KTKevin Techer

Kevin Techer

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Kevin Techer has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

    • 1 January 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: an axiomatic approach

    by David Lowing, Léa Munich, Kevin Techer

    Accurate cost allocation is a challenge for both public service operators and regulatory bodies, given the dual objectives of ensuring essential public service provision and maintaining fair competition. Operators have the obligation to provide essential public services for all individuals, which may incur additional costs. To ompensate this, the operators receive state aids, which are determined by an assessment of the net cost associated with these obligations. However, these aids introduce the risk of distorting competition, as operators may employ them to subsidize competitive activities. To avoid this risk, a precise cost allocation method that adequately assess the net cost of these obligations becomes necessary. Such a method must satisfy specific properties that effectively prevent cross-subsidization. In this paper, we propose a method grounded in cooperative game theory that offers a solution for allocating common costs between activitiesand obligations in public service provision. We adopt a normative approach by introducing a set of desirable axioms that prevent cross-subsidization. We provide two characterizations of our proposed solution on the basis of these axioms. Furthermore, we present an illustration of our method to the allocation of common costs for a public service operator.

    • 11 September 2023
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Hazardous waste transportation: a cost allocation analysis

    by Kevin Techer

    This paper studies hazardous waste transportation problems. Due to their dangerous nature, the transportation of these waste implies a risk of incident having irreversible consequences on the environment. This problem has lead to a body of legal statutes that monitor the generation, storage and transportation of hazardous waste. Assuming that the transport of hazardous waste is done in a cooperative manner on a transport network, this paper investigates how to share the cost of maintaining and operating such network among the involved agents. We analyze the hazardous transportation problem from the viewpoint of axiomatic analysis. We consider several axioms that are derived from different environmental law principles and provide a characterization of a new allocation rule: the responsibility rule. Then we show that the responsibility rule coincides with the multi-choice Shapley value of an appropriate multi-choice game.

    • 1 January 2021
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Marginalism, Egalitarianism and E ciency in Multi-Choice Games

    by David Lowing, Kevin Techer

    The search for a compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism has given rise to many discussions. In the context of cooperative games, this compromise can be understood as a trade-off between the Shapley value and the Equal division value. We investigate this compromise in the context of multi-choice games in which players have several activity levels. To do so, we propose new extensions of the Shapley value and of the Weighted Division values to multi-choice games. Contrary to the existing solution concepts for multi-choice games, each one of these values satisfies a core condition introduced by Grabisch and Xie (2007), namely Multi-Efficiency. We compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism by introducing the multi-choice Egalitarian Shapley values, computed as the convex combination of our extensions. To conduct this study, we introduce new axioms for multi-choice games. This allows us to provide an axiomatic foundation for each of these values.

    • 1 January 2020
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi- choice games approach to the social cost problem

    by Kevin Techer

    We consider a class of social cost problems where one polluter interacts with an arbitrary number of potential victims. Agents are supposed to cooperate and negotiate an optimal pollution level together with monetary transfers. We examine multi-choice cooperative games associated with a social cost problem and an assignment (or mapping) of rights. We introduce a class of mappings of rights that takes into account the pollution intensity and we consider three properties on mappings of rights: core compatibility, Kaldor-Hicks core compatibility and no veto power for a victim. We demonstrate that there exist only two families of mappings of rights that satisfy core compatibility. However, no mapping of rights satisfies Kaldor-Hicks core compatibility and no veto power for a victim.