Peng Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Peng Wang has a total of 52 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gang Liu
National Key Laboratory of Security Communication
5 shared publications - Shuping Mao
Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute
5 shared publications - Yan Jia
State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100085, China
5 shared publications - Yuewu Wang
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
5 shared publications - Lei Hu
Chinese Academy of Sciences
4 shared publications - Lingguang Lei
Chinese Academy of Sciences
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 7 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 64-84
Breaking and Fixing Spoed
- 7 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 25-41
The $m=n+1$ Boundary of EME: A Splicing Distinguisher for the Unrefreshed EME-Core Extension and Its Linear-Map Generalization- 7 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 25-41
The $m=n+1$ Boundary of EME: A Splicing Distinguisher for the Unrefreshed EME-Core Extension and Its Linear-Map Generalization- 19 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 220-240
On the Committing Security of Generic Compositions for Authenticated Encryption
- 19 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 220-240
On the Committing Security of Generic Compositions for Authenticated Encryption
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 468-498
Classical and Quantum Full Plaintext Recovery for Low-Round Feistel-Type Designs
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 468-498
Classical and Quantum Full Plaintext Recovery for Low-Round Feistel-Type Designs
- Open Access
- 8 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-33
Using Learning with Rounding to Instantiate Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms
The Learning with Rounding (LWR) problem, introduced as a deterministic variant of Learning with Errors (LWE), has become a promising foundation for post-quantum cryptography. This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) article presents a comprehensive survey of the theoretical foundations, algorithmic developments, and practical implementations of LWR-based cryptographic schemes. We introduce LWR within the broader landscape of lattice-based cryptography and post-quantum security, highlighting its advantages such as reduced randomness, improved efficiency, and enhanced side-channel resistance. We explore the evolution of security reductions from LWR to LWE, including recent advances that support practical parameter regimes and address challenges in both bounded and unbounded sample settings. This article systematically reviews existing LWR-based schemes — including Saber, Lizard, Florete, Espada, Sable, and SMAUG — analyzing their design choices, parameter sets, and performance tradeoffs. Furthermore, we examine the impact of LWR on side-channel resistance, failure probabilities, and masking efficiency, demonstrating its suitability for secure and efficient implementations. By consolidating the research spanning theory and practice, this SoK aims at guiding future cryptographic design and standardization efforts leveraging LWR.
- 8 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-33
Open AccessUsing Learning with Rounding to Instantiate Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms
The Learning with Rounding (LWR) problem, introduced as a deterministic variant of Learning with Errors (LWE), has become a promising foundation for post-quantum cryptography. This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) article presents a comprehensive survey of the theoretical foundations, algorithmic developments, and practical implementations of LWR-based cryptographic schemes. We introduce LWR within the broader landscape of lattice-based cryptography and post-quantum security, highlighting its advantages such as reduced randomness, improved efficiency, and enhanced side-channel resistance. We explore the evolution of security reductions from LWR to LWE, including recent advances that support practical parameter regimes and address challenges in both bounded and unbounded sample settings. This article systematically reviews existing LWR-based schemes — including Saber, Lizard, Florete, Espada, Sable, and SMAUG — analyzing their design choices, parameter sets, and performance tradeoffs. Furthermore, we examine the impact of LWR on side-channel resistance, failure probabilities, and masking efficiency, demonstrating its suitability for secure and efficient implementations. By consolidating the research spanning theory and practice, this SoK aims at guiding future cryptographic design and standardization efforts leveraging LWR.
- Open Access
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1749-1757
An Android Keystore Scheme with Flash as the Secure Module
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1749-1757
Open AccessAn Android Keystore Scheme with Flash as the Secure Module
- Open Access
Quantum Security of Nonce-Based Encryption
We investigate the quantum security of nonce-based encryption under the indistinguishability against quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-qCPA). While classical results establish that IV-based modes such as CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR achieve IND-qCPA security, we demonstrate that simply replacing the random IV with a nonce undermines both classical and quantum security. To address this, we propose a general transformation from R-IND-qCPA security to N-IND-qCPA security and introduce enhanced variants, namely, CBC2, CFB2, OFB2, and CTR2, that are provably secure in the nonce-based quantum setting. We further show that nonce-based stream cipher encryption inherently satisfies N-IND-qCPA security. These results provide a systematic framework for upgrading IV-based constructions to secure nonce-based counterparts, thereby strengthening practical symmetric encryption against quantum adversaries.
Open AccessQuantum Security of Nonce-Based Encryption
We investigate the quantum security of nonce-based encryption under the indistinguishability against quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-qCPA). While classical results establish that IV-based modes such as CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR achieve IND-qCPA security, we demonstrate that simply replacing the random IV with a nonce undermines both classical and quantum security. To address this, we propose a general transformation from R-IND-qCPA security to N-IND-qCPA security and introduce enhanced variants, namely, CBC2, CFB2, OFB2, and CTR2, that are provably secure in the nonce-based quantum setting. We further show that nonce-based stream cipher encryption inherently satisfies N-IND-qCPA security. These results provide a systematic framework for upgrading IV-based constructions to secure nonce-based counterparts, thereby strengthening practical symmetric encryption against quantum adversaries.
- Open Access
- 9 November 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 13 (22) , 3595
Breaking Enhanced CBC and Its Application
The Enhanced Cipher Block Chaining scheme (eCBC) is an authentication encryption scheme (AE) improved from the CBC encryption scheme. It is shown that eCBC scheme fails to achieve ciphertext integrity (INT-CTXT): the IV is unauthenticated and the tag is a linear XOR of ciphertext hashes, enabling trivial forgeries such as IV substitution, block cancellation, and permutation. Furthermore, the medical image application diagonal block encryption based on eCBC scheme is also insecure. Its deterministic design leaks structural information, breaking confidentiality (IND-CPA). At the same time, it also inherits the forgery weaknesses of eCBC scheme, breaking authenticity. The results highlight that neither eCBC scheme nor its application meet AE security goals. And it is recommended to use standardized AE schemes such as SIV, GCM, or Ascon instead of ad hoc designs.
- 9 November 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 13 (22) , 3595
Open AccessBreaking Enhanced CBC and Its Application
The Enhanced Cipher Block Chaining scheme (eCBC) is an authentication encryption scheme (AE) improved from the CBC encryption scheme. It is shown that eCBC scheme fails to achieve ciphertext integrity (INT-CTXT): the IV is unauthenticated and the tag is a linear XOR of ciphertext hashes, enabling trivial forgeries such as IV substitution, block cancellation, and permutation. Furthermore, the medical image application diagonal block encryption based on eCBC scheme is also insecure. Its deterministic design leaks structural information, breaking confidentiality (IND-CPA). At the same time, it also inherits the forgery weaknesses of eCBC scheme, breaking authenticity. The results highlight that neither eCBC scheme nor its application meet AE security goals. And it is recommended to use standardized AE schemes such as SIV, GCM, or Ascon instead of ad hoc designs.
- Open Access
- 17 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 230-259
How to Recover the Full Plaintext of XCB
- 17 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 230-259
Open AccessHow to Recover the Full Plaintext of XCB
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 329-347
Mitigating the Unprivileged User Namespaces Based Privilege Escalation Attacks with Linux Capabilities
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 329-347
Mitigating the Unprivileged User Namespaces Based Privilege Escalation Attacks with Linux Capabilities