Hongyao Ma
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Hongyao Ma has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Chiwei Yan
Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720
2 shared publications - Adam Wierman
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, United States
1 shared publication - Allen Sirolly
Columbia Business School, New York, New York, United States of America
1 shared publication - Chenkai Yu
Columbia University
1 shared publication - David C. Parkes
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
1 shared publication - Denise Cerna
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Matching Queues, Flexibility, and Incentives
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, whereas others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ride-sharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations that they are willing to accept. Conventional wisdom suggests reserving flexible agents, but this can backfire; anticipating higher matching chances, agents may misreport as specialized, reducing overall matches. We ask how platforms can design simple matching policies that remain effective when agents act strategically. Methodology/results: We model job allocation as a bipartite matching queueing system and analyze equilibrium throughput performance under different policies when agents choose which queue to join. We show that flexibility reservation is optimal under full information but can perform poorly with private information, sometimes substantially worse than random assignment. To address this, we propose a new policy—flexibility reservation with fallback—that guarantees robust performance across settings without requiring precise knowledge of system parameters or agent utility functions. Managerial implications: Our results underscore the importance of accounting for strategic reporting in the design of matching policies; the proposed fallback policy both preserves flexibility and exploits latent flexibility when explicitly flexible agents are exhausted. Its simplicity and parameter-free nature also make it practical to implement in platforms such as ride-sharing and affordable housing allocation. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0774 .
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Matching Queues, Flexibility, and Incentives
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, whereas others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ride-sharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations that they are willing to accept. Conventional wisdom suggests reserving flexible agents, but this can backfire; anticipating higher matching chances, agents may misreport as specialized, reducing overall matches. We ask how platforms can design simple matching policies that remain effective when agents act strategically. Methodology/results: We model job allocation as a bipartite matching queueing system and analyze equilibrium throughput performance under different policies when agents choose which queue to join. We show that flexibility reservation is optimal under full information but can perform poorly with private information, sometimes substantially worse than random assignment. To address this, we propose a new policy—flexibility reservation with fallback—that guarantees robust performance across settings without requiring precise knowledge of system parameters or agent utility functions. Managerial implications: Our results underscore the importance of accounting for strategic reporting in the design of matching policies; the proposed fallback policy both preserves flexibility and exploits latent flexibility when explicitly flexible agents are exhausted. Its simplicity and parameter-free nature also make it practical to implement in platforms such as ride-sharing and affordable housing allocation. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0774 .
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 666
An Equilibrium Solver for A Dynamic Queueing Game
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 666
Open AccessAn Equilibrium Solver for A Dynamic Queueing Game
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 308
The Impact of Race-Blind and Test-Optional Admissions on Racial Diversity and Merit
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 308
Open AccessThe Impact of Race-Blind and Test-Optional Admissions on Racial Diversity and Merit
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 70 (2) , 1025-1041
Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms
Ridesharing platforms have radically changed the way people get around in urban areas, but there remain challenges undercutting the mission of “making transportation as reliable as running water.” A particular concern is that drivers strategize: calling riders to find out their destinations and canceling trips that are not worthwhile, declining trips and chasing surge prices in neighboring areas, and going off-line before large events will end in anticipation of a price increase. In this work, we show that such strategic behaviors are symptoms of inefficiencies in the pricing and dispatching rules governing today's platforms. We propose the Spatio-Temporal Pricing mechanism, which solves for the welfare-optimal matching of drivers to trips, and sets prices that are appropriately smooth in both space and time such that the best thing for drivers to do is accept any proposed trip dispatch. This demonstrates that ridesharing platforms can succeed in optimally orchestrating trips and providing reliable transpiration for riders, while still leaving drivers with the flexibility to decide how to work.
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 70 (2) , 1025-1041
Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms
Ridesharing platforms have radically changed the way people get around in urban areas, but there remain challenges undercutting the mission of “making transportation as reliable as running water.” A particular concern is that drivers strategize: calling riders to find out their destinations and canceling trips that are not worthwhile, declining trips and chasing surge prices in neighboring areas, and going off-line before large events will end in anticipation of a price increase. In this work, we show that such strategic behaviors are symptoms of inefficiencies in the pricing and dispatching rules governing today's platforms. We propose the Spatio-Temporal Pricing mechanism, which solves for the welfare-optimal matching of drivers to trips, and sets prices that are appropriately smooth in both space and time such that the best thing for drivers to do is accept any proposed trip dispatch. This demonstrates that ridesharing platforms can succeed in optimally orchestrating trips and providing reliable transpiration for riders, while still leaving drivers with the flexibility to decide how to work.