Loïc Masure
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Loïc Masure has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- François-Xavier Standaert
UCLouvain, ICTEAM Institute, Crypto Group
4 shared publications François-Xavier Standaert
Université catholique de Louvain
2 shared publications- Thorben Moos
UCLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
2 shared publications - Amir Moradi
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany
1 shared publication - Charles Momin
UCLouvain
1 shared publication Francois Durvaux
Crypto Group, ICTEAM Institute, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 231-261
Bypassing the Random-Probing Model in Masking Security Proofs
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 231-261
Bypassing the Random-Probing Model in Masking Security Proofs
- 7 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Towards a better comprehension of deep learning for side-channel analysis
Vers une meilleure compréhension de l'apprentissage profond appliqué aux attaques par observations: Les récents progrès en apprentissage profond ont bouleversé l'état de l'art des attaques par observations en sécurité embarquée. Mais leur aspect « boîte-noire » empêche à ce jour l'identification des failles implicitement exploitées dans l'implémentation. De même, il est difficile d'interpréter les résultats de telles attaques sur le niveau de sécurité de l'implémentation-cible. Toutes ces raisons ont rendu la communauté scientifique sceptique quant à l’intérêt de ces techniques dans le cadre d'une évaluation de sécurité. Cette thèse se propose de dresser une meilleure compréhension de l'apprentissage profond dans un tel contexte. Nous montrons comment l’entraînement de tels estimateurs peut être analysé à travers le prisme d'une évaluation de sécurité, de façon à estimer a priori la complexité d’une attaque à base de réseaux de neurones sans avoir toutefois à la mener. Nous observons également sur des simulations que ces modèles entraînés sans connaissance a priori des contre-mesures peuvent atteindre les bornes de sécurité théoriques prévues par la littérature, validant la pertinence ou non de certaines contre-mesures comme le partage de secret ou la dissimulation contre les réseaux de neurones. Par ailleurs, nous expliquons comment exploiter un réseau entraîné pour effectuer une caractérisation efficace des fuites d'information dans les observations, et ce même en présence de contre-mesures rendant d'autres techniques classiques inopérantes. Cela permet une meilleure compréhension des fuites d’information exploitées par le réseau et d’affiner le diagnostic de l’évaluateur ou du développeur, afin de proposer des corrections.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Towards a better comprehension of deep learning for side-channel analysis
Vers une meilleure compréhension de l'apprentissage profond appliqué aux attaques par observations: Les récents progrès en apprentissage profond ont bouleversé l'état de l'art des attaques par observations en sécurité embarquée. Mais leur aspect « boîte-noire » empêche à ce jour l'identification des failles implicitement exploitées dans l'implémentation. De même, il est difficile d'interpréter les résultats de telles attaques sur le niveau de sécurité de l'implémentation-cible. Toutes ces raisons ont rendu la communauté scientifique sceptique quant à l’intérêt de ces techniques dans le cadre d'une évaluation de sécurité. Cette thèse se propose de dresser une meilleure compréhension de l'apprentissage profond dans un tel contexte. Nous montrons comment l’entraînement de tels estimateurs peut être analysé à travers le prisme d'une évaluation de sécurité, de façon à estimer a priori la complexité d’une attaque à base de réseaux de neurones sans avoir toutefois à la mener. Nous observons également sur des simulations que ces modèles entraînés sans connaissance a priori des contre-mesures peuvent atteindre les bornes de sécurité théoriques prévues par la littérature, validant la pertinence ou non de certaines contre-mesures comme le partage de secret ou la dissimulation contre les réseaux de neurones. Par ailleurs, nous expliquons comment exploiter un réseau entraîné pour effectuer une caractérisation efficace des fuites d'information dans les observations, et ce même en présence de contre-mesures rendant d'autres techniques classiques inopérantes. Cela permet une meilleure compréhension des fuites d’information exploitées par le réseau et d’affiner le diagnostic de l’évaluateur ou du développeur, afin de proposer des corrections.
- Open Access
- 5 June 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2025 (3) , 32-55
On the Average Random Probing Model
Masking is one of the main countermeasures against side-channel analysis since it relies on provable security. In this context, “provable” means that a security bound can be exhibited for the masked implementation through a theoretical analysis in a given threat model. The main goal in this line of research is therefore to provide the tightest security bound, in the most realistic model, in the most generic way. Yet, all of these objectives cannot be reached together. That is why the masking literature has introduced a large spectrum of threat models and reductions between them, depending on the desired trade-off with respect to these three goals. In this paper, we focus on three threat models, namely the noisy-leakage model (realistic yet hard to work with), the random probing (unrealistic yet easy to work with), and more particularly a third intermediate model called average random probing. Average random probing has been introduced by Dziembowski et al. at Eurocrypt 2015, in order to exhibit a tight reduction between noisy-leakage and random probing models, recently proven by Brian et al. at Eurocrypt 2024. This milestone has strong practical consequences, since otherwise the reduction from the noisy leakage model to the random probing model introduces a prohibitively high constant factor in the security bound, preventing security evaluators to use it in practice. However, we exhibit a gap between the average random probing definitions of Dziembowski et al. (denoted hereafter by DFS-ARP) and Brian et al. (simply denoted by ARP). Whereas any noisy leakage can be tightly reduced to DFS-ARP, we show in this paper that it cannot be tightly reduced to ARP, unless requiring extra assumptions, e.g., if the noisy leakage is deterministic. Our proof techniques do not involve more tools than the one used so far in such reductions, namely basic probability facts, and known properties of the total variation distance. As a consequence, the reduction from the noisy leakage to the random probing — without high constant factor — remains unproven. This stresses the need to clarify the practical relevance of analyzing the security of masking in the random probing model since most of the current efforts towards improving the constructions and their security proofs in the random probing model might be hindered by potentially unavoidable loss in the reduction from more realistic but currently less investigated leakage models.
- 5 June 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2025 (3) , 32-55
Open AccessOn the Average Random Probing Model
Masking is one of the main countermeasures against side-channel analysis since it relies on provable security. In this context, “provable” means that a security bound can be exhibited for the masked implementation through a theoretical analysis in a given threat model. The main goal in this line of research is therefore to provide the tightest security bound, in the most realistic model, in the most generic way. Yet, all of these objectives cannot be reached together. That is why the masking literature has introduced a large spectrum of threat models and reductions between them, depending on the desired trade-off with respect to these three goals. In this paper, we focus on three threat models, namely the noisy-leakage model (realistic yet hard to work with), the random probing (unrealistic yet easy to work with), and more particularly a third intermediate model called average random probing. Average random probing has been introduced by Dziembowski et al. at Eurocrypt 2015, in order to exhibit a tight reduction between noisy-leakage and random probing models, recently proven by Brian et al. at Eurocrypt 2024. This milestone has strong practical consequences, since otherwise the reduction from the noisy leakage model to the random probing model introduces a prohibitively high constant factor in the security bound, preventing security evaluators to use it in practice. However, we exhibit a gap between the average random probing definitions of Dziembowski et al. (denoted hereafter by DFS-ARP) and Brian et al. (simply denoted by ARP). Whereas any noisy leakage can be tightly reduced to DFS-ARP, we show in this paper that it cannot be tightly reduced to ARP, unless requiring extra assumptions, e.g., if the noisy leakage is deterministic. Our proof techniques do not involve more tools than the one used so far in such reductions, namely basic probability facts, and known properties of the total variation distance. As a consequence, the reduction from the noisy leakage to the random probing — without high constant factor — remains unproven. This stresses the need to clarify the practical relevance of analyzing the security of masking in the random probing model since most of the current efforts towards improving the constructions and their security proofs in the random probing model might be hindered by potentially unavoidable loss in the reduction from more realistic but currently less investigated leakage models.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (2)
Randomness Generation for Secure Hardware Masking – Unrolled Trivium to the Rescue
Masking is a prominent strategy to protect cryptographic implementations against side-channel analysis. Its popularity arises from the exponential security gains that can be achieved for (approximately) quadratic resource utilization. Many variants of the countermeasure tailored for different optimization goals have been proposed. The common denominator among all of them is the implicit demand for robust and high entropy randomness. Simply assuming that uniformly distributed random bits are available, without taking the cost of their generation into account, leads to a poor understanding of the efficiency vs. security tradeoff of masked implementations. This is especially relevant in case of hardware masking schemes which are known to consume large amounts of random bits per cycle due to parallelism. Currently, there seems to be no consensus on how to most efficiently derive many pseudo-random bits per clock cycle from an initial seed and with properties suitable for masked hardware implementations. In this work, we evaluate a number of building blocks for this purpose and find that hardware-oriented stream ciphers like Trivium and its reduced-security variant Bivium B outperform most competitors when implemented in an unrolled fashion. Unrolled implementations of these primitives enable the flexible generation of many bits per cycle, which is crucial for satisfying the large randomness demands of state-of-the-art masking schemes. According to our analysis, only Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs), when also unrolled, are capable of producing long non-repetitive sequences of random-looking bits at a higher rate per cycle for the same or lower cost as Trivium and Bivium B. Yet, these instances do not provide black-box security as they generate only linear outputs. We experimentally demonstrate that using multiple output bits from an LFSR in the same masked implementation can violate probing security and even lead to harmful randomness cancellations. Circumventing these problems, and enabling an independent analysis of randomness generation and masking, requires the use of cryptographically stronger primitives like stream ciphers. As a result of our studies, we provide an evidence-based estimate for the cost of securely generating n fresh random bits per cycle. Depending on the desired level of black-box security and operating frequency, this cost can be as low as 20 n to 30 n ASIC gate equivalents (GE) or 3 n to 4 n FPGA look-up tables (LUTs), where n is the number of random bits required. Our results demonstrate that the cost per bit is (sometimes significantly) lower than estimated in previous works, incentivizing parallelism whenever exploitable. This provides further motivation to potentially move low randomness usage from a primary to a secondary design goal in hardware masking research.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (2)
Open AccessRandomness Generation for Secure Hardware Masking – Unrolled Trivium to the Rescue
Masking is a prominent strategy to protect cryptographic implementations against side-channel analysis. Its popularity arises from the exponential security gains that can be achieved for (approximately) quadratic resource utilization. Many variants of the countermeasure tailored for different optimization goals have been proposed. The common denominator among all of them is the implicit demand for robust and high entropy randomness. Simply assuming that uniformly distributed random bits are available, without taking the cost of their generation into account, leads to a poor understanding of the efficiency vs. security tradeoff of masked implementations. This is especially relevant in case of hardware masking schemes which are known to consume large amounts of random bits per cycle due to parallelism. Currently, there seems to be no consensus on how to most efficiently derive many pseudo-random bits per clock cycle from an initial seed and with properties suitable for masked hardware implementations. In this work, we evaluate a number of building blocks for this purpose and find that hardware-oriented stream ciphers like Trivium and its reduced-security variant Bivium B outperform most competitors when implemented in an unrolled fashion. Unrolled implementations of these primitives enable the flexible generation of many bits per cycle, which is crucial for satisfying the large randomness demands of state-of-the-art masking schemes. According to our analysis, only Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs), when also unrolled, are capable of producing long non-repetitive sequences of random-looking bits at a higher rate per cycle for the same or lower cost as Trivium and Bivium B. Yet, these instances do not provide black-box security as they generate only linear outputs. We experimentally demonstrate that using multiple output bits from an LFSR in the same masked implementation can violate probing security and even lead to harmful randomness cancellations. Circumventing these problems, and enabling an independent analysis of randomness generation and masking, requires the use of cryptographically stronger primitives like stream ciphers. As a result of our studies, we provide an evidence-based estimate for the cost of securely generating n fresh random bits per cycle. Depending on the desired level of black-box security and operating frequency, this cost can be as low as 20 n to 30 n ASIC gate equivalents (GE) or 3 n to 4 n FPGA look-up tables (LUTs), where n is the number of random bits required. Our results demonstrate that the cost per bit is (sometimes significantly) lower than estimated in previous works, incentivizing parallelism whenever exploitable. This provides further motivation to potentially move low randomness usage from a primary to a secondary design goal in hardware masking research.
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 260-280
Combining Loop Shuffling and Code PolyMorphism for Enhanced AES Side-Channel Security
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 260-280
Combining Loop Shuffling and Code PolyMorphism for Enhanced AES Side-Channel Security
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 343-376
Prouff and Rivain’s Formal Security Proof of Masking, Revisited
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 343-376
Prouff and Rivain’s Formal Security Proof of Masking, Revisited
- 15 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 596-627
Effective and Efficient Masking with Low Noise Using Small-Mersenne-Prime Ciphers
- 15 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 596-627
Effective and Efficient Masking with Low Noise Using Small-Mersenne-Prime Ciphers
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 86-104
Removing the Field Size Loss from Duc et al.’s Conjectured Bound for Masked Encodings
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 86-104
Removing the Field Size Loss from Duc et al.’s Conjectured Bound for Masked Encodings
- 10 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 13 (2) , 129-147
Side-channel analysis against ANSSI’s protected AES implementation on ARM: end-to-end attacks with multi-task learning
- 10 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 13 (2) , 129-147
Side-channel analysis against ANSSI’s protected AES implementation on ARM: end-to-end attacks with multi-task learning
- 29 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 69-81
A Nearly Tight Proof of Duc et al.’s Conjectured Security Bound for Masked Implementations
- 29 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 69-81
A Nearly Tight Proof of Duc et al.’s Conjectured Security Bound for Masked Implementations