VZVivian Juehui Zheng

Vivian Juehui Zheng

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Vivian Juehui Zheng has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Market visualizations

    by Daniel Friedman, Brett Williams, Vivian Juehui Zheng

    In a $k$ -replica Edgeworth box economy, we compare outcomes of laboratory markets in which human traders have different visualizations available on their screens. Novel visualizations include a heat map that shows at a glance the value of all feasible portfolios (i.e., final allocations); a geometric display of the order book; and order entry via point-and-click on the heat map. Efficiency metrics focus on allocations, prices and profitability. Compared to the traditional text-oriented trader screen for the continuous double auction, we find that the novel features generally increase all three efficiency metrics.

  • Open Access

    Motivated Inference of Ambiguous Information

    by Vivian J. Zheng, Zhaoqi Wang

    We study how motivated beliefs affect the perceived accuracy of the signal itself when the precision of the data-generating process is ambiguous While previous works suggest individuals tend to believe bad news, which suggests a lower financial payoff of an asset, to be more accurate, our main results suggest that individuals tend to believe information that is consistent with their preference to be more accurate, even if the news is good. When receiving multiple information, however, individuals’ perceived accuracy is reduced if the information contradicts each other.

  • Open Access

    Information, Asset Price Volatility, and Liquidity

    by Daniel Friedman, Weishi Steadmon, Vivian Juehui Zheng, Grace Weishi Gu

    Can public information complement private information acquisition? What are the implications for asset market performance? Our paper investigates by constructing a simple bond market in the laboratory. Human investors observe public information on default probability and then, before trading, decide how much to invest in acquiring private information on the bond's recovery rate in the event of default. We derive theoretical predictions regarding information acquisition, investor payoff, market volatility and liquidity, and compare them to laboratory outcomes across several different market formats, information costs and default probabilities. The results suggest that the theory does a good job of explaining the laboratory data. Traders purchase less private information when it is more expensive and when the public information suggests a more benign state. Overall, they purchase a bit less than the optimal amount. In turn, lesser private information purchase increases short-term price volatility but decreases long-term and overall price volatility, and also decreases market liquidity.