YXYi Xu

Yi Xu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yi Xu has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Operations Management in the Sharing Economy: Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities

    by Huan Cao, Liu Ming, Daehoon Noh, David Simchi-Levi, Tunay Tunca, Yi Xu, Weiming Zhu

    The rapid growth of the sharing economy over the past decade has changed many industries in profound ways. The innovative business models that have emerged in the sharing economy present unique opportunities as well as challenges, which have attracted a significant amount of attention from researchers in the operations management field. In this paper, we discuss the advances, challenges, and opportunities for research on operations management in the sharing economy. We divide sharing economy into eight categories: Ride Sharing, Space Sharing, Bike Sharing, Vehicle Sharing, Group Buying, Crowdfunding, Freelancing, and Last-Mile Delivery. For each business category, we identify the gaps and current challenges in the existing literature, discuss emerging industry trends and research topics, and suggest several future research directions. Our goal is to stimulate discussion and ideas about future studies in this area.

  • Evolution of Ride Services: From Ride Hailing to Autonomous Vehicles

    by Daehoon Noh, Tunay I. Tunca, Yi Xu

    In recent years, the ride service industry has been evolving rapidly, driven by disruptive technologies such as mobile apps, artificial intelligence, and autonomous vehicles (AVs). Whereas platform-based decentralized ride-hailing (RH) companies have gained significant market share, vertically integrated robotaxi services using emerging AVs are starting to enter the market. In this paper, we aim to provide insights about the evolution and the future of ride services, studying these two competing business approaches. We game-theoretically model and analyze the competition between a platform-based RH firm and an AV-based ride-service firm. Although the AV model has a capacity commitment advantage, we find that, in larger markets with sufficiently patient customers, the RH firm surprisingly gains the upper hand in competition, having higher market share and profits as well as lower service delays and higher prices even if it has a cost disadvantage. Further, entry of the AV firm into a market with an RH monopolist incumbent may reduce total vehicle supply and increase customer wait costs. We also find that, when customers are impatient, the entry of a high-cost AV firm may lead to a decrease in social welfare despite introducing competition, suggesting that regulators should be careful about introduction of robotaxi services in a market if they are not sufficiently cost-efficient. From a broader perspective, our results demonstrate that platform business models may have significant strategic advantages over firms with traditional vertically integrated models under competition, and loss of platforms’ dominance in a market may result in welfare losses. This paper was accepted by Victor Martinez-de-Albeniz, operations management. Funding: This study is partially supported by Korea University Business School Research Grant. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.02733 .


  • Market Formation, Pricing, and Value Generation in Ride-Hailing Services

    by Liu Ming, Tunay Tunca, Yi Xu, Weiming Zhu

    Problem definition: We empirically study the market for ride-hailing services. In particular, we explore the following questions: (i) How do the two-sided market and prices jointly form in ride-hailing marketplaces? (ii) Does surge pricing create value, and for whom? How can its efficiency be improved? (iii) Can platforms’ strategy on revenue sharing with drivers be improved? (iv) What is the value generated by ride-hailing services, including hosting rival taxi services on ride-hailing apps? Methodology/results: We develop a discrete choice model for the formation of mutually dependent demand (customer side) and supply (driver side) that jointly determine pricing. Using this model and a comprehensive data set obtained from the largest mobile ride platform in China, we estimate customer and driver price elasticities and other factors that affect market participation for the company’s two main markets, namely, basic ride-hailing and taxi services. Based on these estimation results and counterfactual analysis, we demonstrate that surge pricing improves customer and driver welfare as well as platform revenues while counterintuitively reducing taxi revenues on the platform. However, surge pricing should be avoided during nonpeak hours because it can hurt both customer and platform surplus. We show that platform revenues can be improved by increasing drivers’ revenue share from the current levels. Finally, we estimate that the platform’s basic ride-hailing services generated customer value equivalent to $13.25 billion in China in 2024, and hosting rival taxi services on the platform boosted customer surplus by $3.6 billion. Managerial implications: Our empirical framework provides ride-hailing companies a way to estimate demand and supply functions, which can help with optimization of multiple aspects of their operations. Our findings suggest that ride-hailing platforms can improve profits by containing surge-pricing to peak hours only and boosting supply by increasing driver compensation. Finally, our results demonstrate that restricting ride-hailing services create significant welfare losses, whereas including taxi services on ride-hail platforms generates substantial economic value. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0502 .


  • Quality Regulation on Two-Sided Platforms: Exclusion, Subsidization, and First-Party Applications

    by Peng Huang, Gaoyan Lyu, Yi Xu

    Managing the quality of complementary applications is vital to the success of a two-sided platform. While prior research has focused solely on restricting platform access based on a quality threshold, we compare three quality regulation strategies: (1) the platform excludes access to low-quality complementors, (2) it provides a fixed amount of subsidy to high-quality complementors, and (3) it develops its own high-quality applications in addition to those from third-party complementors. Our analyses reveal that the widely adopted exclusion strategy is a special case of the subsidization strategy, and it does not always benefit the platform. In contrast, both subsidization and first-party applications strategies render the platform owner better off, with higher profits, higher average quality, and a larger consumer network, but only subsidization always improves social welfare. In addition, the trade-off between subsidization and first-party applications strategies depends on the development cost of first-party applications and the fraction of high-quality complementors, but the relationship is not monotonic. Our results demonstrate that the platform does not have to sacrifice application quantity for higher application quality. With the right choices, it can profitably improve both measures simultaneously. This research provides concrete guidelines to help platform managers make decisions about regulating the quality of complementary applications.This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.


  • Collaboration in Development of New Drugs

    by Zhili Tian, Haresh Gurnani, Yi Xu

    The development of a new drug is costly and uncertain. As such, pharmaceutical firms often collaborate to develop new drugs. We examine the conditions under which firms should collaborate rather than compete in new drug development. We model the collaboration vs. competition decision problem for two firms using a game‐theoretic model and derive the collaboration conditions. Our study demonstrates that development cost and uncertainties in drug treatment efficacy and safety and patient enrollment drive the collaboration or competition decision for firms. We establish conditions based on probabilities of success of drug development, cost rates, and potential market shares under which the firms should collaborate, and show that there exist scenarios under which the firms actually collaborate on the lower efficacy drug. As such, firms need to take into consideration various factors such as the probability of success, the potential market share, and the development cost of each competing drug when determining whether to collaborate or compete in developing new drugs. Finally, we apply our analytical model to illustrate a case study involving collaboration between Bristol‐Myers Squibb and Pfizer.