important role, and its real‐life substantive significance would scale up considerably at population levels.
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 20 (4) , 2315-2332
Open AccessIndependent Agencies, Regulation‐Compliant Citizens? Evidence From a Survey Experiment on Vaccine Authorization in the EU
The effectiveness of regulatory policy in many areas is contingent on citizens adhering to the scientific advice of regulatory bodies. This in turn depends on whether they perceive this advice as credible . One of the biggest threats to regulatory credibility is the concern that regulatory policy can be tainted by short‐term political interests. Consequently, regulation literature points to agency independence as a crucial resource to securing regulatory credibility, which in turn fosters citizen compliance. We test this assumption both observationally and experimentally in the case of the European Medicines Agency's (EMA) risk assessment for the first COVID‐19 vaccine—a prime example of reliance on credibility in regulation under conditions of controversy and concerns over political interference. We conducted a pre‐registered survey experiment with 4000 EU citizens from four countries timed shortly after the vaccine's approval and before its mass distribution. The results provide partial support that independence is beneficial to regulatory credibility and by extension, to regulatory compliance. Citizens who perceive the EMA as more independent found its risk assessment to be more credible and were more willing to take the vaccine. However, our experimental evidence is less conclusive. Thus, while independence might not in and of itself be a “silver bullet” to ensure regulatory credibility and compliance, it does play an important role, and its real‐life substantive significance would scale up considerably at population levels.
- Open Access
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-29
Is crisis on the rise? An empirical study of the evolution of crisis in the European Union between 1980 and 2023
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-29
Open AccessIs crisis on the rise? An empirical study of the evolution of crisis in the European Union between 1980 and 2023
- Open Access
- 12 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 32 (1) , 235-263
From accountability victim to accountability entrepreneur: testing reputation-informed explanations of voluntary accountability among European Union agencies
- 12 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 32 (1) , 235-263
Open AccessFrom accountability victim to accountability entrepreneur: testing reputation-informed explanations of voluntary accountability among European Union agencies
- Open Access
- 20 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 61 (1) , 215-235
Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape: A Comprehensive Review of EU agencies' Institutional Accountability Relationships*
In this article, we propose a novel conceptualization of account‐holding intensity – defined as both the frequency and diligence of account‐holding – as an instrument for analysing the behaviour of account‐holders in the accountability landscape of EU agencies. We examine the account‐holding intensity of six major institutional EU account‐holders through a complementary mixed‐methods approach that combines quantitative survey data and qualitative interview data collected from directors and senior managers of EU agencies. Account‐holding intensity is measured through the survey data, with the interview data providing detailed insight into why some account‐holders are more/less active and/or diligent than others. The survey and interview data are furthermore triangulated with in‐depth interviews with account‐holders and unobtrusive indicators of account‐holding intensity. This amounts to a comprehensive empirical review of the EU agencies' institutional accountability relationships, which reveals how different account‐holders are driven by different institutional logics that are associated with different account‐holding intensities.
- 20 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 61 (1) , 215-235
Open AccessAccount‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape: A Comprehensive Review of EU agencies' Institutional Accountability Relationships*
In this article, we propose a novel conceptualization of account‐holding intensity – defined as both the frequency and diligence of account‐holding – as an instrument for analysing the behaviour of account‐holders in the accountability landscape of EU agencies. We examine the account‐holding intensity of six major institutional EU account‐holders through a complementary mixed‐methods approach that combines quantitative survey data and qualitative interview data collected from directors and senior managers of EU agencies. Account‐holding intensity is measured through the survey data, with the interview data providing detailed insight into why some account‐holders are more/less active and/or diligent than others. The survey and interview data are furthermore triangulated with in‐depth interviews with account‐holders and unobtrusive indicators of account‐holding intensity. This amounts to a comprehensive empirical review of the EU agencies' institutional accountability relationships, which reveals how different account‐holders are driven by different institutional logics that are associated with different account‐holding intensities.
- Open Access
- 19 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 101 (3) , 865-883
Why do public agencies seek accountability? The role of audiences
Accountability‐seeking behaviors of public agencies are said to be motivated, among others, by attempts at pre‐empting stricter mandatory provisions, logic of appropriateness motives, Machiavellian opportunism, reputational considerations, and a perceived need to compensate for the inadequacy of traditional arrangements. However, we do not know when a particular rationale, or a combination thereof, prevails. This study therefore examines how public agencies seek accountability, to whom and for what reason. Relying on data from 15 interviews with top‐level managers/directors and 75 survey responses, it demonstrates that the type of audience to whom the account is rendered is a key explanatory factor as to why specific mechanisms become “activated.” This study furthermore uncovers why certain rationales are associated with specific types of audiences. Thus, rather than a “holy grail” of one set of driving motivations, our study suggests, one should look at the audience to understand why a public agency seeks accountability.
- 19 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 101 (3) , 865-883
Open AccessWhy do public agencies seek accountability? The role of audiences
Accountability‐seeking behaviors of public agencies are said to be motivated, among others, by attempts at pre‐empting stricter mandatory provisions, logic of appropriateness motives, Machiavellian opportunism, reputational considerations, and a perceived need to compensate for the inadequacy of traditional arrangements. However, we do not know when a particular rationale, or a combination thereof, prevails. This study therefore examines how public agencies seek accountability, to whom and for what reason. Relying on data from 15 interviews with top‐level managers/directors and 75 survey responses, it demonstrates that the type of audience to whom the account is rendered is a key explanatory factor as to why specific mechanisms become “activated.” This study furthermore uncovers why certain rationales are associated with specific types of audiences. Thus, rather than a “holy grail” of one set of driving motivations, our study suggests, one should look at the audience to understand why a public agency seeks accountability.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 25 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Management Review
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1128-1151
Updating public accountability: a conceptual framework of voluntary accountability
Voluntary accountability is widely documented. Yet, the concept does not sit comfortably within prevailing frameworks that conceptualize accountability as an obligation. This paper sets out to update our understanding of accountability by explicitly embedding this phenomenon within the broader conceptual structure of public accountability. It demonstrates how the proposed conceptual framework can help us distinguish between voluntary accountability and related, but distinct, concepts, such as transparency. It further illustrates how the framework can help us answer pressing questions about the varying rationales behind voluntary account-giving, the audiences targeted by accounts as well as the consequences of voluntary accountability for democracy.
- 25 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Management Review
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1128-1151
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessUpdating public accountability: a conceptual framework of voluntary accountability
Voluntary accountability is widely documented. Yet, the concept does not sit comfortably within prevailing frameworks that conceptualize accountability as an obligation. This paper sets out to update our understanding of accountability by explicitly embedding this phenomenon within the broader conceptual structure of public accountability. It demonstrates how the proposed conceptual framework can help us distinguish between voluntary accountability and related, but distinct, concepts, such as transparency. It further illustrates how the framework can help us answer pressing questions about the varying rationales behind voluntary account-giving, the audiences targeted by accounts as well as the consequences of voluntary accountability for democracy.