Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gregory J. Love
University of Mississippi, Oxford, USA
6 shared publications - Ryan E. Carlin
Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA
6 shared publications - Matthew M. Singer
University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA
4 shared publications - Timothy Hellwig
Indiana University
4 shared publications - Jonathan Hartlyn
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
3 shared publications - Nicolás de la Cerda
Tulane University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- p. 1-23
Executive Approval in Extraordinary Times: Comparing across Crises
What drives popular support for political executives? Compared to normal times, we know little about how the public responds to executives in extraordinary circumstances, and we know even less about similarities and differences across crisis events. While a calculating public may sanction incumbents for adverse events, the unexpected nature of many crises has the potential to increase leaders’ approval ratings. Based on time series analyses of executive approval from 35 countries across 25 years and drawing on an original Crisis Events Dataset, we show that the strength of rallies corresponds to crises’ degree of plausible exogeneity and to whether their resolution requires concentrated action by the government. Crises in three domains – security, the environment, and public health – tend to produce rallies rather than reprimands, while economic shocks yield no direct effect on approval. Lastly, we find that institutional features are less important in predicting approval during crises than they are in normal times. By demonstrating crises’ potential to upend the mechanisms of political accountability, our findings lay a foundation for further inquiry into how political context matters for public opinion in extraordinary times.
- 18 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- p. 1-23
Open AccessExecutive Approval in Extraordinary Times: Comparing across Crises
What drives popular support for political executives? Compared to normal times, we know little about how the public responds to executives in extraordinary circumstances, and we know even less about similarities and differences across crisis events. While a calculating public may sanction incumbents for adverse events, the unexpected nature of many crises has the potential to increase leaders’ approval ratings. Based on time series analyses of executive approval from 35 countries across 25 years and drawing on an original Crisis Events Dataset, we show that the strength of rallies corresponds to crises’ degree of plausible exogeneity and to whether their resolution requires concentrated action by the government. Crises in three domains – security, the environment, and public health – tend to produce rallies rather than reprimands, while economic shocks yield no direct effect on approval. Lastly, we find that institutional features are less important in predicting approval during crises than they are in normal times. By demonstrating crises’ potential to upend the mechanisms of political accountability, our findings lay a foundation for further inquiry into how political context matters for public opinion in extraordinary times.
- 26 December 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
Explaining programmatic party appeals in Contemporary Latin America: The differing roles of ideology, particularism, and populism
Political parties and presidents in contemporary Latin America vary considerably in the extent to which they emphasize policy when appealing to voters (programmatism). We use Confirmatory Factor Analysis and data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey—Latin America (CHES-LA) to examine how three key party characteristics relate to programmatism: ideological positions, particularistic strategies, and populism. Our results show that political actors on the ideological extremes rely more heavily on programmatism, that particularism and programmatism have a strong negative relationship, and that populism and programmatism are positively associated. These findings document important variation in how Latin American parties compete for votes, revealing concerning patterns in contemporary party competition. Highly populist parties also tend to be programmatic, creating potential trade-offs between clear policy positions and democratic accountability.
- 26 December 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
Explaining programmatic party appeals in Contemporary Latin America: The differing roles of ideology, particularism, and populism
Political parties and presidents in contemporary Latin America vary considerably in the extent to which they emphasize policy when appealing to voters (programmatism). We use Confirmatory Factor Analysis and data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey—Latin America (CHES-LA) to examine how three key party characteristics relate to programmatism: ideological positions, particularistic strategies, and populism. Our results show that political actors on the ideological extremes rely more heavily on programmatism, that particularism and programmatism have a strong negative relationship, and that populism and programmatism are positively associated. These findings document important variation in how Latin American parties compete for votes, revealing concerning patterns in contemporary party competition. Highly populist parties also tend to be programmatic, creating potential trade-offs between clear policy positions and democratic accountability.
- Open Access
- 26 April 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 58 (3) , 526-561
Executive Approval Dynamics in Presidential and Parliamentary Democratic Regimes
Does the type of democratic regime matter for public evaluations of leaders? We argue two characteristics intrinsic to presidential and parliamentary regimes lead to divergent patterns of executive approval. For presidents, direct elections foster more personal leader-voter linkages; for prime ministers, dependence on the legislature for survival contributes to more institutionalized party systems. These two mechanisms should generate higher approval at the outset of a term—larger honeymoons— for presidents than for prime ministers, but also more rapid decline. Analyses of data from 40 countries produce evidence consistent with these constitutionally-based distinctions. Yet we uncover important within-regime differences. Within presidential systems, approval patterns vary along with paths to power—first-election versus re-election, and elected versus unelected. Within parliamentarism, honeymoons are greater for prime ministers overseeing single-party majoritarian governments. Study findings advance long-standing debates about the relative merits of presidential and parliamentary systems—particularly the tradeoff between democratic responsiveness and stability.
- 26 April 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 58 (3) , 526-561
Open AccessExecutive Approval Dynamics in Presidential and Parliamentary Democratic Regimes
Does the type of democratic regime matter for public evaluations of leaders? We argue two characteristics intrinsic to presidential and parliamentary regimes lead to divergent patterns of executive approval. For presidents, direct elections foster more personal leader-voter linkages; for prime ministers, dependence on the legislature for survival contributes to more institutionalized party systems. These two mechanisms should generate higher approval at the outset of a term—larger honeymoons— for presidents than for prime ministers, but also more rapid decline. Analyses of data from 40 countries produce evidence consistent with these constitutionally-based distinctions. Yet we uncover important within-regime differences. Within presidential systems, approval patterns vary along with paths to power—first-election versus re-election, and elected versus unelected. Within parliamentarism, honeymoons are greater for prime ministers overseeing single-party majoritarian governments. Study findings advance long-standing debates about the relative merits of presidential and parliamentary systems—particularly the tradeoff between democratic responsiveness and stability.
- 10 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 29 (4) , 780-792
Revisiting party system structuration in Latin America and Europe: Economic and socio-cultural dimensions
The degree to which party systems are ideologically and programmatically structured is central to democracy. This article analyzes differences in the extent and nature of programmatic structuration in Latin America and Europe, using a new original data source, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey-Latin America (CHES-LA), in combination with the long-standing CHES-Europe. First, we demonstrate the reliability of CHES-LA in relation to CHES-Europe, and substantiate its validity by comparing it to other expert, elite and party manifesto surveys in Latin America. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we then show that while party system structuration in Latin America is somewhat lower than in Europe, it is also of a decisively different nature. In Latin America economic and socio-cultural policy positions are largely captured in a single overlapping dimension; in Europe, by contrast, competition occurs overwhelmingly along two dimensions, each with distinct clusters of policy positions.
- 10 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 29 (4) , 780-792
Revisiting party system structuration in Latin America and Europe: Economic and socio-cultural dimensions
The degree to which party systems are ideologically and programmatically structured is central to democracy. This article analyzes differences in the extent and nature of programmatic structuration in Latin America and Europe, using a new original data source, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey-Latin America (CHES-LA), in combination with the long-standing CHES-Europe. First, we demonstrate the reliability of CHES-LA in relation to CHES-Europe, and substantiate its validity by comparing it to other expert, elite and party manifesto surveys in Latin America. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we then show that while party system structuration in Latin America is somewhat lower than in Europe, it is also of a decisively different nature. In Latin America economic and socio-cultural policy positions are largely captured in a single overlapping dimension; in Europe, by contrast, competition occurs overwhelmingly along two dimensions, each with distinct clusters of policy positions.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 10 (2) , 298-316
When growth is not enough: inequality, economic gains, and executive approval
A robust economy is assumed to bolster leaders' standing. This ignores how benefits of growth are distributed. Extending the partisan models of economic voting, we theorize executives are more likely rewarded when gains from growth go to their constituents. Analyses of presidential approval in 18 Latin American countries support our pro-constituency model of accountability. When economic inequality is high, growth concentrates among the rich, and approval of right-of-center presidents is higher. Leftist presidents benefit from growth when gains are more equally distributed. Further analyses show growth and inequality inform perceptions of personal finances differently based on wealth, providing a micro-mechanism behind the aggregate findings. Study results imply that the economy is not purely a valence issue, but also a position issue.
- 8 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 10 (2) , 298-316
Open AccessWhen growth is not enough: inequality, economic gains, and executive approval
A robust economy is assumed to bolster leaders' standing. This ignores how benefits of growth are distributed. Extending the partisan models of economic voting, we theorize executives are more likely rewarded when gains from growth go to their constituents. Analyses of presidential approval in 18 Latin American countries support our pro-constituency model of accountability. When economic inequality is high, growth concentrates among the rich, and approval of right-of-center presidents is higher. Leftist presidents benefit from growth when gains are more equally distributed. Further analyses show growth and inequality inform perceptions of personal finances differently based on wealth, providing a micro-mechanism behind the aggregate findings. Study results imply that the economy is not purely a valence issue, but also a position issue.
- Open Access
- 3 February 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 54 (9) , 1499-1533
When Does the Public Get It Right? The Information Environment and the Accuracy of Economic Sentiment
Public evaluations of the economy are key for understanding how citizens develop policy opinions and monitor government performance. But what drives economic evaluations? In this article, we argue the context in which information about the economy is distributed shapes economic perceptions. In high-quality information environments—where policies are transparent, the media is free, and political opposition is robust—mass perceptions closely track economic conditions. In contrast, compromised information environments provide openings for political manipulation, leading perceptions to deviate from business cycle fluctuations. We test our argument with unique data from eight Latin American countries. Results show restrictions on access to information distort the public’s view of economic performance. The ability of voters to sanction governments is stronger when democratic institutions and the media protect citizens’ access to independent, unbiased information. Our findings highlight the importance of accurate evaluations of the economy for government accountability and democratic responsiveness.
- 3 February 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 54 (9) , 1499-1533
Open AccessWhen Does the Public Get It Right? The Information Environment and the Accuracy of Economic Sentiment
Public evaluations of the economy are key for understanding how citizens develop policy opinions and monitor government performance. But what drives economic evaluations? In this article, we argue the context in which information about the economy is distributed shapes economic perceptions. In high-quality information environments—where policies are transparent, the media is free, and political opposition is robust—mass perceptions closely track economic conditions. In contrast, compromised information environments provide openings for political manipulation, leading perceptions to deviate from business cycle fluctuations. We test our argument with unique data from eight Latin American countries. Results show restrictions on access to information distort the public’s view of economic performance. The ability of voters to sanction governments is stronger when democratic institutions and the media protect citizens’ access to independent, unbiased information. Our findings highlight the importance of accurate evaluations of the economy for government accountability and democratic responsiveness.
- 17 November 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 48 (4) , 438-463
Security, Clarity of Responsibility, and Presidential Approval
The importance of institutions in shaping citizens’ ability to punish or reward politicians for economic outcomes is well established. Where institutions divide authority, politicians can blame each other and citizens find it harder to assign responsibility for policy failures; where institutions clarify lines of authority, citizens can better hold politicians accountable. However, this argument assumes that citizens perceive policy responsibility as shared among political actors and this is not always the case. Looking at security policy, we argue that when policy responsibility is concentrated in a single actor the effect of institutions on blame attribution is different from what the economic voting literature predicts. Divided government in this context makes blame-shifting less effective and makes it more likely that citizens will punish incumbents. By contrast, the ability of executives to control the narrative around security failures by blaming the perpetrators, especially during unified government, can help them avoid blame.
- 17 November 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 48 (4) , 438-463
Security, Clarity of Responsibility, and Presidential Approval
The importance of institutions in shaping citizens’ ability to punish or reward politicians for economic outcomes is well established. Where institutions divide authority, politicians can blame each other and citizens find it harder to assign responsibility for policy failures; where institutions clarify lines of authority, citizens can better hold politicians accountable. However, this argument assumes that citizens perceive policy responsibility as shared among political actors and this is not always the case. Looking at security policy, we argue that when policy responsibility is concentrated in a single actor the effect of institutions on blame attribution is different from what the economic voting literature predicts. Divided government in this context makes blame-shifting less effective and makes it more likely that citizens will punish incumbents. By contrast, the ability of executives to control the narrative around security failures by blaming the perpetrators, especially during unified government, can help them avoid blame.
- 1 April 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 37 (1) , 131-133
Erratum to: Cushioning the Fall: Scandals, Economic Conditions, and Executive Approval
- 1 April 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 37 (1) , 131-133
Erratum to: Cushioning the Fall: Scandals, Economic Conditions, and Executive Approval
- 22 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 37 (1) , 109-130
Cushioning the Fall: Scandals, Economic Conditions, and Executive Approval
- 22 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 37 (1) , 109-130
Cushioning the Fall: Scandals, Economic Conditions, and Executive Approval
- 20 September 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 45 (1) , 62-90
Out of the Cabinet
This article challenges a key part of the conventional view of coalitions in presidential systems that sees them as short-lived and ad hoc. The author shows instead that there is wide variation in the durability of governing coalitions across these regimes. She develops a theory of the incentives of parties to participate in the government and the circumstances under which scholars might expect to see the existing governing coalition break down. The author draws on data from 121 cabinets in 12 Latin American countries between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s to show that the dissolution of the cabinet is more likely when the president places less value on coalition building as a policy-making strategy and when parties find it costly to participate in the government. In particular, the author shows that strong unilateral institutional powers tend to diminish the incentives of presidents to compromise with other parties; in contrast, effective legislatures and high rates of approval for the executive contribute significantly to more stable governments.
- 20 September 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 45 (1) , 62-90
Out of the Cabinet
This article challenges a key part of the conventional view of coalitions in presidential systems that sees them as short-lived and ad hoc. The author shows instead that there is wide variation in the durability of governing coalitions across these regimes. She develops a theory of the incentives of parties to participate in the government and the circumstances under which scholars might expect to see the existing governing coalition break down. The author draws on data from 121 cabinets in 12 Latin American countries between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s to show that the dissolution of the cabinet is more likely when the president places less value on coalition building as a policy-making strategy and when parties find it costly to participate in the government. In particular, the author shows that strong unilateral institutional powers tend to diminish the incentives of presidents to compromise with other parties; in contrast, effective legislatures and high rates of approval for the executive contribute significantly to more stable governments.