Peilin Ai
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Peilin Ai has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xi Zhao
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China
2 shared publications - Fujun Lai
Research Center for Smarter Supply Chain, Business School, Soochow University, Suzhou, China
1 shared publication - Guangzhi Shang
NASPO Department of Supply Chain Management, W. P. Carey School of Business Arizona State University Tempe Arizona USA
1 shared publication - Jose Benitez
Department of Information Systems and Business Analytics, Ambassador Crawford College of Business and Entrepreneurship Kent State University Kent Ohio USA
1 shared publication - Xin (Robert) Luo
University of New Mexico
1 shared publication - Zhichao Wu
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (3) , 921-938
Transaction Fee Mechanisms and User Welfare in Permissionless Blockchains
A transaction fee is fundamental in maintaining the stability and decentralization of a permissionless blockchain, the infrastructure underlying major cryptocurrency networks such as Ethereum and Bitcoin. This fee, set and paid by users when initiating each transaction, aggregates to over $24 million daily on Ethereum, imposing a nontrivial barrier to wider adoption. What is worse is that it is disproportionately borne by small users. Like Bitcoin, Ethereum started with a name-your-own-price style fee mechanism. Under this Legacy mechanism, we demonstrate that, surprisingly, only three-quarters of the transaction fee is necessary for users to attain the service quality they receive; the remaining one-quarter thus constitutes welfare loss. In August 2021, Ethereum implemented a fee mechanism change. Together, the Legacy methods and the new scheme, which we call Cap-Tip, describe the two most widely used fee mechanisms in all major permissionless blockchains. We explain the innovations embedded in the Cap-Tip mechanism through the lens of information quality and task decomposition. Collecting over 123 million transactions covering the change period, we estimate the causal impact of Cap-Tip on welfare improvement using a doubly robust difference-in-difference estimator that accommodates heterogeneity across timing of and exposure after adoption. The result is an astounding 80% reduction in welfare loss, achieved by users only 6 days after adoption. Interestingly, we also find that adoption benefits small users more than large ones, alleviating fee disparity and improving fairness. We theorize this difference through user experience and the overconfidence bias. Our study offers a novel operational perspective to unpack how the arguably most significant fee mechanism change in the blockchain space affects user welfare.
- 24 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (3) , 921-938
Transaction Fee Mechanisms and User Welfare in Permissionless Blockchains
A transaction fee is fundamental in maintaining the stability and decentralization of a permissionless blockchain, the infrastructure underlying major cryptocurrency networks such as Ethereum and Bitcoin. This fee, set and paid by users when initiating each transaction, aggregates to over $24 million daily on Ethereum, imposing a nontrivial barrier to wider adoption. What is worse is that it is disproportionately borne by small users. Like Bitcoin, Ethereum started with a name-your-own-price style fee mechanism. Under this Legacy mechanism, we demonstrate that, surprisingly, only three-quarters of the transaction fee is necessary for users to attain the service quality they receive; the remaining one-quarter thus constitutes welfare loss. In August 2021, Ethereum implemented a fee mechanism change. Together, the Legacy methods and the new scheme, which we call Cap-Tip, describe the two most widely used fee mechanisms in all major permissionless blockchains. We explain the innovations embedded in the Cap-Tip mechanism through the lens of information quality and task decomposition. Collecting over 123 million transactions covering the change period, we estimate the causal impact of Cap-Tip on welfare improvement using a doubly robust difference-in-difference estimator that accommodates heterogeneity across timing of and exposure after adoption. The result is an astounding 80% reduction in welfare loss, achieved by users only 6 days after adoption. Interestingly, we also find that adoption benefits small users more than large ones, alleviating fee disparity and improving fairness. We theorize this difference through user experience and the overconfidence bias. Our study offers a novel operational perspective to unpack how the arguably most significant fee mechanism change in the blockchain space affects user welfare.
- Top Cited Papers
- 19 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Operations Management
- Vol. 68 (6-7) , 649-674
Task management in decentralized autonomous organization
In the emerging platform economy, blockchain technologies are reshaping the digital economy. Moreover, disintermediation and decentralization have broken new ground for platform organizations and management mechanisms and instigated the concept of a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization). Recent literature on operations management has called for further research on governance issues related to DAOs. In response to this call, we explore the relationship between DAO management efforts and platform performance in this study. Specifically, we propose and theoretically articulate decentralized voting tasks in DAOs as a new form of organizing. Harnessing both online and on‐chain data from seven sources, we empirically examine how voting task division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information provision affect platform performance in the context of MakerDAO (an Ethereum‐based stablecoin issuance platform). Our findings reveal that strategic decisions arrived at through voting have a positive impact on platform operational performance under certain conditions, whereas operational decisions resulting from voting have a negative impact. Moreover, we elucidate the moderating effects of voting task execution characteristics on the relationship between completed decision tasks and operational performance. These findings have important implications from both theoretical and practical perspectives. We also share all the raw data we use to promote the development of blockchain‐related empirical research.
- 19 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Operations Management
- Vol. 68 (6-7) , 649-674
Top Cited PapersTask management in decentralized autonomous organization
In the emerging platform economy, blockchain technologies are reshaping the digital economy. Moreover, disintermediation and decentralization have broken new ground for platform organizations and management mechanisms and instigated the concept of a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization). Recent literature on operations management has called for further research on governance issues related to DAOs. In response to this call, we explore the relationship between DAO management efforts and platform performance in this study. Specifically, we propose and theoretically articulate decentralized voting tasks in DAOs as a new form of organizing. Harnessing both online and on‐chain data from seven sources, we empirically examine how voting task division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information provision affect platform performance in the context of MakerDAO (an Ethereum‐based stablecoin issuance platform). Our findings reveal that strategic decisions arrived at through voting have a positive impact on platform operational performance under certain conditions, whereas operational decisions resulting from voting have a negative impact. Moreover, we elucidate the moderating effects of voting task execution characteristics on the relationship between completed decision tasks and operational performance. These findings have important implications from both theoretical and practical perspectives. We also share all the raw data we use to promote the development of blockchain‐related empirical research.