Sileshi Demesie Yalew
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Sileshi Demesie Yalew has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Anum Khurshid
RISE Research Institutes of Sweden
1 shared publication - Mudassar Aslam
School of Engineering, Computing, and Mathematics, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, U.K.
1 shared publication - Shahid Raza
School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Scotland, G12 8RZ3, U.K.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 20 (2) , 1031-1047
ShieLD: Shielding Cross-Zone Communication Within Limited-Resourced IoT Devices Running Vulnerable Software Stack
Securing IoT devices is gaining attention as the security risks associated with these devices increase rapidly. TrustZone-M, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for Cortex-M processors, ensures stronger security within an IoT device by allowing isolated execution of security-critical operations, without trusting the entire software stack. However, TrustZone-M does not guarantee secure cross-world communication between applications in the Normal and Secure worlds. The cryptographic protection of the communication channel is an obvious solution; however, within a low-power IoT device, it incurs high overhead if applied to each cross-world message exchange. We present ShieLD, a framework that enables a secure communication channel between the two TrustZone-M worlds by leveraging the Memory Protection Unit (MPU). ShieLD guarantees confidentiality, integrity and authentication services without requiring any cryptographic operations. We implement and evaluate ShieLD using a Musca-A test chip board with Cortex-M33 that supports TrustZone-M. Our empirical evaluation shows, among other gains, the cross-zone communication protected with ShieLD is 5 times faster than the conventional crypto-based communication.
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 20 (2) , 1031-1047
Open AccessShieLD: Shielding Cross-Zone Communication Within Limited-Resourced IoT Devices Running Vulnerable Software Stack
Securing IoT devices is gaining attention as the security risks associated with these devices increase rapidly. TrustZone-M, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for Cortex-M processors, ensures stronger security within an IoT device by allowing isolated execution of security-critical operations, without trusting the entire software stack. However, TrustZone-M does not guarantee secure cross-world communication between applications in the Normal and Secure worlds. The cryptographic protection of the communication channel is an obvious solution; however, within a low-power IoT device, it incurs high overhead if applied to each cross-world message exchange. We present ShieLD, a framework that enables a secure communication channel between the two TrustZone-M worlds by leveraging the Memory Protection Unit (MPU). ShieLD guarantees confidentiality, integrity and authentication services without requiring any cryptographic operations. We implement and evaluate ShieLD using a Musca-A test chip board with Cortex-M33 that supports TrustZone-M. Our empirical evaluation shows, among other gains, the cross-zone communication protected with ShieLD is 5 times faster than the conventional crypto-based communication.