MRMarcela Prieto Rudolphy

Marcela Prieto Rudolphy

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Marcela Prieto Rudolphy has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    ABOLITIONISM NOW

    by Marcela Prieto Rudolphy

    Although legal academia has recently turned its attention towards abolitionism, there is disagreement as to what abolitionism is and widespread skepticism exists about its plausibility. This Article aims to make two contributions to discussions about penal abolitionism. First, it provides a novel theorization of different kinds of abolitionism. Second, it argues that, contrary to widespread skepticism, the case in favor of complete and short-term decarceration is extremely difficult to resist. This is true even accounting for the problem of “the dangerous few,” that is, the problem of releasing individuals who might potentially harm others. This problem has been discussed but not satisfactorily resolved by the relevant literature up to this point. Part I of the Article discusses what it means to be an abolitionist. It distinguishes abolitionism from minimalism and then provides three categorizations that are useful to understand the abolitionist movement. Part II argues that complete and short-term decarceration (that is, abolitionism now, or what the Article refers to as “non-ideal prison abolitionism”) does not deserve the skepticism with which it is often met. The Article starts from two assumptions, which make the argument in favor of decarceration harder. If prison abolitionism is plausible under these exacting conditions, the case presented in the Article becomes stronger. The first assumption is that—even though there is a relatively widespread consensus among scholars that this assumption is at least partially false—all individuals currently incarcerated in the U.S. have been justly punished and the length of their incarceration is proportionate. The second assumption is that imprisonment could be justified in ideal conditions, that is, in a just society where prisons are safe, treat individuals humanely, and provide adequate access to physical and mental health resources, as well as to educational and recreational activities. U.S. prisons are, however, generally far from being “ideal prisons.” They thus impose further harmful effects on those who are imprisoned, which have been extensively documented in the literature and are canvassed in the Article. The Article then argues that, given how unfeasible it is to fix prisons in the short term so that they achieve their “ideal form,” the case in favor of decarceration is extremely difficult to resist, even accounting for the problem of “the dangerous few.” There are two strategies that might be used to justify the continued incarceration of the so-called “dangerous few.” First, one could argue that continued incarceration of the dangerous few is justified because it is necessary to defend innocent parties from serious harm. Second, one could argue that continued incarceration of the dangerous few can be justified because (1) they committed a criminal offense in the past and (2) their incarceration contributes to eliminating harm to innocent parties by deterring crime. However, the conditions required for each justification are difficult to support. If we account for this uncertainty, that is, the fact that we cannot be sure that these justifications can or will succeed, continued incarceration becomes impermissible. In fewer words, we should close prisons. This might seem like a radical conclusion. However, there is no need to embrace a radical vision of the world to embrace it. This conclusion follows, in fact, from basic liberal commitments that reasonable people already support. Ultimately, it might be the case that we should all be (non-ideal) prison abolitionists.

  • Open Access

    Constitucionalismo paritário

    by Rosalind Dixon, Marcela Prieto Rudolphy

    Em 2021, a Convenção Chilena tornou-se o primeiro órgão constituinte com paridade de gênero. Contudo, a proposta de texto constitucional – que refletiu diversas normas relacionadas a gênero – foi rejeitada por 61,89% dos votantes no plebiscito de saída de 2022. Neste artigo, argumentamos que, embora o constitucionalismo paritário seja promissor e, no caso chileno, tenha se associadoa resultados relacionados a gênero no texto constitucional, a promessa da paridade pode não se concretizar. Assim, advertimos contra uma visão ingênua do constitucionalismo paritário como um dos principais legados do processo de elaboração da Constituição chilena que ocorreu entre 2020 e 2022.

  • ¿Cómo pueden fracasar los procesos constituyentes?How can constitution-making processes fail?

    by Sergio Verdugo, Marcela Prieto

    This introduction to the symposium presents some preliminary insights on the constitution-making literature, identifies some of the gaps in the field, explains the purposes of the symposium, and provides an overview of all the symposium contributions.


  • Open Access

    Parity constitutionalism

    by Rosalind Dixon, Marcela Prieto Rudolphy

    In 2021, the Chilean Convention became the first constitution-making body with gender parity. However, the draft – which reflected many gender-related norms – was rejected by 61.89 per cent of voters in the exit plebiscite of 2022. In this article, we argue that although parity constitutionalism has promise and, in the Chilean case, was linked to gender-related outcomes in the constitutional text, parity’s promise may fail to materialize. We thus caution against a naïve view of parity constitutionalism as one of the key legacies of the 2020–22 Chilean constitution-making process.


  • Open Access

    Between predictability and perplexity

    by Marcela Prieto Rudolphy

    This article focuses on the relationship between academia, the gendered division of labor, and the pandemic. After briefly canvassing preliminary research about the effects of the pandemic on academic women, it discusses the gendered division of caregiving responsibilities, both inside the family and in academic institutions. Through the lens of feminist theory, the article aims to understand what can be perceived as a kind of paradox or contradiction: on the one hand, there is something deeply predictable about the fact that women have shouldered relatively disproportionate caregiving responsibilities during the pandemic. On the other hand, and because these gendered effects are so predictable, there is something somewhat perplexing in the lack of institutional response. This article explains what is predictable about the phenomenon as an instantiation of misogyny and the gendered division of labor—a reproduction of already existing issues. The somewhat perplexing nature of the phenomenon comes from the lack of institutional response to deeply predictable effects, but it is also related to how resilient the gendered nature of caregiving obligations has proven to be, even during the extraordinary circumstances of a pandemic. This resilience, the article suggests, might be explained by the intersection of misogyny and economic exploitation.


  • Right-wing populism, the reasonable, and the limits of ideal theory: A reply to Gila Stopler

    by Marcela Prieto Rudolphy

    This article replies to Gila Stopler’s critique of John Rawls’s Political Liberalism. It argues that there are two strands in Stopler’s arguments. The first is Stopler’s critique of Political Liberalism for its accommodation of “right-wing populism.” This article argues that “right-wing populism” is not a “reasonable comprehensive view” under Rawls’s theory. Thus, Political Liberalism does not accommodate this view; it excludes it from the possibility of a reasonable overlapping consensus. The second strand in Stopler’s article can be interpreted as an invitation to think about the value of idealization in political theory. More concretely, this article argues that Stopler’s claims can be read as suggesting that political liberalism’s flaw is not that it tolerates illiberal views, but that it tells us little about how to achieve and maintain an overlapping consensus about justice in the kind of societies we actually inhabit. This article briefly argues that this critique deserves attention, especially given the circumstances of today’s societies, where extreme views are not uncommon and the effects of climate change threaten the very possibility of justice.


  • Populist Governments and International Law: A Reply to Heike Krieger

    by Marcela Prieto Rudolphy

    In this article, I argue that there are two main objections against Heike Krieger’s view on what ‘a populist approach to international law’ entails. First, there are two methodological obstacles that counsel against constructing ‘a populist approach to international law’: populism varies significantly depending on its definition of ‘the people’ and international law is a fragmented regime. Second, the opposition between a ‘law of coordination’ and a ‘law of cooperation’ to which Krieger resorts is misleading, for it obscures the fact that the value of cooperation and coordination lies primarily in the values for which we coordinate and cooperate. As such, I argue that this opposition may make us partially blind to two important dangers that some forms of populism may pose right now: their cooperating to reshape international law and institutions according to (some) of their values and their refusing to cooperate or coordinate in the achievement of urgent goals. Nonetheless, I conclude that the precise shape of these dangers – as well as how to resist them – remains blurry if we do not pay proper attention to the ways in which different forms of populism define ‘the people’.