David Lowing
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
David Lowing has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Kevin Techer
3 shared publications- Kevin Techer
CRESE 30, avenue de l'Observatoire 25009 Besançon France
3 shared publications - Léa Munich
CRESE 30, avenue de l'Observatoire 25009 Besançon Munich France
3 shared publications - Daniel Fryer
School of Mathematics and Physics, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Australia
2 shared publications - Hien Duy Nguyen
La Trobe University
2 shared publications - Inga Strümke
Department of Computer Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 8 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 363 (3) , 1-24
A Myerson value for multi-choice games with a communication network
- 8 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 363 (3) , 1-24
A Myerson value for multi-choice games with a communication network
- 7 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Values for multi-choice cooperative games with applications to sharing the cost of a gas distribution network
Valeurs pour les jeux coopératifs à choix multiples avec applications au partage des coûts d'un réseau de distribution de gaz: Le rôle d'un réseau de distribution de gaz est de connecter des consommateurs à une source de gaz. Ce réseau est géré par un opérateur, dont la tâche engendre divers coûts. Certains de ces coûts peuvent ne pas être imputables à un consommateur particulier.En supposant que l'opérateur souhaite recouvrir ces coûts en facturant ses services, le problème est alors de déterminer comment partager ces coûts entre les consommateurs.La présente thèse propose des solutions à ce problème en mobilisant la théorie des jeux (coopératifs) multi-choix.Toutes les solutions proposées dans cette thèse sont conçues pour prendre en compte les demandes en gaz des consommateurs.De plus, comme certains principes éthiques sont souhaitables pour un opérateur de réseau en ce qui concerne la manière dont il facture les consommateurs, certaines de nos solutions sont conçues pour satisfaire à ces principes. Ces principes sont : l'indépendance aux demandes supérieure et la péréquation. Enfin, certaines solutions parviennent aussi à prendre en compte les différentes informations fournies par le réseau de distribution.Cette thèse est constituée de sept chapitres. Le Chapitre 1 fait office d'introduction. Le Chapitre 2 introduit les notations et les définitions nécessaires à la bonne compréhension de la thèse. Les Chapitres 3 à 6 contiennent les contributions de la thèse.Chacune de ces contributions apporte ses propres solutions.Nous caractérisation axiomatiquement chacune d'entre elles et discutons de leur pertinence dans le cadre de la distribution de gaz. Enfin, le Chapitre 7 conclut la thèse.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Values for multi-choice cooperative games with applications to sharing the cost of a gas distribution network
Valeurs pour les jeux coopératifs à choix multiples avec applications au partage des coûts d'un réseau de distribution de gaz: Le rôle d'un réseau de distribution de gaz est de connecter des consommateurs à une source de gaz. Ce réseau est géré par un opérateur, dont la tâche engendre divers coûts. Certains de ces coûts peuvent ne pas être imputables à un consommateur particulier.En supposant que l'opérateur souhaite recouvrir ces coûts en facturant ses services, le problème est alors de déterminer comment partager ces coûts entre les consommateurs.La présente thèse propose des solutions à ce problème en mobilisant la théorie des jeux (coopératifs) multi-choix.Toutes les solutions proposées dans cette thèse sont conçues pour prendre en compte les demandes en gaz des consommateurs.De plus, comme certains principes éthiques sont souhaitables pour un opérateur de réseau en ce qui concerne la manière dont il facture les consommateurs, certaines de nos solutions sont conçues pour satisfaire à ces principes. Ces principes sont : l'indépendance aux demandes supérieure et la péréquation. Enfin, certaines solutions parviennent aussi à prendre en compte les différentes informations fournies par le réseau de distribution.Cette thèse est constituée de sept chapitres. Le Chapitre 1 fait office d'introduction. Le Chapitre 2 introduit les notations et les définitions nécessaires à la bonne compréhension de la thèse. Les Chapitres 3 à 6 contiennent les contributions de la thèse.Chacune de ces contributions apporte ses propres solutions.Nous caractérisation axiomatiquement chacune d'entre elles et discutons de leur pertinence dans le cadre de la distribution de gaz. Enfin, le Chapitre 7 conclut la thèse.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 245
Fair effort-sharing for climate change mitigation: A normative approach
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 245
Fair effort-sharing for climate change mitigation: A normative approach
- 20 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 48-62
Multi-choice Solutions for Feature and Parameter Importance
- 20 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 48-62
Multi-choice Solutions for Feature and Parameter Importance
- Open Access
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 54 (2) , 1-32
Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 54 (2) , 1-32
Open AccessSharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach
- Open Access
Sub-game order preservation and values for TU-games
In cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), a player's contribution may vary depending on the coalition they join, reflecting different levels of synergy with other members. In this paper, we introduce a family of axioms referred to as sub-game order preservation axioms, which formalize the intuition that a player's payoff should increase with the degree of synergy they exhibit within a coalition. We propose four distinct axioms, each of which captures a different interpretation of what constitutes synergy in the context of transferable utility. We demonstrate that one of these variants is incompatible with the classical Efficiency axiom, thereby giving rise to an impossibility result. The remaining three axioms, when combined with Efficiency, lead to unique characterizations of three well-known solution concepts: the Shapley value, the Center of the Imputation Set (CIS), and the Equal Allocation of Non-Separable Contributions (ENSC) value, respectively.
Open AccessSub-game order preservation and values for TU-games
In cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), a player's contribution may vary depending on the coalition they join, reflecting different levels of synergy with other members. In this paper, we introduce a family of axioms referred to as sub-game order preservation axioms, which formalize the intuition that a player's payoff should increase with the degree of synergy they exhibit within a coalition. We propose four distinct axioms, each of which captures a different interpretation of what constitutes synergy in the context of transferable utility. We demonstrate that one of these variants is incompatible with the classical Efficiency axiom, thereby giving rise to an impossibility result. The remaining three axioms, when combined with Efficiency, lead to unique characterizations of three well-known solution concepts: the Shapley value, the Center of the Imputation Set (CIS), and the Equal Allocation of Non-Separable Contributions (ENSC) value, respectively.
- 12 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 54 (1) , 1-29
The permission-Owen value: axiomatization and application to liability situations
- 12 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 54 (1) , 1-29
The permission-Owen value: axiomatization and application to liability situations
- Open Access
An Endogenous Approach to the Polluted River Problem
Polluting agents situated along a river must collectively clean it to meet a minimum water quality standard. Since cleaning operations are costly, it is crucial to allocate these expenses fairly. This paper introduces the Upstream Prorata Sharing method, which endogenously assigns responsibility to each agent based on the potential costs their pollution imposes on downstream river segments. We present three distinct axiomatic characterizations grounded in different principles. First, we explore fairness properties, which address scenarios where some agents reduce their cleanup costs. Next, we examine merging properties, analyzing the implications of two agents combining into a single entity. Finally, we propose a redistribution property, which quantifies how much an agent should contribute to cleaning downstream segments.
Open AccessAn Endogenous Approach to the Polluted River Problem
Polluting agents situated along a river must collectively clean it to meet a minimum water quality standard. Since cleaning operations are costly, it is crucial to allocate these expenses fairly. This paper introduces the Upstream Prorata Sharing method, which endogenously assigns responsibility to each agent based on the potential costs their pollution imposes on downstream river segments. We present three distinct axiomatic characterizations grounded in different principles. First, we explore fairness properties, which address scenarios where some agents reduce their cleanup costs. Next, we examine merging properties, analyzing the implications of two agents combining into a single entity. Finally, we propose a redistribution property, which quantifies how much an agent should contribute to cleaning downstream segments.
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 137
Toward a consensus on extended Shapley values for multi-choice games
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 137
Toward a consensus on extended Shapley values for multi-choice games
- Open Access
Fair effort-sharing for climate change mitigation: a normative approach
A major challenge in climate change negotiations lies in devising an effort-sharing method perceived as fair by most, if not all, governments. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change emphasizes two core fairness principles for sharing mitigation efforts: common but differentiated responsibilities, which holds that nations with higher greenhouse gas emissions should contribute more, and respective capabilities, which asserts that economically advantaged countries should bear a greater share of the burden. These principles, while compelling, often conflict in practice. This paper introduces and axiomatically characterizes a family of effort-sharing methods designed to balance these competing principles. The proposed methods are computationally efficient and their practical relevance is demonstrated using global data.
Open AccessFair effort-sharing for climate change mitigation: a normative approach
A major challenge in climate change negotiations lies in devising an effort-sharing method perceived as fair by most, if not all, governments. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change emphasizes two core fairness principles for sharing mitigation efforts: common but differentiated responsibilities, which holds that nations with higher greenhouse gas emissions should contribute more, and respective capabilities, which asserts that economically advantaged countries should bear a greater share of the burden. These principles, while compelling, often conflict in practice. This paper introduces and axiomatically characterizes a family of effort-sharing methods designed to balance these competing principles. The proposed methods are computationally efficient and their practical relevance is demonstrated using global data.