Brett Williams
Research Subjects
Brett Williams has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel Friedman
Department of Economics, University of Essex
2 shared publications - Duncan James
Fordham Univ, 113 W 60th St, New York, NY 10023 USA
1 shared publication Sameh Habib
1 shared publication- Vivian Juehui Zheng
University of California
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 May 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- p. 1-22
Market visualizations
In a $k$ -replica Edgeworth box economy, we compare outcomes of laboratory markets in which human traders have different visualizations available on their screens. Novel visualizations include a heat map that shows at a glance the value of all feasible portfolios (i.e., final allocations); a geometric display of the order book; and order entry via point-and-click on the heat map. Efficiency metrics focus on allocations, prices and profitability. Compared to the traditional text-oriented trader screen for the continuous double auction, we find that the novel features generally increase all three efficiency metrics.- 6 May 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- p. 1-22
Open AccessMarket visualizations
In a $k$ -replica Edgeworth box economy, we compare outcomes of laboratory markets in which human traders have different visualizations available on their screens. Novel visualizations include a heat map that shows at a glance the value of all feasible portfolios (i.e., final allocations); a geometric display of the order book; and order entry via point-and-click on the heat map. Efficiency metrics focus on allocations, prices and profitability. Compared to the traditional text-oriented trader screen for the continuous double auction, we find that the novel features generally increase all three efficiency metrics. - Open Access
- 7 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Minimal Intelligence in the Double Auction: Logit-Choice and Reservation Utility
I propose a new boundedly-rational trader-behavior model for the continuous double auction, fit in the general equilibrium (GE) framework. Traders' order placement and acceptance strategies are driven by GE-adaptions of two classic mechanisms: within-period reservation prices (here utilities), and price-acceptability beliefs. Traders use probabilistic choice over their set of admissible orders, based on beliefs formed about the acceptability of each order. The logit choice parameter allows the precision of trader order placement to range from zero intelligence to perfectly maximizing given beliefs. Simulations report market performance for this model, finding promising measures of efficiency and evidence of convergence to nearly Pareto optimal allocations. The model is then applied to experimental data from Williams (2025a) and Friedman et al. (2025), capturing an encouraging amount of the utility-reducing behavior and order placement in general.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMinimal Intelligence in the Double Auction: Logit-Choice and Reservation Utility
I propose a new boundedly-rational trader-behavior model for the continuous double auction, fit in the general equilibrium (GE) framework. Traders' order placement and acceptance strategies are driven by GE-adaptions of two classic mechanisms: within-period reservation prices (here utilities), and price-acceptability beliefs. Traders use probabilistic choice over their set of admissible orders, based on beliefs formed about the acceptability of each order. The logit choice parameter allows the precision of trader order placement to range from zero intelligence to perfectly maximizing given beliefs. Simulations report market performance for this model, finding promising measures of efficiency and evidence of convergence to nearly Pareto optimal allocations. The model is then applied to experimental data from Williams (2025a) and Friedman et al. (2025), capturing an encouraging amount of the utility-reducing behavior and order placement in general.
- Open Access
- 13 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
- Vol. 48
Zero intelligence in an Edgeworth box
- 13 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
- Vol. 48
Open AccessZero intelligence in an Edgeworth box
- Open Access
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 9 (2) , 239-251
Violations of first-order stochastic dominance
I find necessary and sufficient conditions for first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) violations for choices from a budget line of Arrow securities. Applying this characterization to existing data, I compare FOSD violation rates across a broad set of risk preference elicitation tasks.
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 9 (2) , 239-251
Open AccessViolations of first-order stochastic dominance
I find necessary and sufficient conditions for first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) violations for choices from a budget line of Arrow securities. Applying this characterization to existing data, I compare FOSD violation rates across a broad set of risk preference elicitation tasks.
- Open Access
- 17 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 133, 58-76
Varieties of risk preference elicitation
- 17 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 133, 58-76
Open AccessVarieties of risk preference elicitation