Fang-Yu Chen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Fang-Yu Chen has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Austin Horng-En Wang
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA
5 shared publications - Yao-Yuan Yeh
Department of International Studies & Modern Languages University of St. Thomas Houston Texas USA
4 shared publications - Charles K. S. Wu
University of South Alabama
3 shared publications Charles K.S. Wu
University of South Alabama
1 shared publicationCharles Ks Wu
Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, University of South Alabama, Mobile, AL, USA
1 shared publicationYao-Yuan Yeh
University of Saint Thomas
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 October 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
‘Apes Together Strong’: How Assurance Trumps Moral Hazard in Alliances
Moral hazard (MH) has been a persistent concern in U.S. alliance politics, which assumes that allies are motivated to reduce their defense efforts in response to stronger U.S. commitments. Cases from recent literature, including Taiwan’s substantial increase in defense spending between 2021 and 2024 when the Biden administration accidentally emphasized its assurances, challenge this MH assumption. This article proposes goal interdependence (GI) as an alternative explanation: when the U.S. and its allies share the same strategic goal, such as maintaining the status quo, perceived U.S. efforts trigger reciprocal contributions rather than free riding. Evidence from a survey experiment (PollcracyLab, 2025, n = 1,300) and a nationally representative survey (TNSS, 2024, n = 1,506) in Taiwan supports the GI mechanism but not the MH. The findings offer theoretical and policy implications for understanding alliance behavior and sustaining deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.
- 8 October 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
Open Access‘Apes Together Strong’: How Assurance Trumps Moral Hazard in Alliances
Moral hazard (MH) has been a persistent concern in U.S. alliance politics, which assumes that allies are motivated to reduce their defense efforts in response to stronger U.S. commitments. Cases from recent literature, including Taiwan’s substantial increase in defense spending between 2021 and 2024 when the Biden administration accidentally emphasized its assurances, challenge this MH assumption. This article proposes goal interdependence (GI) as an alternative explanation: when the U.S. and its allies share the same strategic goal, such as maintaining the status quo, perceived U.S. efforts trigger reciprocal contributions rather than free riding. Evidence from a survey experiment (PollcracyLab, 2025, n = 1,300) and a nationally representative survey (TNSS, 2024, n = 1,506) in Taiwan supports the GI mechanism but not the MH. The findings offer theoretical and policy implications for understanding alliance behavior and sustaining deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 88 (4) , 1309-1324
Undercurrent in Taiwan: Nationalism and Calculation of the Cross-Strait Relations (2002–2022)
The literature highlights the conflicting trends between rising nationalism and stable preferences for status quo on cross-strait relations in Taiwan. This article provides new insights from the Taiwan National Security Survey (2002–2022, 14 waves, n = 16, 494) to help explain this apparent inconsistency. The surveys employed “conditional preference” items to capture how the cross-strait attitudes of Taiwanese people are shaped. Since 2002, Taiwanese identifiers have increased steadily, while dual identifiers have decreased. Most respondents still prefer the status quo, but there is a gradual rise in support for independence. Hypothetical scenarios reveal that a majority support independence if China will not attack and oppose unification if China and Taiwan differ economically and politically. Furthermore, the percentage supporting independence given China will attack is increasing, while the percentage supporting unification if China and Taiwan are similar has considerably decreased. Conditional preferences are influenced by perceived economic benefits from China and the military strength of China, Taiwan, and the United States.
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 88 (4) , 1309-1324
Undercurrent in Taiwan: Nationalism and Calculation of the Cross-Strait Relations (2002–2022)
The literature highlights the conflicting trends between rising nationalism and stable preferences for status quo on cross-strait relations in Taiwan. This article provides new insights from the Taiwan National Security Survey (2002–2022, 14 waves, n = 16, 494) to help explain this apparent inconsistency. The surveys employed “conditional preference” items to capture how the cross-strait attitudes of Taiwanese people are shaped. Since 2002, Taiwanese identifiers have increased steadily, while dual identifiers have decreased. Most respondents still prefer the status quo, but there is a gradual rise in support for independence. Hypothetical scenarios reveal that a majority support independence if China will not attack and oppose unification if China and Taiwan differ economically and politically. Furthermore, the percentage supporting independence given China will attack is increasing, while the percentage supporting unification if China and Taiwan are similar has considerably decreased. Conditional preferences are influenced by perceived economic benefits from China and the military strength of China, Taiwan, and the United States.
- 27 April 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 20 (3)
Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, and Dual Clarity
The United States has successfully prevented the military conflict between China and Taiwan since the 1980s through the Strategic Ambiguity (SA) strategy, which discourages both sides from deviating from the status quo by not committing to defend or not to defend Taiwan. The recent US–China tensions and the rising nationalism in China and Taiwan drew critics to SA and suggested it be replaced with the strategic clarity strategy. We argue that the choice of Dual Clarity (DC)—the United States promises to defend only if Taiwan does not unilaterally declare de jure independence—is widely ignored. We examine the psychological mechanisms behind the three strategies through a pre-registered, within-subject survey experiment in Taiwan (n = 910). The result shows that DC can keep the status quo similar to SA—respondents lowered their support of independence in both DC and SA conditions. The results hold through robustness checks and formalized by a game-theoretical model.
- 27 April 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 20 (3)
Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, and Dual Clarity
The United States has successfully prevented the military conflict between China and Taiwan since the 1980s through the Strategic Ambiguity (SA) strategy, which discourages both sides from deviating from the status quo by not committing to defend or not to defend Taiwan. The recent US–China tensions and the rising nationalism in China and Taiwan drew critics to SA and suggested it be replaced with the strategic clarity strategy. We argue that the choice of Dual Clarity (DC)—the United States promises to defend only if Taiwan does not unilaterally declare de jure independence—is widely ignored. We examine the psychological mechanisms behind the three strategies through a pre-registered, within-subject survey experiment in Taiwan (n = 910). The result shows that DC can keep the status quo similar to SA—respondents lowered their support of independence in both DC and SA conditions. The results hold through robustness checks and formalized by a game-theoretical model.
- 31 August 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 22 (4) , 784-802
The Multiverse of Taiwan’s Future: Reconsidering the Independence–Unification (Tondu) Attitudes
For decades, scholars have constructed various ways to measure Taiwanese public opinion on the nation’s future, the independence–unification ( Tondu) question. While existing surveys find that Taiwanese people become more likely to support independence, the majority still favors the “status quo” option. Existing measurements have a number of weaknesses. For instance, most do not inform citizens what the “status quo” means, nor do they specify when and how independence and unification will manifest in reality. We propose a new approach to measuring citizens’ preferences of the nation’s future by specifying five mutually exclusive options on the independence–unification spectrum and field a nationwide survey to illustrate the validity of the new typology. Compared with traditional measurements, our method has more substantial explanatory power for several key political issues in Taiwan.
- 31 August 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 22 (4) , 784-802
The Multiverse of Taiwan’s Future: Reconsidering the Independence–Unification (Tondu) Attitudes
For decades, scholars have constructed various ways to measure Taiwanese public opinion on the nation’s future, the independence–unification ( Tondu) question. While existing surveys find that Taiwanese people become more likely to support independence, the majority still favors the “status quo” option. Existing measurements have a number of weaknesses. For instance, most do not inform citizens what the “status quo” means, nor do they specify when and how independence and unification will manifest in reality. We propose a new approach to measuring citizens’ preferences of the nation’s future by specifying five mutually exclusive options on the independence–unification spectrum and field a nationwide survey to illustrate the validity of the new typology. Compared with traditional measurements, our method has more substantial explanatory power for several key political issues in Taiwan.
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 49 (1) , 132-146
High-level visit and national security policy: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Taiwan
Great powers often use high-level visits to reassure weaker states. The literature on public diplomacy shows that these visits can bring a number of advantages while overlooking their potential impact on increasing support for the great power’s security agenda and confidence in the host country’s defense policy and military. This note employed a quasi-experiment in Taiwan, in which three high-profile US Senators visited Taiwan unexpectedly during a one-week national survey (n = 1,500) in June 2021. Propensity score matching and regression discontinuity analysis showed that the visit significantly increased Taiwanese respondents’ confidence in their own military, the government’s security policy, and support for the security policy favored by the US (strengthening the Taiwanese military). Limitations, scope conditions, and suggestions for future work were also discussed. Las grandes potencias suelen utilizar las visitas de alto nivel para tranquilizar a los Estados más débiles. La literatura sobre diplomacia pública muestra que estas visitas pueden aportar una serie de ventajas, al tiempo que pasa por alto su impacto potencial en el aumento del apoyo a la agenda de seguridad de la gran potencia y de la confianza en la política de defensa y el ejército del país anfitrión. Esta nota empleó un cuasi-experimento en Taiwán, en el que tres senadores estadounidenses de alto perfil visitaron Taiwán inesperadamente durante una encuesta nacional de una semana (n = 1500) en junio de 2021. El pareamiento por puntaje de propensión y el análisis de regresión discontinua mostraron que la visita aumentó significativamente la confianza de los encuestados taiwaneses en su propio ejército, la política de seguridad del gobierno y el apoyo a la política de seguridad propugnada por Estados Unidos (fortalecimiento del ejército taiwanés). También se debatieron las limitaciones, las condiciones del ámbito de aplicación y las sugerencias para futuros trabajos. Généralement, les grandes puissances emploient les visites officielles pour réassurer les États plus faibles. La littérature sur la diplomatie politique montre que ces visites peuvent apporter quantité d’avantages, mais omet l’effet potentiel de renforcement du soutien au programme de sécurité de la grande puissance et de la confiance dans la politique de défense et l’armée du pays hôte. Cette note s’appuie sur une quasi-expérience à Taïwan, au cours de laquelle trois importants sénateurs américains ont effectué une visite inattendue à Taïwan, lors d’un sondage national d’une semaine (n = 1 500) en juin 2021. L’appariement sur le score de propension et l’analyse de la régression sur discontinuité ont montré que la visite a fortement renforcé la confiance des Taïwanais interrogés en leur propre armée, la politique de sécurité du gouvernement et le soutien à la politique de sécurité que préféraient les États-Unis (renforcement de l’armée taïwanaise). Nous nous sommes également intéressés aux limites, aux conditions du champ d’application et aux suggestions de travaux ultérieurs.
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 49 (1) , 132-146
High-level visit and national security policy: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Taiwan
Great powers often use high-level visits to reassure weaker states. The literature on public diplomacy shows that these visits can bring a number of advantages while overlooking their potential impact on increasing support for the great power’s security agenda and confidence in the host country’s defense policy and military. This note employed a quasi-experiment in Taiwan, in which three high-profile US Senators visited Taiwan unexpectedly during a one-week national survey (n = 1,500) in June 2021. Propensity score matching and regression discontinuity analysis showed that the visit significantly increased Taiwanese respondents’ confidence in their own military, the government’s security policy, and support for the security policy favored by the US (strengthening the Taiwanese military). Limitations, scope conditions, and suggestions for future work were also discussed. Las grandes potencias suelen utilizar las visitas de alto nivel para tranquilizar a los Estados más débiles. La literatura sobre diplomacia pública muestra que estas visitas pueden aportar una serie de ventajas, al tiempo que pasa por alto su impacto potencial en el aumento del apoyo a la agenda de seguridad de la gran potencia y de la confianza en la política de defensa y el ejército del país anfitrión. Esta nota empleó un cuasi-experimento en Taiwán, en el que tres senadores estadounidenses de alto perfil visitaron Taiwán inesperadamente durante una encuesta nacional de una semana (n = 1500) en junio de 2021. El pareamiento por puntaje de propensión y el análisis de regresión discontinua mostraron que la visita aumentó significativamente la confianza de los encuestados taiwaneses en su propio ejército, la política de seguridad del gobierno y el apoyo a la política de seguridad propugnada por Estados Unidos (fortalecimiento del ejército taiwanés). También se debatieron las limitaciones, las condiciones del ámbito de aplicación y las sugerencias para futuros trabajos. Généralement, les grandes puissances emploient les visites officielles pour réassurer les États plus faibles. La littérature sur la diplomatie politique montre que ces visites peuvent apporter quantité d’avantages, mais omet l’effet potentiel de renforcement du soutien au programme de sécurité de la grande puissance et de la confiance dans la politique de défense et l’armée du pays hôte. Cette note s’appuie sur une quasi-expérience à Taïwan, au cours de laquelle trois importants sénateurs américains ont effectué une visite inattendue à Taïwan, lors d’un sondage national d’une semaine (n = 1 500) en juin 2021. L’appariement sur le score de propension et l’analyse de la régression sur discontinuité ont montré que la visite a fortement renforcé la confiance des Taïwanais interrogés en leur propre armée, la politique de sécurité du gouvernement et le soutien à la politique de sécurité que préféraient les États-Unis (renforcement de l’armée taïwanaise). Nous nous sommes également intéressés aux limites, aux conditions du champ d’application et aux suggestions de travaux ultérieurs.