Nicolás de la Cerda
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Nicolás de la Cerda has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
2 shared publications - Jack T. Rametta
Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis, Davis, USA
2 shared publications - Jacob R. Gunderson
University of Gothenburg
2 shared publications - Jonathan Hartlyn
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
2 shared publications - Sam Fuller
Center for American Political Studies, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA
2 shared publications - Ayelén Vanegas
Universidad Católica del Uruguay
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-19
Positional Blurring in Context: How Dimensionality and Ideology Constrain Strategy
Positional blurring is a common and effective party strategy. It enables parties to downplay some issues while highlighting and clarifying their profile on others. However, we know little about how parties use this strategy outside European party systems, in which (right-wing) populist parties are particularly noteworthy for their blurred economic positions and clear cultural positions. Is that strategy inherent to populism or a reflection of context-specific incentives? This article uses data from Europe and Latin America to argue that populists tailor their strategies to the dimensionality of their party system and populism’s host ideology. We find that multidimensional party systems and exclusionary thick ideologies drive populists to blur their economic positions. Extending this research field beyond Europe for the first time, these findings show that populists are heterogeneous actors whose varied thick ideologies embedded in diverse political systems systematically constrain their strategic behavior.
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-19
Open AccessPositional Blurring in Context: How Dimensionality and Ideology Constrain Strategy
Positional blurring is a common and effective party strategy. It enables parties to downplay some issues while highlighting and clarifying their profile on others. However, we know little about how parties use this strategy outside European party systems, in which (right-wing) populist parties are particularly noteworthy for their blurred economic positions and clear cultural positions. Is that strategy inherent to populism or a reflection of context-specific incentives? This article uses data from Europe and Latin America to argue that populists tailor their strategies to the dimensionality of their party system and populism’s host ideology. We find that multidimensional party systems and exclusionary thick ideologies drive populists to blur their economic positions. Extending this research field beyond Europe for the first time, these findings show that populists are heterogeneous actors whose varied thick ideologies embedded in diverse political systems systematically constrain their strategic behavior.
- 26 December 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
Explaining programmatic party appeals in Contemporary Latin America: The differing roles of ideology, particularism, and populism
Political parties and presidents in contemporary Latin America vary considerably in the extent to which they emphasize policy when appealing to voters (programmatism). We use Confirmatory Factor Analysis and data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey—Latin America (CHES-LA) to examine how three key party characteristics relate to programmatism: ideological positions, particularistic strategies, and populism. Our results show that political actors on the ideological extremes rely more heavily on programmatism, that particularism and programmatism have a strong negative relationship, and that populism and programmatism are positively associated. These findings document important variation in how Latin American parties compete for votes, revealing concerning patterns in contemporary party competition. Highly populist parties also tend to be programmatic, creating potential trade-offs between clear policy positions and democratic accountability.
- 26 December 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
Explaining programmatic party appeals in Contemporary Latin America: The differing roles of ideology, particularism, and populism
Political parties and presidents in contemporary Latin America vary considerably in the extent to which they emphasize policy when appealing to voters (programmatism). We use Confirmatory Factor Analysis and data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey—Latin America (CHES-LA) to examine how three key party characteristics relate to programmatism: ideological positions, particularistic strategies, and populism. Our results show that political actors on the ideological extremes rely more heavily on programmatism, that particularism and programmatism have a strong negative relationship, and that populism and programmatism are positively associated. These findings document important variation in how Latin American parties compete for votes, revealing concerning patterns in contemporary party competition. Highly populist parties also tend to be programmatic, creating potential trade-offs between clear policy positions and democratic accountability.
- Open Access
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 48 (2) , 1023-1050
Cueing Without Parties: Experimental Evidence from Peru
Citizens infer policy information from partisan cues, yet their utility varies cross-nationally. In weakly institutionalized democracies with short-lived political parties and volatile party systems, partisan cues are likely of little heuristic value. I argue that in these contexts, citizens leverage alternative political markers, such as ideological or political movement-related categories, to make sense of the political arena. I test this argument in Peru, a country with an extremely volatile and distrusted party system. Using a survey experiment, I show that political cues significantly influence policy preferences even in the absence of clear and strong partisan brands. Further analysis using causal forest reveals that movement-related political identities are the primary moderators of cueing effects, outweighing traditional factors such as partisanship or ideology. Notably, while non-partisan cues influence attitude formation, only outgroup cues effectively shape preferences. I theorize that this asymmetry could potentially stem from two distinct features of the Peruvian political landscape: deep mistrust in political parties and patterns of affective polarization marked by stronger outgroup prejudice than ingroup favoritism. Overall, this study underscores the importance of alternative forms of political identification in weakly institutionalized party systems, extending existing theories of public opinion formation to diverse democratic settings.
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 48 (2) , 1023-1050
Open AccessCueing Without Parties: Experimental Evidence from Peru
Citizens infer policy information from partisan cues, yet their utility varies cross-nationally. In weakly institutionalized democracies with short-lived political parties and volatile party systems, partisan cues are likely of little heuristic value. I argue that in these contexts, citizens leverage alternative political markers, such as ideological or political movement-related categories, to make sense of the political arena. I test this argument in Peru, a country with an extremely volatile and distrusted party system. Using a survey experiment, I show that political cues significantly influence policy preferences even in the absence of clear and strong partisan brands. Further analysis using causal forest reveals that movement-related political identities are the primary moderators of cueing effects, outweighing traditional factors such as partisanship or ideology. Notably, while non-partisan cues influence attitude formation, only outgroup cues effectively shape preferences. I theorize that this asymmetry could potentially stem from two distinct features of the Peruvian political landscape: deep mistrust in political parties and patterns of affective polarization marked by stronger outgroup prejudice than ingroup favoritism. Overall, this study underscores the importance of alternative forms of political identification in weakly institutionalized party systems, extending existing theories of public opinion formation to diverse democratic settings.
- Open Access
- 21 May 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Institutional Accountability and Support for Democracy: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
How do criminal proceedings against democratically elected executives influence citizens' support for democracy? We explore citizens' reactions to institutional accountability processes by analyzing the effect of coup charges brought against former president Bolsonaro by Brazil's Prosecutor General. Taking advantage of the fortuitous timing of these charges during our survey fieldwork, we demonstrate that the indictment significantly bolstered democratic support among non-Bolsonaro voters, while having no discernible negative effect on his supporters. Our findings offer a nuanced view of theories suggesting that partisan loyalties should lead supporters to reject democratic institutions that target their preferred leaders. This study contributes novel evidence on democratic resilience by capturing real-time reactions to consequential accountability processes outside experimental settings.
- 21 May 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessInstitutional Accountability and Support for Democracy: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
How do criminal proceedings against democratically elected executives influence citizens' support for democracy? We explore citizens' reactions to institutional accountability processes by analyzing the effect of coup charges brought against former president Bolsonaro by Brazil's Prosecutor General. Taking advantage of the fortuitous timing of these charges during our survey fieldwork, we demonstrate that the indictment significantly bolstered democratic support among non-Bolsonaro voters, while having no discernible negative effect on his supporters. Our findings offer a nuanced view of theories suggesting that partisan loyalties should lead supporters to reject democratic institutions that target their preferred leaders. This study contributes novel evidence on democratic resilience by capturing real-time reactions to consequential accountability processes outside experimental settings.
- Open Access
- 18 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 48 (1) , 273-297
Affect, Not Ideology: The Heterogeneous Effects of Partisan Cues on Policy Support
How do individuals process political information? What behavioral mechanisms drive partisan bias? In this paper, we evaluate the extent to which partisan bias is driven by affect or ideology in a three-pronged approach informed by both psychological theories and recent advances in methodology. First, we use a novel survey experiment designed to disentangle the competing mechanisms of ideology and partisan affect. Second, we leverage multidimensional scaling methods for latent variable estimation for both partisan affect and ideology. Third, we employ a principled machine learning method, causal forest, to detect and estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Contrary to previous literature, we find that affect is the sole moderator of partisan cueing processes, and only for out-party cues. These findings not only contribute to the literature on political behavior, but underscore the importance of careful measurement and robust subgroup analysis.
- 18 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 48 (1) , 273-297
Open AccessAffect, Not Ideology: The Heterogeneous Effects of Partisan Cues on Policy Support
How do individuals process political information? What behavioral mechanisms drive partisan bias? In this paper, we evaluate the extent to which partisan bias is driven by affect or ideology in a three-pronged approach informed by both psychological theories and recent advances in methodology. First, we use a novel survey experiment designed to disentangle the competing mechanisms of ideology and partisan affect. Second, we leverage multidimensional scaling methods for latent variable estimation for both partisan affect and ideology. Third, we employ a principled machine learning method, causal forest, to detect and estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Contrary to previous literature, we find that affect is the sole moderator of partisan cueing processes, and only for out-party cues. These findings not only contribute to the literature on political behavior, but underscore the importance of careful measurement and robust subgroup analysis.
- Open Access
- 5 August 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Politics in Latin America
- Vol. 16 (2) , 252-271
Ideological and Populist Bases of Partisan Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic in Latin America
This research note explores variation in how political parties and presidents in Latin America responded to the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey-Latin America (CHES-LA), we argue that preferences regarding the trade-off between virus containment and maintaining an open economy were shaped by the ideological positions of presidents and parties, particularly for more programmatic ones. This is largely consistent with findings in other world regions. Yet, beyond ideological orientation, populism, also had an important – though heterogeneous – effect on response preferences, with non-populists, particularly highly programmatic ones, more consistently supporting virus containment. In addition, both incumbents and more populist presidents and parties favoured further concentration of executive power to address the pandemic. These findings provide evidence of the importance of understanding how ideology, populism and programmatic linkages interact in Latin America’s party systems.
- 5 August 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Politics in Latin America
- Vol. 16 (2) , 252-271
Open AccessIdeological and Populist Bases of Partisan Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic in Latin America
This research note explores variation in how political parties and presidents in Latin America responded to the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey-Latin America (CHES-LA), we argue that preferences regarding the trade-off between virus containment and maintaining an open economy were shaped by the ideological positions of presidents and parties, particularly for more programmatic ones. This is largely consistent with findings in other world regions. Yet, beyond ideological orientation, populism, also had an important – though heterogeneous – effect on response preferences, with non-populists, particularly highly programmatic ones, more consistently supporting virus containment. In addition, both incumbents and more populist presidents and parties favoured further concentration of executive power to address the pandemic. These findings provide evidence of the importance of understanding how ideology, populism and programmatic linkages interact in Latin America’s party systems.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 63 (3) , 1208-1226
Are party families in Europe ideologically coherent today?
Researchers classify political parties into families by their shared cleavage origins. However, as parties have drifted from the original ideological commitments, it is unclear to what extent party families today can function as effective heuristics for shared positions. We propose an alternative way of classifying parties based solely on their ideological positions as one solution to this challenge. We use model‐based clustering to recast common subjective decisions involved in the process of creating party groups as problems of model selection, thus, providing non‐subjective criteria to define ideological clusters. By comparing canonical families to our ideological clusters, we show that while party families on the right are often too similar to justify categorizing them into different clusters, left‐wing families are weakly internally cohesive. Moreover, we identify two clusters predominantly composed of parties in Eastern Europe, questioning the degree to which categories originally designed to describe Western Europe can generalize to other regions.
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 63 (3) , 1208-1226
Open AccessAre party families in Europe ideologically coherent today?
Researchers classify political parties into families by their shared cleavage origins. However, as parties have drifted from the original ideological commitments, it is unclear to what extent party families today can function as effective heuristics for shared positions. We propose an alternative way of classifying parties based solely on their ideological positions as one solution to this challenge. We use model‐based clustering to recast common subjective decisions involved in the process of creating party groups as problems of model selection, thus, providing non‐subjective criteria to define ideological clusters. By comparing canonical families to our ideological clusters, we show that while party families on the right are often too similar to justify categorizing them into different clusters, left‐wing families are weakly internally cohesive. Moreover, we identify two clusters predominantly composed of parties in Eastern Europe, questioning the degree to which categories originally designed to describe Western Europe can generalize to other regions.
- Open Access
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Affect, Not Ideology: The Heterogeneous Effects of Partisan Cues on Policy Support
How do individuals process political information? What behavioral mechanisms drive partisan bias? In this paper, we evaluate the extent to which partisan bias is driven by affect or ideology in a three-pronged approach informed by both psychological theories and recent advances in methodology. First, we use a novel survey experiment designed to disentangle the competing mechanisms of ideology and partisan affect. Second, we leverage multidimensional scaling methods for latent variable estimation for both partisan affect and ideology. Third, we employ a principled machine learning method, causal forest, to detect and estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Contrary to previous literature, we find that affect is the sole moderator of partisan cueing processes, and only for out-party cues. These findings not only contribute to the literature on political behavior, but underscore the importance of careful measurement and robust subgroup analysis.
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessAffect, Not Ideology: The Heterogeneous Effects of Partisan Cues on Policy Support
How do individuals process political information? What behavioral mechanisms drive partisan bias? In this paper, we evaluate the extent to which partisan bias is driven by affect or ideology in a three-pronged approach informed by both psychological theories and recent advances in methodology. First, we use a novel survey experiment designed to disentangle the competing mechanisms of ideology and partisan affect. Second, we leverage multidimensional scaling methods for latent variable estimation for both partisan affect and ideology. Third, we employ a principled machine learning method, causal forest, to detect and estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Contrary to previous literature, we find that affect is the sole moderator of partisan cueing processes, and only for out-party cues. These findings not only contribute to the literature on political behavior, but underscore the importance of careful measurement and robust subgroup analysis.
- 10 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 29 (4) , 780-792
Revisiting party system structuration in Latin America and Europe: Economic and socio-cultural dimensions
The degree to which party systems are ideologically and programmatically structured is central to democracy. This article analyzes differences in the extent and nature of programmatic structuration in Latin America and Europe, using a new original data source, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey-Latin America (CHES-LA), in combination with the long-standing CHES-Europe. First, we demonstrate the reliability of CHES-LA in relation to CHES-Europe, and substantiate its validity by comparing it to other expert, elite and party manifesto surveys in Latin America. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we then show that while party system structuration in Latin America is somewhat lower than in Europe, it is also of a decisively different nature. In Latin America economic and socio-cultural policy positions are largely captured in a single overlapping dimension; in Europe, by contrast, competition occurs overwhelmingly along two dimensions, each with distinct clusters of policy positions.
- 10 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 29 (4) , 780-792
Revisiting party system structuration in Latin America and Europe: Economic and socio-cultural dimensions
The degree to which party systems are ideologically and programmatically structured is central to democracy. This article analyzes differences in the extent and nature of programmatic structuration in Latin America and Europe, using a new original data source, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey-Latin America (CHES-LA), in combination with the long-standing CHES-Europe. First, we demonstrate the reliability of CHES-LA in relation to CHES-Europe, and substantiate its validity by comparing it to other expert, elite and party manifesto surveys in Latin America. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we then show that while party system structuration in Latin America is somewhat lower than in Europe, it is also of a decisively different nature. In Latin America economic and socio-cultural policy positions are largely captured in a single overlapping dimension; in Europe, by contrast, competition occurs overwhelmingly along two dimensions, each with distinct clusters of policy positions.
- Open Access
- 21 February 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Politics in Latin America
- Vol. 14 (1) , 3-30
Unstable Identities: The Decline of Partisanship in Contemporary Chile
Between 1990 and 2018 Chile experienced one of Latin America’s most dramatic declines in party identification, from 80% in the early 1990s to under 20% in 2016. This decline seems puzzling given a highly institutionalized and programmatic party system, and low levels of ideological convergence. This paper argues that, to a large extent, the decrease in partisanship can be understood as a consequence of the erosion of the main political cleavage that articulated the political landscape throughout this period: the dissolution of the conflict between the supporters of the previous military regime (1973–1990) and the advocates of democracy. Because this conflict was the key driver of political identities following the dictatorship, as it faded overtime, particularly after conservative parties distanced themselves from the military regime for electoral reasons, partisans lost an important reason to feel attached to political parties. More broadly, the paper argues that unless political identities are continually reinforced by political actors, they are unlikely to remain stable sources of identification.
- 21 February 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Politics in Latin America
- Vol. 14 (1) , 3-30
Open AccessUnstable Identities: The Decline of Partisanship in Contemporary Chile
Between 1990 and 2018 Chile experienced one of Latin America’s most dramatic declines in party identification, from 80% in the early 1990s to under 20% in 2016. This decline seems puzzling given a highly institutionalized and programmatic party system, and low levels of ideological convergence. This paper argues that, to a large extent, the decrease in partisanship can be understood as a consequence of the erosion of the main political cleavage that articulated the political landscape throughout this period: the dissolution of the conflict between the supporters of the previous military regime (1973–1990) and the advocates of democracy. Because this conflict was the key driver of political identities following the dictatorship, as it faded overtime, particularly after conservative parties distanced themselves from the military regime for electoral reasons, partisans lost an important reason to feel attached to political parties. More broadly, the paper argues that unless political identities are continually reinforced by political actors, they are unlikely to remain stable sources of identification.