Lingguang Lei
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Lingguang Lei has a total of 43 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yuewu Wang
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
9 shared publications - Jiwu Jing
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
6 shared publications - Kun Sun
George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
6 shared publications Jiwu Jing
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
3 shared publications- Peng Wang
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
3 shared publications - Chunjing Kou
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1749-1757
An Android Keystore Scheme with Flash as the Secure Module
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1749-1757
Open AccessAn Android Keystore Scheme with Flash as the Secure Module
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 329-347
Mitigating the Unprivileged User Namespaces Based Privilege Escalation Attacks with Linux Capabilities
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 329-347
Mitigating the Unprivileged User Namespaces Based Privilege Escalation Attacks with Linux Capabilities
- 17 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 190-208
A Lightweight Defense Scheme Against Usermode Helper Privilege Escalation Using Linux Capability
- 17 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 190-208
A Lightweight Defense Scheme Against Usermode Helper Privilege Escalation Using Linux Capability
- 10 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 74 (2) , 356-370
AsyncGBP+: Bridging SSL/TLS and Heterogeneous Computing Power With GPU-Based Providers
The rapid evolution of GPUs has emerged as a promising solution for accelerating the worldwide used SSL/TLS, which faces performance bottlenecks due to its underlying heavy cryptographic computations. Nevertheless, substantial structural adjustments from the parallel mode of GPUs to the serial mode of the SSL/TLS stack are imperative, potentially constraining the practical deployment of GPUs. In this paper, we propose AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ , a three-level framework that facilitates the seamless conversion of cryptographic requests from synchronous to asynchronous mode. We conduct an in-depth analysis of the OpenSSL provider and cryptographic primitive features relevant to GPU implementations, aiming to fully exploit the potential of GPUs. Notably, AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ supports three working settings (offline/online/hybrid), finely tailored for various public key cryptographic primitives, including traditional ones like X25519, Ed25519, ECDSA, and the quantum-safe CRYSTALS-Kyber. A comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ can efficiently achieve an improvement of up to 137.8$\times$ compared to the default OpenSSL provider (for X25519, Ed25519, ECDSA) and 113.30$\times$ compared to OpenSSL-compatible liboqs (for CRYSTALS-Kyber) in a single-process setting. Furthermore, AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ surpasses the current fastest commercial-off-the-shelf OpenSSL-compatible TLS accelerator with a 5.3$\times$ to 7.0$\times$ performance improvement.- 10 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 74 (2) , 356-370
AsyncGBP+: Bridging SSL/TLS and Heterogeneous Computing Power With GPU-Based Providers
The rapid evolution of GPUs has emerged as a promising solution for accelerating the worldwide used SSL/TLS, which faces performance bottlenecks due to its underlying heavy cryptographic computations. Nevertheless, substantial structural adjustments from the parallel mode of GPUs to the serial mode of the SSL/TLS stack are imperative, potentially constraining the practical deployment of GPUs. In this paper, we propose AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ , a three-level framework that facilitates the seamless conversion of cryptographic requests from synchronous to asynchronous mode. We conduct an in-depth analysis of the OpenSSL provider and cryptographic primitive features relevant to GPU implementations, aiming to fully exploit the potential of GPUs. Notably, AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ supports three working settings (offline/online/hybrid), finely tailored for various public key cryptographic primitives, including traditional ones like X25519, Ed25519, ECDSA, and the quantum-safe CRYSTALS-Kyber. A comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ can efficiently achieve an improvement of up to 137.8$\times$ compared to the default OpenSSL provider (for X25519, Ed25519, ECDSA) and 113.30$\times$ compared to OpenSSL-compatible liboqs (for CRYSTALS-Kyber) in a single-process setting. Furthermore, AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ surpasses the current fastest commercial-off-the-shelf OpenSSL-compatible TLS accelerator with a 5.3$\times$ to 7.0$\times$ performance improvement.- 10 June 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 6168-6183
Condo: Enhancing Container Isolation Through Kernel Permission Data Protection
Container technology is widely adopted due to its features such as light weight and ease of rapid deployment. However, as an OS-level virtualization mechanism, container isolation relies on the kernel’s security mechanisms and the kernel permission data (usually non-control flow data) used by these mechanisms. None of the existing mitigation schemes for non-control flow data attacks provide an effective and practical solution to container security since they either trigger too much overhead, have limited effectiveness over attacks launched in specific ways, or can only be used to protect some specific kernel data. In addition, none of them accurately identify the kernel data associated with container isolation. In this paper, we provide a solution called Condo that enhances container isolation by protecting the associated kernel permission data. We first present a generic non-control flow kernel data protection mechanism that protects different types of kernel data uniformly with low overhead and is not limited by attack methods or data types. We then demystify the models of various kernel access control mechanisms in the container environment, and identify the subject and object permission data that are critical to container isolation. Finally, we provide a solution named Condo to enhance container isolation, which is completely transparent to the existing container ecosystem, including containerized applications and container management/orchestration tools such as Docker. Experimental results show that Condo can effectively reduce the compromises of container isolation due to memory corruption attacks with an acceptable overhead.
- 10 June 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 6168-6183
Condo: Enhancing Container Isolation Through Kernel Permission Data Protection
Container technology is widely adopted due to its features such as light weight and ease of rapid deployment. However, as an OS-level virtualization mechanism, container isolation relies on the kernel’s security mechanisms and the kernel permission data (usually non-control flow data) used by these mechanisms. None of the existing mitigation schemes for non-control flow data attacks provide an effective and practical solution to container security since they either trigger too much overhead, have limited effectiveness over attacks launched in specific ways, or can only be used to protect some specific kernel data. In addition, none of them accurately identify the kernel data associated with container isolation. In this paper, we provide a solution called Condo that enhances container isolation by protecting the associated kernel permission data. We first present a generic non-control flow kernel data protection mechanism that protects different types of kernel data uniformly with low overhead and is not limited by attack methods or data types. We then demystify the models of various kernel access control mechanisms in the container environment, and identify the subject and object permission data that are critical to container isolation. Finally, we provide a solution named Condo to enhance container isolation, which is completely transparent to the existing container ecosystem, including containerized applications and container management/orchestration tools such as Docker. Experimental results show that Condo can effectively reduce the compromises of container isolation due to memory corruption attacks with an acceptable overhead.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 337-346
AsyncGBP: Unleashing the Potential of Heterogeneous Computing for SSL/TLS with GPU-based Provider
The proliferation of IoT and 5G technologies has led to an explosion of data traffic that data centers must handle while ensuring secure transmission via SSL/TLS. The high volume of cryptographic operations required imposes performance bottlenecks. The GPU-based cryptographic accelerator is one of the competitive solutions. However, significant structural differences with practical applications confine their capacities to specific domains, such as offline cryptanalysis, undermining their potential for real-world cryptographic acceleration. This paper investigates the feasibility of using GPUs as cryptographic accelerators for concurrent data secure transmission scenarios like SSL/TLS. Specifically, we propose AsyncGBP, a framework that integrates the original OpenSSL software stack with the heterogeneous GPU-based accelerator. To enhance user-friendliness and take full advantage of GPUs’ SIMT execution model, AsyncGBP features an OpenSSL-compatible asynchronous design, which seamlessly converts cryptographic requests from synchronous to asynchronous mode, efficiently aggregates numerous requests, and rationally schedules GPU for computation. We also provide a fine-grained GPU-based cryptographic algorithm stack that includes X25519, Ed25519, and ChaCha20-Poly1305. A comprehensive evaluation shows that AsyncGBP can efficiently achieve up to 97% of GPU local performance on an RTX 3070, resulting in an improvement of up to 137x compared to the default OpenSSL provider in a single-process setting. Furthermore, AsyncGBP outperforms the existing fastest commercial-off-the-shelf OpenSSL-compatible TLS accelerator by a significant margin, achieving a 5.3x to 7.0x performance improvement.
- 7 August 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 337-346
Open AccessAsyncGBP: Unleashing the Potential of Heterogeneous Computing for SSL/TLS with GPU-based Provider
The proliferation of IoT and 5G technologies has led to an explosion of data traffic that data centers must handle while ensuring secure transmission via SSL/TLS. The high volume of cryptographic operations required imposes performance bottlenecks. The GPU-based cryptographic accelerator is one of the competitive solutions. However, significant structural differences with practical applications confine their capacities to specific domains, such as offline cryptanalysis, undermining their potential for real-world cryptographic acceleration. This paper investigates the feasibility of using GPUs as cryptographic accelerators for concurrent data secure transmission scenarios like SSL/TLS. Specifically, we propose AsyncGBP, a framework that integrates the original OpenSSL software stack with the heterogeneous GPU-based accelerator. To enhance user-friendliness and take full advantage of GPUs’ SIMT execution model, AsyncGBP features an OpenSSL-compatible asynchronous design, which seamlessly converts cryptographic requests from synchronous to asynchronous mode, efficiently aggregates numerous requests, and rationally schedules GPU for computation. We also provide a fine-grained GPU-based cryptographic algorithm stack that includes X25519, Ed25519, and ChaCha20-Poly1305. A comprehensive evaluation shows that AsyncGBP can efficiently achieve up to 97% of GPU local performance on an RTX 3070, resulting in an improvement of up to 137x compared to the default OpenSSL provider in a single-process setting. Furthermore, AsyncGBP outperforms the existing fastest commercial-off-the-shelf OpenSSL-compatible TLS accelerator by a significant margin, achieving a 5.3x to 7.0x performance improvement.
- 19 April 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21 (3) , 1068-1083
A Hybrid System Call Profiling Approach for Container Protection
Over-privileged Linux containers might put the underlying OS at risk by permitting pointless system calls that could be exploited as entry points to the kernel. However, finding such security profiles is a difficult task as it demands examining the implementation/operation of containers in the absence of knowledge regarding its required system calls. In this article, we propose a hybrid approach to limit the system call usage during the execution of containers. Specifically, given an application container, we maintain an initial fine-grained whitelist by dynamic tracking to control the run-time security along with a complementary whitelist extracted via static analysis to maintain container's functionality while addressing the coverage limitation of dynamic analysis. Our method automatically analyzes the container behavior to identify three execution phases and dynamically enforce the corresponding fine-grained system call whitelists. The invoked system call will be compared with both whitelists to decide if it should be killed to guarantee the container security or logged for further analysis. Our evaluation results with 193 Docker images demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in significantly reducing the required system calls during the applications' life-cycle. Furthermore, we discuss the reduced attack surface and demonstrate the efficiency of our approach through empirical analysis results.
- 19 April 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21 (3) , 1068-1083
A Hybrid System Call Profiling Approach for Container Protection
Over-privileged Linux containers might put the underlying OS at risk by permitting pointless system calls that could be exploited as entry points to the kernel. However, finding such security profiles is a difficult task as it demands examining the implementation/operation of containers in the absence of knowledge regarding its required system calls. In this article, we propose a hybrid approach to limit the system call usage during the execution of containers. Specifically, given an application container, we maintain an initial fine-grained whitelist by dynamic tracking to control the run-time security along with a complementary whitelist extracted via static analysis to maintain container's functionality while addressing the coverage limitation of dynamic analysis. Our method automatically analyzes the container behavior to identify three execution phases and dynamically enforce the corresponding fine-grained system call whitelists. The invoked system call will be compared with both whitelists to decide if it should be killed to guarantee the container security or logged for further analysis. Our evaluation results with 193 Docker images demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in significantly reducing the required system calls during the applications' life-cycle. Furthermore, we discuss the reduced attack surface and demonstrate the efficiency of our approach through empirical analysis results.
- 2 March 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21 (1) , 254-269
CacheIEE: Cache-Assisted Isolated Execution Environment on ARM Multi-Core Platforms
ARM TrustZone technology has been widely used to create Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) for enhancing the security of applications. However, the increasing number of installed security-sensitive applications in the secure world will inevitably enlarge the trusted computing base (TCB) of TEE systems. To minimize the TCB of the secure world and increase application portability, Isolated Execution Environments (IEEs) are proposed to protect applications in enclaves created in the normal world. However, existing IEE systems cannot provide the same level of security as the TEE systems, particularly, on resolving the multi-vector attacks that include both physical memory disclosure attacks and software attacks. In this paper, we develop a new cache-assisted IEE system called CacheIEE that creates enclaves in the L1 data cache of the normal world to protect sensitive data against multi-vector attacks. First, by always storing the sensitive data in the L1 data cache, CacheIEE can effectively prevent physical memory disclosure attacks. Second, we protect the L1 data cache against untrusted rich OS running in other cores. To support more applications, CacheIEE can process large-size sensitive data in the L1 data cache with constrained capacity. We implement a system prototype of CacheIEE and verify its security and practicability.
- 2 March 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21 (1) , 254-269
CacheIEE: Cache-Assisted Isolated Execution Environment on ARM Multi-Core Platforms
ARM TrustZone technology has been widely used to create Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) for enhancing the security of applications. However, the increasing number of installed security-sensitive applications in the secure world will inevitably enlarge the trusted computing base (TCB) of TEE systems. To minimize the TCB of the secure world and increase application portability, Isolated Execution Environments (IEEs) are proposed to protect applications in enclaves created in the normal world. However, existing IEE systems cannot provide the same level of security as the TEE systems, particularly, on resolving the multi-vector attacks that include both physical memory disclosure attacks and software attacks. In this paper, we develop a new cache-assisted IEE system called CacheIEE that creates enclaves in the L1 data cache of the normal world to protect sensitive data against multi-vector attacks. First, by always storing the sensitive data in the L1 data cache, CacheIEE can effectively prevent physical memory disclosure attacks. Second, we protect the L1 data cache against untrusted rich OS running in other cores. To support more applications, CacheIEE can process large-size sensitive data in the L1 data cache with constrained capacity. We implement a system prototype of CacheIEE and verify its security and practicability.
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 17 (15566013) , 1709-1724
TrustSAMP: Securing Streaming Music Against Multivector Attacks on ARM Platform
Streaming music has dominated the digital music industry in recent years, which allows users to enjoy a huge music library online with a low subscription price. Terminal-side audio DRM (Digital Right Management) is very critical for streaming music industry, compromising of which will cause unrestricted listening, dumping and unauthorized secondary distribution. However, existing DRM protection schemes mainly focus on defeating software attacks but lack complete shielding against the physical memory disclosure attacks, which may even be launched by the owner of the terminal device. In this paper, we propose a terminal-side audio DRM solution called TrustSAMP to protect the copyrighted audio data against both software attacks and physical memory disclosure attacks. The basic idea is to process the audio data plaintext only in certain on-SoC components secured by ARM TrustZone. To minimize the TCB (Trusted Computing Base) of the secure world, we separate the control flow and the data flow of the Linux audio subsystem and port only the codes used for audio data decryption and plaintext transfer into the secure world. Moreover, we leave most driver codes of the audio-associated on-SoC components in the rich OS (i.e., in the normal world), and introduce a tiny proxy in the secure world to control the associated registers according to the requests from the normal-world drivers. The prototype implemented on real hardware shows that TrustSAMP can play a variety of wav-format audio with very small overhead and negligible loss of audio quality.
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 17 (15566013) , 1709-1724
TrustSAMP: Securing Streaming Music Against Multivector Attacks on ARM Platform
Streaming music has dominated the digital music industry in recent years, which allows users to enjoy a huge music library online with a low subscription price. Terminal-side audio DRM (Digital Right Management) is very critical for streaming music industry, compromising of which will cause unrestricted listening, dumping and unauthorized secondary distribution. However, existing DRM protection schemes mainly focus on defeating software attacks but lack complete shielding against the physical memory disclosure attacks, which may even be launched by the owner of the terminal device. In this paper, we propose a terminal-side audio DRM solution called TrustSAMP to protect the copyrighted audio data against both software attacks and physical memory disclosure attacks. The basic idea is to process the audio data plaintext only in certain on-SoC components secured by ARM TrustZone. To minimize the TCB (Trusted Computing Base) of the secure world, we separate the control flow and the data flow of the Linux audio subsystem and port only the codes used for audio data decryption and plaintext transfer into the secure world. Moreover, we leave most driver codes of the audio-associated on-SoC components in the rich OS (i.e., in the normal world), and introduce a tiny proxy in the secure world to control the associated registers according to the requests from the normal-world drivers. The prototype implemented on real hardware shows that TrustSAMP can play a variety of wav-format audio with very small overhead and negligible loss of audio quality.
- 25 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 160-177
Evaluation on the Security of Commercial Cloud Container Services
- 25 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 160-177
Evaluation on the Security of Commercial Cloud Container Services