Flóra Samu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Flóra Samu has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Károly Takács
ELTE Centre for Social Sciences, Computational Social Science Research Group, Budapest, Hungary
3 shared publications - Andrea Fariña
Institute for Psychology, Social, Economic and Organisational Psychology, Leiden University, 2333 AK Leiden, the Netherlands
1 shared publication - Gilbert Roberts
Independent Researcher
1 shared publication - Henriette Zeidler
Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology and Health, Sapienza University
1 shared publication - Héctor Marín Manrique
Department of Psychology and Sociology, Universidad de Zaragoza, Campus Universitario de Teruel, Teruel, 44003, Spain; Comparative Minds Group, Department of Psychology, Universitat de Girona, Girona, Spain
1 shared publication - Júlia Galántai
Centre for Social Sciences
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 November 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Discourse & Society
- Vol. 37 (2) , 203-225
Gender norms and couples’ conversations on childbearing intentions: A spontaneous speech corpus-based text analysis
Couples need balance in their relationships and, at the same time, try to adjust to the expectations of their social environment. These expectations create challenges particularly if they come from and are surrounded by an environment dominated by traditional gender values. We collected a unique corpus of 100 hours of unfiltered spontaneous dyadic conversations by couples living on the same floor of a Hungarian dormitory. We analysed the topics of their conversations to gain insight into their relationship characteristics and concepts of childbearing with Structural Topic Models (STMs) jointly with survey information. We found that while dyadic conversations were balanced, couples with more traditional attitudes related more to the topic of housework. Survey self-reports indicated that housework-related tasks and their division caused most conflicts within the couples. Couples spoke about housework and in relation to their views on becoming a parent, and these discussions were not packed with emotion-laden words. Overall, our results imply that couples rationally plan childbearing irrespective of the gender norms they follow.
- 9 November 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Discourse & Society
- Vol. 37 (2) , 203-225
Open AccessGender norms and couples’ conversations on childbearing intentions: A spontaneous speech corpus-based text analysis
Couples need balance in their relationships and, at the same time, try to adjust to the expectations of their social environment. These expectations create challenges particularly if they come from and are surrounded by an environment dominated by traditional gender values. We collected a unique corpus of 100 hours of unfiltered spontaneous dyadic conversations by couples living on the same floor of a Hungarian dormitory. We analysed the topics of their conversations to gain insight into their relationship characteristics and concepts of childbearing with Structural Topic Models (STMs) jointly with survey information. We found that while dyadic conversations were balanced, couples with more traditional attitudes related more to the topic of housework. Survey self-reports indicated that housework-related tasks and their division caused most conflicts within the couples. Couples spoke about housework and in relation to their views on becoming a parent, and these discussions were not packed with emotion-laden words. Overall, our results imply that couples rationally plan childbearing irrespective of the gender norms they follow.
- Open Access
- 5 October 2022
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 9 (10)
Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling
How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition.
- 5 October 2022
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 9 (10)
Open AccessCondition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling
How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition.
- 4 October 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 376 (1838)
The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation
Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here, we identify the cognitive mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions) and to create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
- 4 October 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 376 (1838)
The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation
Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here, we identify the cognitive mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions) and to create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
- Open Access
- 4 October 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 376 (1838) , 20200302
Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding
Gossip is believed to be an informal device that alleviates the problem of cooperation in humans. Communication about previous acts and passing on reputational information could be valuable for conditional action in cooperation problems and pose a punishment threat to defectors. It is an open question, however, what kind of mechanisms can make gossip honest and credible and reputational information reliable, especially if intense competition for reputations does not exclusively dictate passing on honest information. We propose two mechanisms that could support the honesty and credibility of gossip under such a conflict of interest. One is the possibility of voluntary checks of received evaluative information from different sources and the other is social bonding between the sender and the receiver. We tested the efficiency of cross-checking and social bonding in a laboratory experiment where subjects played the Prisoner's Dilemma with gossip interactions. Although individuals had confidence in gossip in both conditions, we found that, overall, neither the opportunities for cross-checking nor bonding were able to maintain cooperation. Meanwhile, strong competition for reputation increased cooperation when individuals' payoffs depended greatly on their position relative to their rivals. Our results suggest that intense competition for reputation facilitates gossip functioning as an informal device promoting cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
- 4 October 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 376 (1838) , 20200302
Open AccessEvaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding
Gossip is believed to be an informal device that alleviates the problem of cooperation in humans. Communication about previous acts and passing on reputational information could be valuable for conditional action in cooperation problems and pose a punishment threat to defectors. It is an open question, however, what kind of mechanisms can make gossip honest and credible and reputational information reliable, especially if intense competition for reputations does not exclusively dictate passing on honest information. We propose two mechanisms that could support the honesty and credibility of gossip under such a conflict of interest. One is the possibility of voluntary checks of received evaluative information from different sources and the other is social bonding between the sender and the receiver. We tested the efficiency of cross-checking and social bonding in a laboratory experiment where subjects played the Prisoner's Dilemma with gossip interactions. Although individuals had confidence in gossip in both conditions, we found that, overall, neither the opportunities for cross-checking nor bonding were able to maintain cooperation. Meanwhile, strong competition for reputation increased cooperation when individuals' payoffs depended greatly on their position relative to their rivals. Our results suggest that intense competition for reputation facilitates gossip functioning as an informal device promoting cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.