Baolei Qi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Baolei Qi has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gaoliang Tian
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China
3 shared publications - Ling Liu
College of Business, University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire, Eau Claire, USA
1 shared publication - Nan Hu
Department of Accounting and Finance , University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire , Eau Claire , WI , USA
1 shared publication - Rong Yang
Saunders College of Business, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY, USA
1 shared publication - Xu Li
The University of Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 42 (3) , 571-597
Can media deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from China
- 8 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 42 (3) , 571-597
Can media deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from China
- Open Access
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Clute Institute in Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1331-1344
The Impact Of Audit Committees Personal Characteristics On Earnings Management: Evidence From China
This study investigates the influence of audit committees personal characteristics on the firms earnings management behavior using Chinas publicly traded firms during 2004-2010. Overall, our findings suggest that audit committees several personal characteristics, such as age, gender, education level, and working experience, are associated with earnings management, which in turn may affect the quality of financial reporting. The results are robust after controlling the size, independence, meeting frequency of audit committee, and other firm specific characteristics. The results are consistent with the predictions based on the Upper Echelons Theory. The contributions to the earnings management literature and implications for regulators and investors are also discussed.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Clute Institute in Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1331-1344
Open AccessThe Impact Of Audit Committees Personal Characteristics On Earnings Management: Evidence From China
This study investigates the influence of audit committees personal characteristics on the firms earnings management behavior using Chinas publicly traded firms during 2004-2010. Overall, our findings suggest that audit committees several personal characteristics, such as age, gender, education level, and working experience, are associated with earnings management, which in turn may affect the quality of financial reporting. The results are robust after controlling the size, independence, meeting frequency of audit committee, and other firm specific characteristics. The results are consistent with the predictions based on the Upper Echelons Theory. The contributions to the earnings management literature and implications for regulators and investors are also discussed.
- 24 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting
- Vol. 23 (3) , 187-207
Can Government Policies Induce Earnings Management Behavior? ‐Evidence from Chinese Public Listed Firms
Earnings management behavior is a concern of standard setters, regulators, and investors. This study predicts that government policies can induce earnings management behavior. Based on a sample of 8,765 firm years ranging from 2002 to 2009, this study uses two methods to detect the effect of government policies on managers' earnings management behavior. One is the earnings distribution method developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and the other is the modified Jones model proposed by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). We find that policies issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) can induce managers of listed firms to engage in earnings management to either avoid negative consequences (e.g., delisting) or to meet requirements (e.g., refinancing). So, although the purpose of government is to protect investors as well as to promote the healthy development of the securities market, its policies are a double‐edged sword: if there is no strict and effective control mechanism, government policies can harm investors and disturb the normal order of the securities market.
- 24 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting
- Vol. 23 (3) , 187-207
Can Government Policies Induce Earnings Management Behavior? ‐Evidence from Chinese Public Listed Firms
Earnings management behavior is a concern of standard setters, regulators, and investors. This study predicts that government policies can induce earnings management behavior. Based on a sample of 8,765 firm years ranging from 2002 to 2009, this study uses two methods to detect the effect of government policies on managers' earnings management behavior. One is the earnings distribution method developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and the other is the modified Jones model proposed by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). We find that policies issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) can induce managers of listed firms to engage in earnings management to either avoid negative consequences (e.g., delisting) or to meet requirements (e.g., refinancing). So, although the purpose of government is to protect investors as well as to promote the healthy development of the securities market, its policies are a double‐edged sword: if there is no strict and effective control mechanism, government policies can harm investors and disturb the normal order of the securities market.