FSFlóra Samu

Flóra Samu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Flóra Samu has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Gender norms and couples’ conversations on childbearing intentions: A spontaneous speech corpus-based text analysis

    by Júlia Galántai, Flóra Samu, Károly Takács

    Couples need balance in their relationships and, at the same time, try to adjust to the expectations of their social environment. These expectations create challenges particularly if they come from and are surrounded by an environment dominated by traditional gender values. We collected a unique corpus of 100 hours of unfiltered spontaneous dyadic conversations by couples living on the same floor of a Hungarian dormitory. We analysed the topics of their conversations to gain insight into their relationship characteristics and concepts of childbearing with Structural Topic Models (STMs) jointly with survey information. We found that while dyadic conversations were balanced, couples with more traditional attitudes related more to the topic of housework. Survey self-reports indicated that housework-related tasks and their division caused most conflicts within the couples. Couples spoke about housework and in relation to their views on becoming a parent, and these discussions were not packed with emotion-laden words. Overall, our results imply that couples rationally plan childbearing irrespective of the gender norms they follow.

  • Open Access

    Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling

    by Szabolcs Számadó, Flóra Samu, Károly Takács

    How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition.


  • The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation

    by Héctor M. Manrique, Henriette Zeidler, Gilbert Roberts, Pat Barclay, Michael Walker, Flóra Samu, Andrea Fariña, Redouan Bshary, Nichola Raihani

    Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here, we identify the cognitive mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions) and to create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.


  • Open Access

    Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding

    by Flóra Samu, Károly Takács

    Gossip is believed to be an informal device that alleviates the problem of cooperation in humans. Communication about previous acts and passing on reputational information could be valuable for conditional action in cooperation problems and pose a punishment threat to defectors. It is an open question, however, what kind of mechanisms can make gossip honest and credible and reputational information reliable, especially if intense competition for reputations does not exclusively dictate passing on honest information. We propose two mechanisms that could support the honesty and credibility of gossip under such a conflict of interest. One is the possibility of voluntary checks of received evaluative information from different sources and the other is social bonding between the sender and the receiver. We tested the efficiency of cross-checking and social bonding in a laboratory experiment where subjects played the Prisoner's Dilemma with gossip interactions. Although individuals had confidence in gossip in both conditions, we found that, overall, neither the opportunities for cross-checking nor bonding were able to maintain cooperation. Meanwhile, strong competition for reputation increased cooperation when individuals' payoffs depended greatly on their position relative to their rivals. Our results suggest that intense competition for reputation facilitates gossip functioning as an informal device promoting cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.