LMLiu Ming

Liu Ming

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Liu Ming has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Reducing Traffic Incidents in Meal Deliveries: Penalize the Platform or Its Independent Drivers?

    by Wenchang Zhang, Christopher S. Tang, Liu Ming, Yue Cheng

    Problem definition: Some governments have toughened traffic penalties for meal-delivery drivers, yet the number of meal delivery–related traffic incidents has not abated. These observations prompted two questions: Under a given penalty scheme, how should a profit-maximizing platform determine the delivery fee to charge its customers and the commission to pay its drivers? How should a welfare-maximizing government determine its penalty scheme to curb traffic incidents and improve the social surplus of all stakeholders? Methodology/results: We represent the system dynamics using a three-stage game-theoretic model, from which our equilibrium analysis yields three key insights. First, penalizing the platform for delivery-related incidents is more effective at reducing risky driving than penalizing drivers. Higher platform penalties discourage unrealistic delivery-time promises, allowing drivers to lower their driving speeds. By contrast, increasing driver penalties does not consistently curb risky driving, because the platform may offset penalties by raising driver commissions, which further incentivizes speeding. Second, lowering driver penalties expands the platform’s service area by encouraging drivers to accept longer-distance or lower-paying orders. Third, penalizing only the platform—rather than the drivers—maximizes total social surplus, provided the penalty is not set excessively high, which could undermine the balance between safety and market coverage. Our findings remain robust even when key modeling assumptions are relaxed separately. We illustrate our findings using data collected from a Chinese meal-delivery platform. Managerial implications: Governments should shift from penalizing drivers to targeting platforms, acknowledging their pivotal role in shaping driver behavior. This policy change would incentivize platforms to promote safe driving practices over speedy deliveries. Funding: The work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72271212]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0259 .


  • Operations Management in the Sharing Economy: Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities

    by Huan Cao, Liu Ming, Daehoon Noh, David Simchi-Levi, Tunay Tunca, Yi Xu, Weiming Zhu

    The rapid growth of the sharing economy over the past decade has changed many industries in profound ways. The innovative business models that have emerged in the sharing economy present unique opportunities as well as challenges, which have attracted a significant amount of attention from researchers in the operations management field. In this paper, we discuss the advances, challenges, and opportunities for research on operations management in the sharing economy. We divide sharing economy into eight categories: Ride Sharing, Space Sharing, Bike Sharing, Vehicle Sharing, Group Buying, Crowdfunding, Freelancing, and Last-Mile Delivery. For each business category, we identify the gaps and current challenges in the existing literature, discuss emerging industry trends and research topics, and suggest several future research directions. Our goal is to stimulate discussion and ideas about future studies in this area.

  • Omnichannel Operations in On-Demand Delivery Platform with Buy-Online-and-Pick-up-in-Store

    by Yu Guo, Fei Gao, Wenchang Zhang, Liu Ming

    Problem definition: This paper studies an emerging omnichannel on-demand economy, where consumers decide how their orders are delivered through a platform: fulfilled by independent couriers or picked up in-store by themselves. We analyze the platform’s optimal pricing strategies across service channels and its wage-setting decisions for couriers and assess the resulting welfare implications. Methodology/results: We develop a stylized model to study how buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store (BOPS) influences pricing on both the courier and consumer sides. We then estimate model primitives using data from a leading meal-delivery platform in China and use these estimates to quantify the effects of BOPS. Our main results are as follows. First, although it is widely recognized that price is positively related to demand for gig services, this conventional wisdom no longer holds in an omnichannel environment with BOPS, particularly when consumers are less sensitive to delivery congestion. Second, although BOPS shifts the burden of delivery cost from the platform to consumers, the BOPS-channel price need not be lower than the delivery-channel price in a gig-economy setting. Third, although BOPS always improves platform and merchant profits, it enhances consumer surplus only when market demand is sufficiently great while consistently reducing courier welfare. Managerial implications: In an omnichannel environment, pricing strategies proven effective in the traditional gig economy may become suboptimal. Moreover, because the gains from BOPS are unevenly distributed, platform managers and policymakers should look beyond aggregate gains and consider the welfare losses that BOPS adoption imposes on couriers. Funding: Y. Guo gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72471218 and 72188101]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2025.0109 .

  • Consumer Equilibrium, Demand Effects, and Efficiency in Group Buying

    by Liu Ming, Tunay I. Tunca

    Problem definition: We explore consumer equilibrium and efficiency in group buying events, in which the unit price for a good or service decreases with higher number of consumer sign-ups. Specifically, we study the following questions: (i) How does the dynamic consumer sign-up equilibrium evolve during these events? (ii) Is there empirical evidence that employing group buying increases demand? If so, by how much? (iii) Are there profit gains from employing this mechanism and how can they be improved? Academic/practical relevance: Group buying events are becoming increasingly popular in certain markets, especially in China. Our study contributes to better understanding of this innovative pricing mechanism and its effects on demand and profits, and can help with more effective implementation in practice. Methodology: We build a continuous-time dynamic game theoretical model to study consumer behavior and solve for its equilibrium. We then apply it to data obtained from group buying events employed by a large retailer and use structural regression methods and data clustering to estimate and evaluate demand and profit effects. Results: We demonstrate that our theoretical equilibrium is a good fit for the observed consumer behavior. We empirically show that group buying discounts are not very effective in boosting demand for very low and very high base demand levels but can significantly improve demand for intermediate levels. We estimate that employing group buying improved the retailer’s product demand and profits by 16.6% and 11.1%, respectively, and with better price and discount selections, it can improve profits by more than 30% on average. Managerial implications: Our theoretical model provides insights into dynamic consumer behavior during group buying events and can be a basis for researchers and practitioners in studying and designing these events. Our findings provide concrete support for managers on benefits of employing the mechanism, and our data-based method and analysis provide guidance for improving performance.


  • The Incentive Game Under Target Effects in Ridesharing: A Structural Econometric Analysis

    by Xirong Chen, Zheng Li, Liu Ming, Weiming Zhu

    Problem definition: We study a ridesharing platform’s optimal bonus-setting decisions for capacity and profit maximization problems in which drivers set daily income targets. Academic and Practical Relevance: Sharing-economy companies have been providing monetary rewards to incentivize self-scheduled drivers to work longer. We study the effectiveness of the monetary bonus scheme in the context of the ridesharing industry, where the drivers are highly heterogeneous and set income targets. Methodology: We model a driver’s decision-making processes and the platform’s optimization problem as a Stackelberg game. Then, utilizing comprehensive datasets obtained from a leading ridesharing platform, we develop a novel empirical strategy to provide evidence on the existence of drivers’ income-targeting behavior through a reduced-form and structural analysis. Furthermore, we perform a counterfactual analysis to calculate the optimal bonus rates for different scenarios by using the characteristics of heterogeneous drivers derived from the estimation outcomes. Results: Our theoretical model suggests that the drivers’ working hours do not increase monotonically with the bonus rate under the target effect and that the platform may not use all its budget on bonuses to maximize capacity or profit. We empirically demonstrate that the drivers engage in income-targeting behavior, and furthermore, we estimate the income targets for heterogeneous drivers. Through counterfactual analysis, we illustrate how the optimal bonus scheme varies when the platform faces different driver compositions and market conditions. We also find that, compared with the platform’s previous bonus setting, the optimal bonus strategy improves the capacity level during peak hours by as much as 26%, boosting the total profit by $4.3 million per month. Managerial implications: It is challenging to develop a flexible self-scheduled supply of drivers that can match the ever-changing demand and maintain the market share of the ridesharing platform. When offering monetary bonuses to incentivize drivers to work longer, the drivers’ income-targeting behavior can undermine the effectiveness of such bonus schemes. The platform needs to understand the heterogeneity of drivers’ behavioral preferences regarding monetary rewards to design an effective bonus strategy.