Gaoliang Tian
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Gaoliang Tian has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Baolei Qi
Xi’an Jiaotong University
3 shared publications - M. M. Fonseka
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China
2 shared publications - Ahsan Habib
School of Accountancy, Economics and Finance, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand
1 shared publication - Hua Feng
School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, China
1 shared publication - Ling Liu
College of Business, University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire, Eau Claire, USA
1 shared publication Liuchuang Li
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 May 2019
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 15 (5) , 829-857
Aggressive tax planning and stock price synchronicity: evidence from China
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between aggressive tax planning and stock price synchronicity.Design/methodology/approach: Employing the special institutional background of China, this study constructs tax aggressiveness and stock price synchronicity measures for a large sample of Chinese stocks spanning the period 2003–2015. The authors employ OLS regression as the baseline methodology, and a fixed effect model, the Fama–Macbeth method and GMM as sensitivity checks. Matched samples and difference-in-difference analyses are used to control for endogeneity.Findings: The authors find a significant and positive association between aggressive tax planning and stock price synchronicity. Because material information about risky tax transactions tends to be hidden in various tax accruals accounts, aggressive tax strategies make financial statements less transparent, thereby, increasing information asymmetry and decreasing stock price informativeness. The authors also find that the firms engaging in aggressive tax planning exhibit relatively high corporate opacity. In addition, the authors find that improvements in the tax enforcement regime, ownership status and high-quality auditors all constrain the adverse effects of tax aggressiveness.Practical implications: This study has important practical implications for China’s regulators, who are striving to reduce the tax burden of enterprises. It also helps investors to consider investment decisions more appropriately from a taxation perspective.Originality/value: First, this paper contributes to the stock price efficiency literature by identifying the effect of a hitherto unexamined factor, namely, firm-level aggressive tax planning, on the efficiency of stock prices. Second, this study provides further empirical evidence to support the agency view of tax aggressiveness, and the informational interpretation of stock price synchronicity. Third, this study helps us better understand the effects of firm-level tax policy on firm-specific information capitalization in an environment where overall country-level investor protection is relatively weak.
- 14 May 2019
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 15 (5) , 829-857
Aggressive tax planning and stock price synchronicity: evidence from China
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between aggressive tax planning and stock price synchronicity.Design/methodology/approach: Employing the special institutional background of China, this study constructs tax aggressiveness and stock price synchronicity measures for a large sample of Chinese stocks spanning the period 2003–2015. The authors employ OLS regression as the baseline methodology, and a fixed effect model, the Fama–Macbeth method and GMM as sensitivity checks. Matched samples and difference-in-difference analyses are used to control for endogeneity.Findings: The authors find a significant and positive association between aggressive tax planning and stock price synchronicity. Because material information about risky tax transactions tends to be hidden in various tax accruals accounts, aggressive tax strategies make financial statements less transparent, thereby, increasing information asymmetry and decreasing stock price informativeness. The authors also find that the firms engaging in aggressive tax planning exhibit relatively high corporate opacity. In addition, the authors find that improvements in the tax enforcement regime, ownership status and high-quality auditors all constrain the adverse effects of tax aggressiveness.Practical implications: This study has important practical implications for China’s regulators, who are striving to reduce the tax burden of enterprises. It also helps investors to consider investment decisions more appropriately from a taxation perspective.Originality/value: First, this paper contributes to the stock price efficiency literature by identifying the effect of a hitherto unexamined factor, namely, firm-level aggressive tax planning, on the efficiency of stock prices. Second, this study provides further empirical evidence to support the agency view of tax aggressiveness, and the informational interpretation of stock price synchronicity. Third, this study helps us better understand the effects of firm-level tax policy on firm-specific information capitalization in an environment where overall country-level investor protection is relatively weak.
- 6 November 2017
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Nankai Business Review International
- Vol. 8 (4) , 390-403
Impact of ownership types and political connection on private equity placement
Purpose: In China, private equity placement (PEP) has become the most important equity refinancing method because most listed firms issue new stocks in this method. However, previous literature has not paid much attention to the impact of political connections on PEP. In this paper, the authors aim to focus on the effect of ultimate ownership types and political connections on approval, approval time, approval results and proceeds of PEP. Besides that the authors also explore the influence of different types and levels of political connections on PEP. Design/methodology/approach: This study investigates the impact of ultimate ownership and political connections of private firms on the approval of PEPs. The authors obtain a final sample of 1,651 private placement events of Chinese-listed firms. To test the hypothesis that the authors developed in this paper, the authors use empirical models from the existing literature about political connections and corporate finance. They establish multiple linear regressions to test Hypothesis 1 and 3 and introduce a logit model to test Hypothesis 2. Findings: First, this study documents that state-owned firms have significant advantages over private firms in approval procedure. Second, political connections seem to help private firms obtain approval of placements from China Securities Regulatory Commission. Third, political connections through government officers are not useful for firms to obtain refinance resources, whereas the connections of being members of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and People’s Congress are the two valuable types of political connections to help private firms obtain approval. Originality/value: This paper has three main contributions to the previous literature. The first contribution is to provide an evidence for the relation between political connections and PEP approval procedures. The second contribution is to provide a comparison between government officer’s connection and social title’s connection. The third contribution of this paper is to reveal the influence of non-disclosed political connection on PEP approval. All the three contributions are important for understanding the relation between political connections and firm refinancial policy.
- 6 November 2017
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Nankai Business Review International
- Vol. 8 (4) , 390-403
Impact of ownership types and political connection on private equity placement
Purpose: In China, private equity placement (PEP) has become the most important equity refinancing method because most listed firms issue new stocks in this method. However, previous literature has not paid much attention to the impact of political connections on PEP. In this paper, the authors aim to focus on the effect of ultimate ownership types and political connections on approval, approval time, approval results and proceeds of PEP. Besides that the authors also explore the influence of different types and levels of political connections on PEP. Design/methodology/approach: This study investigates the impact of ultimate ownership and political connections of private firms on the approval of PEPs. The authors obtain a final sample of 1,651 private placement events of Chinese-listed firms. To test the hypothesis that the authors developed in this paper, the authors use empirical models from the existing literature about political connections and corporate finance. They establish multiple linear regressions to test Hypothesis 1 and 3 and introduce a logit model to test Hypothesis 2. Findings: First, this study documents that state-owned firms have significant advantages over private firms in approval procedure. Second, political connections seem to help private firms obtain approval of placements from China Securities Regulatory Commission. Third, political connections through government officers are not useful for firms to obtain refinance resources, whereas the connections of being members of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and People’s Congress are the two valuable types of political connections to help private firms obtain approval. Originality/value: This paper has three main contributions to the previous literature. The first contribution is to provide an evidence for the relation between political connections and PEP approval procedures. The second contribution is to provide a comparison between government officer’s connection and social title’s connection. The third contribution of this paper is to reveal the influence of non-disclosed political connection on PEP approval. All the three contributions are important for understanding the relation between political connections and firm refinancial policy.
- Top Cited Papers
- 4 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 157 (2) , 391-411
CEO Ability and Corporate Social Responsibility
- 4 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 157 (2) , 391-411
Top Cited PapersCEO Ability and Corporate Social Responsibility
- Open Access
- 28 June 2013
- Published by Clute Institute in Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Vol. 29 (4) , 963-982
Does Accessibility To Different Sources Of Financial Capital Affect Competitive Advantage And Sustained Competitive Advantages? Evidence From A Highly Regulated Chinese Market
We investigate whetheraccess to different financial capital sources offers competitive advantages inChina's highly regulated market. To identify sources and analyze financialcapital relationships that affect competitive advantages, we study 6750firm-year observations from 2000-2009. Firms gain competitive advantages whenthey can access internal and external financing in equities, bonds andequity-financed capital. Financial industry reforms benefit large private andgovernment-owned firms. Regional institutional developments help to accesssources of external financial capital. Implications include the need tomobilize external financial resources for small and private firms and furtherreform security regulations to ensure fair competition and sustainability.
- 28 June 2013
- Published by Clute Institute in Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Vol. 29 (4) , 963-982
Open AccessDoes Accessibility To Different Sources Of Financial Capital Affect Competitive Advantage And Sustained Competitive Advantages? Evidence From A Highly Regulated Chinese Market
We investigate whetheraccess to different financial capital sources offers competitive advantages inChina's highly regulated market. To identify sources and analyze financialcapital relationships that affect competitive advantages, we study 6750firm-year observations from 2000-2009. Firms gain competitive advantages whenthey can access internal and external financing in equities, bonds andequity-financed capital. Financial industry reforms benefit large private andgovernment-owned firms. Regional institutional developments help to accesssources of external financial capital. Implications include the need tomobilize external financial resources for small and private firms and furtherreform security regulations to ensure fair competition and sustainability.
- 8 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 42 (3) , 571-597
Can media deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from China
- 8 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 42 (3) , 571-597
Can media deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from China
- Open Access
- 13 February 2013
- Published by Clute Institute in Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Vol. 29 (2) , 607-620
The Network Of Interlocking Directorates And Firm Performance In Transition Economies: Evidence From China
Using a Chinese sample containing 8727 firm-years over the period from 2005 to 2010, we investigate the economic effect of interlocking directorate networks, and find that firms with central position measured by network centrality in interlocking directorate networks earn superior one- to three-year ahead performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on Sales (ROS). We also show that the economic effect of interlocking directorate network is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our evidence is important, because it shows that to some extent the interlocking directorate network can serve as an solution to the institutional voids which are derived from the reform in Chinese translation economy.
- 13 February 2013
- Published by Clute Institute in Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Vol. 29 (2) , 607-620
Open AccessThe Network Of Interlocking Directorates And Firm Performance In Transition Economies: Evidence From China
Using a Chinese sample containing 8727 firm-years over the period from 2005 to 2010, we investigate the economic effect of interlocking directorate networks, and find that firms with central position measured by network centrality in interlocking directorate networks earn superior one- to three-year ahead performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on Sales (ROS). We also show that the economic effect of interlocking directorate network is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our evidence is important, because it shows that to some extent the interlocking directorate network can serve as an solution to the institutional voids which are derived from the reform in Chinese translation economy.
- Open Access
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Clute Institute in Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1331-1344
The Impact Of Audit Committees Personal Characteristics On Earnings Management: Evidence From China
This study investigates the influence of audit committees personal characteristics on the firms earnings management behavior using Chinas publicly traded firms during 2004-2010. Overall, our findings suggest that audit committees several personal characteristics, such as age, gender, education level, and working experience, are associated with earnings management, which in turn may affect the quality of financial reporting. The results are robust after controlling the size, independence, meeting frequency of audit committee, and other firm specific characteristics. The results are consistent with the predictions based on the Upper Echelons Theory. The contributions to the earnings management literature and implications for regulators and investors are also discussed.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Clute Institute in Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1331-1344
Open AccessThe Impact Of Audit Committees Personal Characteristics On Earnings Management: Evidence From China
This study investigates the influence of audit committees personal characteristics on the firms earnings management behavior using Chinas publicly traded firms during 2004-2010. Overall, our findings suggest that audit committees several personal characteristics, such as age, gender, education level, and working experience, are associated with earnings management, which in turn may affect the quality of financial reporting. The results are robust after controlling the size, independence, meeting frequency of audit committee, and other firm specific characteristics. The results are consistent with the predictions based on the Upper Echelons Theory. The contributions to the earnings management literature and implications for regulators and investors are also discussed.
- 24 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting
- Vol. 23 (3) , 187-207
Can Government Policies Induce Earnings Management Behavior? ‐Evidence from Chinese Public Listed Firms
Earnings management behavior is a concern of standard setters, regulators, and investors. This study predicts that government policies can induce earnings management behavior. Based on a sample of 8,765 firm years ranging from 2002 to 2009, this study uses two methods to detect the effect of government policies on managers' earnings management behavior. One is the earnings distribution method developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and the other is the modified Jones model proposed by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). We find that policies issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) can induce managers of listed firms to engage in earnings management to either avoid negative consequences (e.g., delisting) or to meet requirements (e.g., refinancing). So, although the purpose of government is to protect investors as well as to promote the healthy development of the securities market, its policies are a double‐edged sword: if there is no strict and effective control mechanism, government policies can harm investors and disturb the normal order of the securities market.
- 24 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting
- Vol. 23 (3) , 187-207
Can Government Policies Induce Earnings Management Behavior? ‐Evidence from Chinese Public Listed Firms
Earnings management behavior is a concern of standard setters, regulators, and investors. This study predicts that government policies can induce earnings management behavior. Based on a sample of 8,765 firm years ranging from 2002 to 2009, this study uses two methods to detect the effect of government policies on managers' earnings management behavior. One is the earnings distribution method developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and the other is the modified Jones model proposed by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). We find that policies issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) can induce managers of listed firms to engage in earnings management to either avoid negative consequences (e.g., delisting) or to meet requirements (e.g., refinancing). So, although the purpose of government is to protect investors as well as to promote the healthy development of the securities market, its policies are a double‐edged sword: if there is no strict and effective control mechanism, government policies can harm investors and disturb the normal order of the securities market.