Georgina D. Campelia
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Georgina D. Campelia has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aaron Wightman
Department of Pediatrics University of Washington Seattle Washington USA
2 shared publications Denise M. Dudzinski
University of Washington School of Medicine, & UW Medicine Ethics Consultation Service
2 shared publicationsJames N. Kirkpatrick
Division of Cardiology, Department of Bioethics & Humanities, University of Washington School of Medicine, Seattle, Washington; University of Washington Medicine, Ethics Consultation Service, Seattle, Washington
2 shared publications- Jennifer Cobelli Kett
Division of Bioethics and Palliative Care, Department of Pediatrics University of Washington School of Medicine Seattle Washington USA
2 shared publications Amanda Hine
Children's Hospital Colorado Aurora Colorado USA
1 shared publication- Ashley Feinsinger
University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 3
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Worldview Silencing: Recognizing Reasoned Objections to Brain Death
The determination of death by neurologic criteria (brain death) has increasingly become a topic of controversy. Here we address a question that provokes clinical ethics consultations and scholarly debate: “how should objections to the declaration of neurologic death be handled?” While much of the discourse on this question has focused on the legitimacy of the criteria for brain death determinations or the motivations of individuals' objections to declarations of death, our analysis addresses a deeper issue inherent in the conflicts in clinical settings. We argue that some objections to brain death cannot be explained away as grief, misunderstanding, or different religious beliefs. Rather, tensions between worldviews—fundamental standpoints or lenses through which humans experience and conceptualize the world around them—may drive conflicts around brain death. In what follows, we introduce the concept of worldview silencing as a means of recognizing the injustice that can occur when brain death objections grounded in alternative ontologies of death are unfairly dismissed or disrespected. Ultimately, we contend that the concept of worldview silencing offers moral guidance for just recognition of objections to brain death in practice, education, and policy.
Open AccessWorldview Silencing: Recognizing Reasoned Objections to Brain Death
The determination of death by neurologic criteria (brain death) has increasingly become a topic of controversy. Here we address a question that provokes clinical ethics consultations and scholarly debate: “how should objections to the declaration of neurologic death be handled?” While much of the discourse on this question has focused on the legitimacy of the criteria for brain death determinations or the motivations of individuals' objections to declarations of death, our analysis addresses a deeper issue inherent in the conflicts in clinical settings. We argue that some objections to brain death cannot be explained away as grief, misunderstanding, or different religious beliefs. Rather, tensions between worldviews—fundamental standpoints or lenses through which humans experience and conceptualize the world around them—may drive conflicts around brain death. In what follows, we introduce the concept of worldview silencing as a means of recognizing the injustice that can occur when brain death objections grounded in alternative ontologies of death are unfairly dismissed or disrespected. Ultimately, we contend that the concept of worldview silencing offers moral guidance for just recognition of objections to brain death in practice, education, and policy.
- Open Access
- 5 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 2 (9) , pgad283
Retrospective analysis of equity-based optimization for COVID-19 vaccine allocation
Marginalized racial and ethnic groups in the United States were disproportionally affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. To study these disparities, we construct an age-and-race-stratified mathematical model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission fitted to age-and-race-stratified data from 2020 in Oregon and analyze counterfactual vaccination strategies in early 2021. We consider two racial groups: non-Hispanic White persons and persons belonging to BIPOC groups (including non-Hispanic Black persons, non-Hispanic Asian persons, non-Hispanic American-Indian or Alaska-Native persons, and Hispanic or Latino persons). We allocate a limited amount of vaccine to minimize overall disease burden (deaths or years of life lost), inequity in disease outcomes between racial groups (measured with five different metrics), or both. We find that, when allocating small amounts of vaccine (10% coverage), there is a trade-off between minimizing disease burden and minimizing inequity. Older age groups, who are at a greater risk of severe disease and death, are prioritized when minimizing measures of disease burden, and younger BIPOC groups, who face the most inequities, are prioritized when minimizing measures of inequity. The allocation strategies that minimize combinations of measures can produce middle-ground solutions that similarly improve both disease burden and inequity, but the trade-off can only be mitigated by increasing the vaccine supply. With enough resources to vaccinate 20% of the population the trade-off lessens, and with 30% coverage, we can optimize both equity and mortality. Our goal is to provide a race-conscious framework to quantify and minimize inequity that can be used for future pandemics and other public health interventions.
- 5 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 2 (9) , pgad283
Open AccessRetrospective analysis of equity-based optimization for COVID-19 vaccine allocation
Marginalized racial and ethnic groups in the United States were disproportionally affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. To study these disparities, we construct an age-and-race-stratified mathematical model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission fitted to age-and-race-stratified data from 2020 in Oregon and analyze counterfactual vaccination strategies in early 2021. We consider two racial groups: non-Hispanic White persons and persons belonging to BIPOC groups (including non-Hispanic Black persons, non-Hispanic Asian persons, non-Hispanic American-Indian or Alaska-Native persons, and Hispanic or Latino persons). We allocate a limited amount of vaccine to minimize overall disease burden (deaths or years of life lost), inequity in disease outcomes between racial groups (measured with five different metrics), or both. We find that, when allocating small amounts of vaccine (10% coverage), there is a trade-off between minimizing disease burden and minimizing inequity. Older age groups, who are at a greater risk of severe disease and death, are prioritized when minimizing measures of disease burden, and younger BIPOC groups, who face the most inequities, are prioritized when minimizing measures of inequity. The allocation strategies that minimize combinations of measures can produce middle-ground solutions that similarly improve both disease burden and inequity, but the trade-off can only be mitigated by increasing the vaccine supply. With enough resources to vaccinate 20% of the population the trade-off lessens, and with 30% coverage, we can optimize both equity and mortality. Our goal is to provide a race-conscious framework to quantify and minimize inequity that can be used for future pandemics and other public health interventions.
- 26 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 29-42
Relational suffering and the moral authority of love and care
- 26 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 29-42
Relational suffering and the moral authority of love and care
- 22 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Developing World Bioethics
- Vol. 23 (3) , 269-276
What the ‘greater good’ excludes: Patients left behind by pre‐operative COVID‐19 screening in an Ethiopian town
During the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic, bioethical analyses often emphasized population health and societal benefit. Hospital policies frequently focused on reducing risk of transmitting SARS‐CoV‐2 by restricting visitors; requiring protective equipment; and screening staff, patients and visitors. While restrictions can be burdensome, they are often justified as essential measures to protect the whole population against a virus with high rates of transmission, morbidity and mortality. Yet communities are not monolithic, and the impacts of these restrictions affect different groups differently. An ophthalmological unit outreach program in Ethiopia serves to illustrate. Pre‐operative screening policies were designed to protect as many patients as possible but had adverse impacts on underserved communities. As this case study demonstrates, creating hospital policies that truly serve the good of the society may require a more holistic review of impacts on inequitably positioned communities.
- 22 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Developing World Bioethics
- Vol. 23 (3) , 269-276
What the ‘greater good’ excludes: Patients left behind by pre‐operative COVID‐19 screening in an Ethiopian town
During the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic, bioethical analyses often emphasized population health and societal benefit. Hospital policies frequently focused on reducing risk of transmitting SARS‐CoV‐2 by restricting visitors; requiring protective equipment; and screening staff, patients and visitors. While restrictions can be burdensome, they are often justified as essential measures to protect the whole population against a virus with high rates of transmission, morbidity and mortality. Yet communities are not monolithic, and the impacts of these restrictions affect different groups differently. An ophthalmological unit outreach program in Ethiopia serves to illustrate. Pre‐operative screening policies were designed to protect as many patients as possible but had adverse impacts on underserved communities. As this case study demonstrates, creating hospital policies that truly serve the good of the society may require a more holistic review of impacts on inequitably positioned communities.
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 41 (4) , 165-178
Relational suffering and the moral authority of love and care
Suffering is a ubiquitous yet elusive concept in health care. In a field devoted to the pursuit of objective data, suffering is a phenomenon with deep ties to subjective experience, moral values, and cultural norms. Suffering’s tie to subjective experience makes it challenging to discern and respond to the suffering of others. In particular, the question of whether a child with profound neurocognitive disabilities can suffer has generated a robust discourse, rooted in philosophical conceptualizations of personhood as well as the academic and experiential expertise of practiced health-care professionals. The issue remains unresolved because it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to ever truly know an infant’s lived experience. But what if this is not the best question? What if instead of asking “can this infant suffer?” the discourse is broadened to ask “is there suffering here?” This latter question demands attention to patients’ subjective experiences of suffering, but also to the web of relationships that envelop them. Without losing sight of the importance of patients’ experiences, consideration of their relationships may elucidate the presence of suffering when the patients themselves are unable to provide the same clarity. In this essay, care ethics frames an examination of how suffering manifests in the loving and caring relationships that surround an infant with profound neurocognitive disabilities, changing those relationships and affecting the individuals within them. Exploring suffering through these relationships may offer clarity on the presence and content of suffering for infants with profound cognitive disabilities, in turn offering moral guidance for responding to suffering and supporting flourishing in this context.
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 41 (4) , 165-178
Relational suffering and the moral authority of love and care
Suffering is a ubiquitous yet elusive concept in health care. In a field devoted to the pursuit of objective data, suffering is a phenomenon with deep ties to subjective experience, moral values, and cultural norms. Suffering’s tie to subjective experience makes it challenging to discern and respond to the suffering of others. In particular, the question of whether a child with profound neurocognitive disabilities can suffer has generated a robust discourse, rooted in philosophical conceptualizations of personhood as well as the academic and experiential expertise of practiced health-care professionals. The issue remains unresolved because it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to ever truly know an infant’s lived experience. But what if this is not the best question? What if instead of asking “can this infant suffer?” the discourse is broadened to ask “is there suffering here?” This latter question demands attention to patients’ subjective experiences of suffering, but also to the web of relationships that envelop them. Without losing sight of the importance of patients’ experiences, consideration of their relationships may elucidate the presence of suffering when the patients themselves are unable to provide the same clarity. In this essay, care ethics frames an examination of how suffering manifests in the loving and caring relationships that surround an infant with profound neurocognitive disabilities, changing those relationships and affecting the individuals within them. Exploring suffering through these relationships may offer clarity on the presence and content of suffering for infants with profound cognitive disabilities, in turn offering moral guidance for responding to suffering and supporting flourishing in this context.
- 27 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in HEC Forum
- Vol. 32 (2) , 111-124
Creating Space for Feminist Ethics in Medical School
Alongside clinical practice, medical schools now confront mounting reasons to examine nontraditional approaches to ethics. Increasing awareness of systems of oppression and their effects on the experiences of trainees, patients, professionals, and generally on medical care, is pushing medical curriculum into an unfamiliar territory. While there is room throughout medical school to take up these concerns, ethics curricula are well-positioned to explore new pedagogical approaches. Feminist ethics has long addressed systems of oppression and broader structures of power. Some of its established concepts can offer distinct value as medical climates change and adapt in response to increased awareness of the experiences of marginalized individuals and populations. In this essay, we offer a set of concepts from feminist ethics that have a fundamental role to play in medical school curriculum: relationality, relational autonomy, and epistemic justice. Though these concepts are not exhaustive, they can be taught in tandem with the concepts that have historically grounded ethics education in medical school, such as autonomy and beneficence. Ultimately, we contend that these concepts hold particular value in ethics curriculum insofar as they diversify mainstream ethical approaches, directly address the pervasiveness of systems of oppression in medicine, and recognize the voices and concerns that may be marginalized in standard approaches.
- 27 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in HEC Forum
- Vol. 32 (2) , 111-124
Creating Space for Feminist Ethics in Medical School
Alongside clinical practice, medical schools now confront mounting reasons to examine nontraditional approaches to ethics. Increasing awareness of systems of oppression and their effects on the experiences of trainees, patients, professionals, and generally on medical care, is pushing medical curriculum into an unfamiliar territory. While there is room throughout medical school to take up these concerns, ethics curricula are well-positioned to explore new pedagogical approaches. Feminist ethics has long addressed systems of oppression and broader structures of power. Some of its established concepts can offer distinct value as medical climates change and adapt in response to increased awareness of the experiences of marginalized individuals and populations. In this essay, we offer a set of concepts from feminist ethics that have a fundamental role to play in medical school curriculum: relationality, relational autonomy, and epistemic justice. Though these concepts are not exhaustive, they can be taught in tandem with the concepts that have historically grounded ethics education in medical school, such as autonomy and beneficence. Ultimately, we contend that these concepts hold particular value in ethics curriculum insofar as they diversify mainstream ethical approaches, directly address the pervasiveness of systems of oppression in medicine, and recognize the voices and concerns that may be marginalized in standard approaches.
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in The Annals of Thoracic Surgery
- Vol. 108 (6) , 1610-1611
Reinterpreting Informed Decision-Making Through The Clinician–Patient Relationship
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in The Annals of Thoracic Surgery
- Vol. 108 (6) , 1610-1611
Reinterpreting Informed Decision-Making Through The Clinician–Patient Relationship
- 27 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-15
History and Development of Medical Ethics In the West
- 27 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-15
History and Development of Medical Ethics In the West
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Project MUSE in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
- Vol. 62 (4) , 640-656
Care Labor in VAD Therapy: Some Feminist Concerns
Ventricular assist device (VAD) care offers a distinctive lens through which we can explore unjust gender norms. This is a resource-intensive intervention, one in which increasingly sophisticated technology brings with it the need for more long-term care. This care work is demanding, involving device maintenance, medication and appointment management, household work, and emotional support. Most patients eligible for receiving VADs are men, so it is not surprising that it is more often women who are responsible for the care of patients with VADs. Still, there is room to question why so much of this labor is expected of and taken on by female caregivers, when it could be shared with male caregivers and even patients themselves. To the extent that gender difference in the distribution of this labor is avoidable and inequitable, it becomes in part a disparity resulting from unjust social norms. In order to unpack some of this injustice, the authors utilize empiric data and theoretical work in feminist ethics to articulate some of the mechanisms of the gender disparity in VAD care labor and to offer communitarian decision-making and redistribution of care labor as potential routes toward greater justice for women with respect to VAD therapy.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Project MUSE in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
- Vol. 62 (4) , 640-656
Care Labor in VAD Therapy: Some Feminist Concerns
Ventricular assist device (VAD) care offers a distinctive lens through which we can explore unjust gender norms. This is a resource-intensive intervention, one in which increasingly sophisticated technology brings with it the need for more long-term care. This care work is demanding, involving device maintenance, medication and appointment management, household work, and emotional support. Most patients eligible for receiving VADs are men, so it is not surprising that it is more often women who are responsible for the care of patients with VADs. Still, there is room to question why so much of this labor is expected of and taken on by female caregivers, when it could be shared with male caregivers and even patients themselves. To the extent that gender difference in the distribution of this labor is avoidable and inequitable, it becomes in part a disparity resulting from unjust social norms. In order to unpack some of this injustice, the authors utilize empiric data and theoretical work in feminist ethics to articulate some of the mechanisms of the gender disparity in VAD care labor and to offer communitarian decision-making and redistribution of care labor as potential routes toward greater justice for women with respect to VAD therapy.
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 31 (6) , 530-544
Empathic Knowledge: The Import of Empathy’s Social Epistemology
The epistemic and moral worth of empathy is deeply contested. Some doubt the possibility and sufficiency of empathic knowledge (can we mirror another’s subjective mental state?). Others question whether knowing how another feels is causally linked to moral actions (e.g. acts of beneficence or altruism). Though some have defended empathy as a form of knowing or an important epistemic endeavor, there is a gap in these responses that weakens their force against empathy’s skeptics. On the one hand, the epistemologists tend to focus on individuals (individual neurology, epistemic content, etc.). On the other hand, the moral theorists and moral-epistemologists tend to focus on the social (interpersonal harms, social benefit, etc.). Here, I contend that the first group could learn from the second and, together, form a stronger defense of empathy’s epistemic import. Namely, if, as epistemologists, we can begin from a conceptualization of empathy as a social epistemic practice within which knowledge is formed and confirmed with others, then we can better allow for (1) possibility in understanding how another feels, (2) reliability in empathic processes, and (3) appropriate sensitivity to variance and degrees of empathic knowing.
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 31 (6) , 530-544
Empathic Knowledge: The Import of Empathy’s Social Epistemology
The epistemic and moral worth of empathy is deeply contested. Some doubt the possibility and sufficiency of empathic knowledge (can we mirror another’s subjective mental state?). Others question whether knowing how another feels is causally linked to moral actions (e.g. acts of beneficence or altruism). Though some have defended empathy as a form of knowing or an important epistemic endeavor, there is a gap in these responses that weakens their force against empathy’s skeptics. On the one hand, the epistemologists tend to focus on individuals (individual neurology, epistemic content, etc.). On the other hand, the moral theorists and moral-epistemologists tend to focus on the social (interpersonal harms, social benefit, etc.). Here, I contend that the first group could learn from the second and, together, form a stronger defense of empathy’s epistemic import. Namely, if, as epistemologists, we can begin from a conceptualization of empathy as a social epistemic practice within which knowledge is formed and confirmed with others, then we can better allow for (1) possibility in understanding how another feels, (2) reliability in empathic processes, and (3) appropriate sensitivity to variance and degrees of empathic knowing.