Maciej Siemiątkowski

Conspiracy beliefs vary substantially across countries and regions, yet the ecological factors underlying this variation remain largely unexplored. Drawing on behavioral immune system theory, which suggests that pathogen threat can heighten vigilance toward potential dangers, we examined whether pathogen prevalence predicts conspiracy beliefs. Study 1 analyzed four cross-national datasets (20-32 countries) and found that conspiracy beliefs were higher in countries with greater historical pathogen prevalence. Study 2 tested this relationship in a preregistered study using a larger sample (N = 15,503 from 55 countries) and found that historical pathogen prevalence predicted higher levels of conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 extended these findings to the US state level using data from 123,781 participants across 50 states. Finally, Study 4 (N = 493) experimentally manipulated perceived pathogen prevalence and found causal effects on generic and vaccine-related conspiracy beliefs. These findings extend behavioral immune system research by relating pathogen-rich ecologies to contemporary conspiracy thinking.

The social cure hypothesis proposes that national identification can be beneficial to the well‐being and mental health of ingroup members. However, research has also identified a social curse phenomenon in which identification can exacerbate distress and undermine recovery after trauma. We propose that these seemingly paradoxical phenomena arise from the effects of different dimensions of identification. To test this approach, we examined the context of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, as the actions of Russian troops, bombings, and the loss of homes and relatives are all sources of trauma for Ukrainians. Our research hypothesised that ingroup ties and ingroup affect would serve as protective factors, while identity centrality would serve as a risk factor for post‐traumatic stress (PTS) symptoms. Using two studies conducted among Ukrainians living in Ukraine ( N ₁ = 1012) and Ukrainian refugees in Poland ( N ₂ = 381), we consistently found that identity centrality was positively associated with PTS symptoms. In addition, Study 2 provided evidence for the protective role of ingroup ties and affect. These findings clarify how specific dimensions of national identification may function as either a ‘social cure’ or a ‘social curse’ during ongoing conflict, with important implications for mental health interventions for war‐affected populations.

Even decades after historical traumas, their scarcity shapes victimhood perceptions and beliefs about outgroups. In one correlational ( N = 369) and one experimental ( N = 510) study, we examined how exclusive versus inclusive victim beliefs predict outgroup, World War II-related, and generic conspiracy beliefs. We also tested the mediating role of three victimogenic cognitive biases: hostile intentions attribution, negative interpretation, and memory bias. Unlike prior work focusing mainly on exclusive victimhood, our studies provide the first direct comparison of both victimhood forms, revealing their distinct and sometimes opposing effects on conspiracy thinking. Correlational results showed that exclusive victim beliefs heightened conspiracy beliefs, with different biases mediating different conspiracy types. Experimental results showed that exclusive victim beliefs increased outgroup and generic conspiracy beliefs through negative interpretation bias, whereas inclusive victim beliefs reduced WWII and generic conspiracies by weakening hostile attribution bias. We discuss the implications of the findings for intergroup relations and post-conflict beliefs.

Research on collective narcissism has overlooked the complex nature of identification, treating national collective narcissism as an alternative rather than a consequence of national identification. In four studies (n = 974, n = 1016, n = 111, and n = 210), we thoroughly examined the relations of three dimensions of national identification, national collective narcissism and negative intergroup phenomena. We proposed that national collective narcissism should be considered more as a result of the high centrality of national identity rather than an alternative form of identification, whereas strength of ties should have positive outcomes. Our results revealed that national collective narcissism mediates the relationship between centrality and negative intergroup phenomena. In two experiments, we provided evidence that national collective narcissism is a consequence of high centrality of national identity. Our findings suggest a need to reconsider the perspectives on national identification and national collective narcissism.

Through five studies, this research examined how objectively measured societal freedom and individual perceptions of it are related to reduced belief in conspiracy theories. Study 1 ( N = 6353 participants from 36 countries) examined the negative relationship between societal freedom (as measured by the Human Freedom Index) and generic conspiracy beliefs. Study 2 ( N = 44,458 participants from 52 countries) focused on interest group‐related COVID‐19 conspiracy beliefs– a measure not explicitly referring to government actors. Moving to the individual level, Study 3 ( N = 278) examined relationships between perceived societal freedom and various conspiracy beliefs, while Study 4 ( N = 246) experimentally tested whether manipulating perceptions of societal freedom affected belief in generic conspiracist beliefs as well as those related to vaccines and financial crises. Results indicated that both greater societal freedom and higher perceived societal freedom are associated with lower levels of conspiracy beliefs. In Study 5 ( N = 592), we examined the psychological mechanisms mediating the relationship between perceived societal freedom and conspiracy beliefs and found the significant indirect effect via political anger. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of how macro‐level conditions can be incorporated into efforts to reduce the prevalence of conspiracy theories.

Through five studies, this research examined how objectively measured societal freedom and individual perceptions of it are related to reduced belief in conspiracy theories. Study 1 (N = 6,353 participants from 36 countries) examined the negative relationship between societal freedom (as measured by the Human Freedom Index) and generic conspiracy beliefs. Study 2 (N = 44,458 participants from 52 countries) focused on interest groups-related COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs - a measure not explicitly refering to government actors. Moving to the individual level, Study 3 (N = 278) examined relationships between perceived societal freedom and various conspiracy beliefs, while Study 4 (N = 246) experimentally tested whether manipulating perceptions of societal freedom affected belief in generic conspiracist beliefs as well as those related to vaccines and financial crises. Results indicated that both greater societal freedom and higher perceived societal freedom are associated with lower levels of conspiracy beliefs. In Study 5 (N = 592), we examined the psychological mechanisms mediating the relationship between perceived societal freedom and conspiracy beliefs and found the significant indirect effect of political anger. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of how both macro-level conditions can be incorporated into efforts to reduce the prevalence of conspiracy theories.

The key aim of the present research was to analyze the causal effects of authoritarian submission on intergroup helping intentions and susceptibility to anti‐helping misinformation in a context where authorities are mobilizing national support for the outgroup. Employing a longitudinal design, we surveyed a sample of Polish residents ( N in t ₃ = 710) to examine distinct effects of RWA facets (authoritarian aggression, conventionalism, and authoritarian submission) on intergroup helping intentions and susceptibility to anti‐helping misinformation. For the first time, we have shown that while characteristics related to certain RWA facets can encourage supportive actions that align with the directives of authorities, others may simultaneously exacerbate existing negative attitudes. Our study revealed that while conventionalism predicted increased susceptibility to anti‐helping misinformation, authoritarian submission had a negative effect on this variable. Furthermore, only authoritarian submission increased intergroup helping intentions over time, reflecting adherence to norms endorsed by authorities. These findings highlight the complexity of RWA effects, suggesting that due to their opposite signs, certain relationships might be reduced when RWA is treated as a unidimensional construct. This emphasizes the need to recognize the multifaceted nature of RWA when designing both research as well as strategies aimed at promoting harmonious intergroup relations.

Conspiracy theories polarize people in different cultural contexts around important issues such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Across four studies, we examined whether cultural tightness, that describes the extent to which social norms are strictly enforced and deviance is discouraged, predicts various conspiracy beliefs, demonstrating a robust relationship between these two variables. In Study 1 (N = 31,894), we found that cultural tightness positively predicted COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, after controlling for individual- and country-level variables. Study 2 (N = 9,000) extended these findings to climate change, vaccine-related, and generic conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 (N = 370) examined this relationship at the individual level, showing that perceived cultural tightness predicted climate change and generic conspiracy beliefs, and that this relationship was mediated by the need for cognitive closure. Study 4 (N = 390) experimentally manipulated perceived tightness indicating that individuals exposed to a scenario about a future society based on law and order (tightness condition) reported higher climate change and generic conspiracy beliefs compared to those in the loose (a future society based on openness) and control (no scenario) conditions. These findings are discussed in light of cultural factors that can breed conspiracy beliefs.

Conspiracy theories emerge in the context of crises that affect states with far-reaching consequences. So far, little is known about the link between conspiracy beliefs and state resilience, despite a growing body of evidence on other macro-level predictors of conspiracy beliefs. State resilience has been shown to be critical for effective crisis management. However, this macro-level factor has been understudied in the context of belief in conspiracy theories. Bringing the concept of state resilience from fields such as security studies or economics to the social psychological literature on conspiracy beliefs, we conducted three studies (N = 42,643 participants nested in 51 countries, N = 297 UK participants, and N = 268 UK participants). Results showed that higher scores on the State Resilience Index (Study 1) and higher perceived state resilience (Studies 2 and 3) predicted lower COVID-19 (Study 1), climate change-related and generic conspiracy beliefs (Studies 2 and 3). The importance of state resilience as a macro-level predictor of conspiracy beliefs in the social psychological and policy-making domains is discussed.

An important development in the study of face impressions was the introduction of dominance and trustworthiness as the primary and potentially orthogonal traits judged from faces. We test competing predictions of recent accounts that address evidence against the independence of these judgements. To this end we develop a version of recent ‘deep models of face impressions’ better suited for data‐efficient experimental manipulation. In Study 1 ( N = 128) we build impression models using 15 times less ratings per dimension than previously assumed necessary. In Study 2 ( N = 234) we show how our method can precisely manipulate dominance and trustworthiness impressions of face photographs and observe how the effects' pattern of the cues of one trait on impressions of the other differs from previous accounts. We propose an altered account that stresses how a successful execution of the two judgements' functional roles requires impressions of trustworthiness and dominance to be based on cues of both traits. Finally we show our manipulation resulted in larger effect sizes using a broader array of features than previous methods. Our approach lets researchers manipulate face stimuli for various face perception studies and investigate new dimensions with minimal data collection.