Theofilos Gkinopoulos

Conspiracy beliefs vary substantially across countries and regions, yet the ecological factors underlying this variation remain largely unexplored. Drawing on behavioral immune system theory, which suggests that pathogen threat can heighten vigilance toward potential dangers, we examined whether pathogen prevalence predicts conspiracy beliefs. Study 1 analyzed four cross-national datasets (20-32 countries) and found that conspiracy beliefs were higher in countries with greater historical pathogen prevalence. Study 2 tested this relationship in a preregistered study using a larger sample (N = 15,503 from 55 countries) and found that historical pathogen prevalence predicted higher levels of conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 extended these findings to the US state level using data from 123,781 participants across 50 states. Finally, Study 4 (N = 493) experimentally manipulated perceived pathogen prevalence and found causal effects on generic and vaccine-related conspiracy beliefs. These findings extend behavioral immune system research by relating pathogen-rich ecologies to contemporary conspiracy thinking.

Even decades after historical traumas, their scarcity shapes victimhood perceptions and beliefs about outgroups. In one correlational ( N = 369) and one experimental ( N = 510) study, we examined how exclusive versus inclusive victim beliefs predict outgroup, World War II-related, and generic conspiracy beliefs. We also tested the mediating role of three victimogenic cognitive biases: hostile intentions attribution, negative interpretation, and memory bias. Unlike prior work focusing mainly on exclusive victimhood, our studies provide the first direct comparison of both victimhood forms, revealing their distinct and sometimes opposing effects on conspiracy thinking. Correlational results showed that exclusive victim beliefs heightened conspiracy beliefs, with different biases mediating different conspiracy types. Experimental results showed that exclusive victim beliefs increased outgroup and generic conspiracy beliefs through negative interpretation bias, whereas inclusive victim beliefs reduced WWII and generic conspiracies by weakening hostile attribution bias. We discuss the implications of the findings for intergroup relations and post-conflict beliefs.

Research on collective narcissism has overlooked the complex nature of identification, treating national collective narcissism as an alternative rather than a consequence of national identification. In four studies (n = 974, n = 1016, n = 111, and n = 210), we thoroughly examined the relations of three dimensions of national identification, national collective narcissism and negative intergroup phenomena. We proposed that national collective narcissism should be considered more as a result of the high centrality of national identity rather than an alternative form of identification, whereas strength of ties should have positive outcomes. Our results revealed that national collective narcissism mediates the relationship between centrality and negative intergroup phenomena. In two experiments, we provided evidence that national collective narcissism is a consequence of high centrality of national identity. Our findings suggest a need to reconsider the perspectives on national identification and national collective narcissism.

Through five studies, this research examined how objectively measured societal freedom and individual perceptions of it are related to reduced belief in conspiracy theories. Study 1 (N = 6,353 participants from 36 countries) examined the negative relationship between societal freedom (as measured by the Human Freedom Index) and generic conspiracy beliefs. Study 2 (N = 44,458 participants from 52 countries) focused on interest groups-related COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs - a measure not explicitly refering to government actors. Moving to the individual level, Study 3 (N = 278) examined relationships between perceived societal freedom and various conspiracy beliefs, while Study 4 (N = 246) experimentally tested whether manipulating perceptions of societal freedom affected belief in generic conspiracist beliefs as well as those related to vaccines and financial crises. Results indicated that both greater societal freedom and higher perceived societal freedom are associated with lower levels of conspiracy beliefs. In Study 5 (N = 592), we examined the psychological mechanisms mediating the relationship between perceived societal freedom and conspiracy beliefs and found the significant indirect effect of political anger. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of how both macro-level conditions can be incorporated into efforts to reduce the prevalence of conspiracy theories.

Climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing humanity. To limit its damaging impacts, billions of people must take pro-environmental actions. However, these often require effort and people avoid effort. It is vital to identify psychological interventions that increase willingness to exert effort. 3,055 people from six diverse countries completed an effort-based decision-making task (Pro-Environmental Effort Task; Bulgaria: n=404, Greece: n=85, Nigeria: n=660, Sweden: n=1090, UK: n=482, USA: n=334). Participants chose whether to exert physical effort (50-95% of their maximum) to reduce carbon emissions, after experiencing one of 11 expert crowd-sourced interventions or no intervention. We applied computational modelling to precisely quantify motivation to help the climate, compared to a closely matched non-environmental cause. We found two interventions, which reduced the psychological distance to climate change impacts or promoted climate action as patriotic and protecting participants’ way of life, had consistent positive effects on increasing effortful pro-environmental behaviours, across measures and control analyses. At the individual level, motivation to benefit the climate was associated with belief in climate change and support for pro-environmental policies. In contrast, trait apathy and effort aversion were linked with reduced motivation to benefit both the climate and food cause. Together, our results have crucial implications for promoting effortful actions that help mitigate climate change.

This paper explores willful ignorance as a socially motivated, group-basedphenomenon closely tied to conspiracy beliefs. While prior research has emphasizedindividual motives, we highlight how groups actively ignore dissonant information toprotect identity, cohesion, and status. Drawing on organizational, socio-political, andhistorical contexts, we show how both powerful and marginalized groups use willfulignorance to sustain conspiratorial narratives that affirm their worldview and deflectmoral accountability. We propose a four-dimensional model - based on valence andgroup orientation - that explains how symbolic and realistic motivations drive selectiveignorance. This framework offers a new lens for understanding how identity and powerdynamics shape belief persistence, with broad implications for addressing polarization,misinformation, and collective decision-making.

Conspiracy theories polarize people in different cultural contexts around important issues such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Across four studies, we examined whether cultural tightness, that describes the extent to which social norms are strictly enforced and deviance is discouraged, predicts various conspiracy beliefs, demonstrating a robust relationship between these two variables. In Study 1 (N = 31,894), we found that cultural tightness positively predicted COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, after controlling for individual- and country-level variables. Study 2 (N = 9,000) extended these findings to climate change, vaccine-related, and generic conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 (N = 370) examined this relationship at the individual level, showing that perceived cultural tightness predicted climate change and generic conspiracy beliefs, and that this relationship was mediated by the need for cognitive closure. Study 4 (N = 390) experimentally manipulated perceived tightness indicating that individuals exposed to a scenario about a future society based on law and order (tightness condition) reported higher climate change and generic conspiracy beliefs compared to those in the loose (a future society based on openness) and control (no scenario) conditions. These findings are discussed in light of cultural factors that can breed conspiracy beliefs.

Conspiracy theories emerge in the context of crises that affect states with far-reaching consequences. So far, little is known about the link between conspiracy beliefs and state resilience, despite a growing body of evidence on other macro-level predictors of conspiracy beliefs. State resilience has been shown to be critical for effective crisis management. However, this macro-level factor has been understudied in the context of belief in conspiracy theories. Bringing the concept of state resilience from fields such as security studies or economics to the social psychological literature on conspiracy beliefs, we conducted three studies (N = 42,643 participants nested in 51 countries, N = 297 UK participants, and N = 268 UK participants). Results showed that higher scores on the State Resilience Index (Study 1) and higher perceived state resilience (Studies 2 and 3) predicted lower COVID-19 (Study 1), climate change-related and generic conspiracy beliefs (Studies 2 and 3). The importance of state resilience as a macro-level predictor of conspiracy beliefs in the social psychological and policy-making domains is discussed.

Time constitutes a prominent tool in political communication and the themes around temporality have become central in politics scholarship. Political rhetorical communication ranges from reflection on countries’ historical pasts to projections to idealized futures for the sake of making the past relevant to the future and ensuring countries’ historical continuity. At the same time, future narratives occupy a prominent space in political discourse, built on promises and guarantees, but at the same time often return back to good old ages. These political communicative struggles between the history and the vision or between the past and the present are often appealing to audience and are often used as criteria for political decision and voting. This entry offers an overview of how different temporalities are used in political communication and the political purposes they may fulfill in politicians’ effort to appeal to their audiences. Furthermore, this entry outlines examples such as populist leadership, where struggles between different temporalities may take place and serve different political purposes. Finally, the entry provides some concluding remarks that can spark off further research interest and avenues for future research in political communication.