Maximilian Orlt
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Maximilian Orlt has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sebastian Faust
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany
4 shared publications - Sebastian Berndt
Technische Hochschule Lübeck
2 shared publications - Thomas Eisenbarth
University of Lübeck
2 shared publications - Francesco Berti
Bar-Ilan University
1 shared publication - Juliane Krämer
Universität Regensburg
1 shared publication - Kathrin Wirschem
Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2025 (2) , 420-459
All-You-Can-Compute: Packed Secret Sharing for Combined Resilience
Unprotected cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to implementation attacks, such as passive side-channel attacks and active fault injection attacks. Recently, countermeasures like polynomial masking and duplicated masking have been introduced to protect implementations against combined attacks that exploit leakage and faults simultaneously. While duplicated masking requires O (t · e) shares to resist an adversary capable of probing t values and faulting e values, polynomial masking requires only O (t · e) shares, which is particularly beneficial for affine computation. At CHES’24, Arnold et al. showed how to further improve the efficiency of polynomial masking in the presence of combined attacks by embedding two secrets into one polynomial sharing. This essentially reduces the complexity of previous constructions by half. The authors also observed that using techniques from packed secret sharing (Grosso et al., CHES’13) cannot easily achieve combined resilience to encode an arbitrary number of secrets in one polynomial encoding. In this work, we resolve these challenges and show that it is possible to embed an arbitrary number of secrets in one encoding and propose gadgets that are secure against combined attacks. We present two constructions that are generic and significantly improve the computational and randomness complexity of existing compilers, such as the laOla compiler presented by Berndt et al. at CRYPTO’23 and its improvement by Arnold et al. For example, for an AES evaluation that protects against t probes and e faults, we improve the randomness complexity of the state-of-the-art construction when t + e > 3, leading to an improvement of up to a factor of 2.41.
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2025 (2) , 420-459
Open AccessAll-You-Can-Compute: Packed Secret Sharing for Combined Resilience
Unprotected cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to implementation attacks, such as passive side-channel attacks and active fault injection attacks. Recently, countermeasures like polynomial masking and duplicated masking have been introduced to protect implementations against combined attacks that exploit leakage and faults simultaneously. While duplicated masking requires O (t · e) shares to resist an adversary capable of probing t values and faulting e values, polynomial masking requires only O (t · e) shares, which is particularly beneficial for affine computation. At CHES’24, Arnold et al. showed how to further improve the efficiency of polynomial masking in the presence of combined attacks by embedding two secrets into one polynomial sharing. This essentially reduces the complexity of previous constructions by half. The authors also observed that using techniques from packed secret sharing (Grosso et al., CHES’13) cannot easily achieve combined resilience to encode an arbitrary number of secrets in one polynomial encoding. In this work, we resolve these challenges and show that it is possible to embed an arbitrary number of secrets in one encoding and propose gadgets that are secure against combined attacks. We present two constructions that are generic and significantly improve the computational and randomness complexity of existing compilers, such as the laOla compiler presented by Berndt et al. at CRYPTO’23 and its improvement by Arnold et al. For example, for an AES evaluation that protects against t probes and e faults, we improve the randomness complexity of the state-of-the-art construction when t + e > 3, leading to an improvement of up to a factor of 2.41.
- Open Access
- 18 July 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2024 (3) , 671-706
Polynomial sharings on two secrets: Buy one, get one free
While passive side-channel attacks and active fault attacks have been studied intensively in the last few decades, strong attackers combining these attacks have only been studied relatively recently. Due to its simplicity, most countermeasures against passive attacks are based on additive sharing. Unfortunately, extending these countermeasures against faults often leads to quite a significant performance penalty, either due to the use of expensive cryptographic operations or a large number of shares due to massive duplication. Just recently, Berndt, Eisenbarth, Gourjon, Faust, Orlt, and Seker thus proposed to use polynomial sharing against combined attackers (CRYPTO 2023). While they construct gadgets secure against combined attackers using only a linear number of shares, the overhead introduced might still be too large for practical scenarios.In this work, we show how the overhead of nearly all known constructions using polynomial sharing can be reduced by nearly half by embedding two secrets in the coefficients of one polynomial at the expense of increasing the degree of the polynomial by one. We present a very general framework that allows adapting these constructions to this new sharing scheme and prove the security of this approach against purely passive side-channel attacks, purely active fault attacks, and combined attacks. Furthermore, we present new gadgets allowing us to operate upon the different secrets in a number of useful ways.
- 18 July 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2024 (3) , 671-706
Open AccessPolynomial sharings on two secrets: Buy one, get one free
While passive side-channel attacks and active fault attacks have been studied intensively in the last few decades, strong attackers combining these attacks have only been studied relatively recently. Due to its simplicity, most countermeasures against passive attacks are based on additive sharing. Unfortunately, extending these countermeasures against faults often leads to quite a significant performance penalty, either due to the use of expensive cryptographic operations or a large number of shares due to massive duplication. Just recently, Berndt, Eisenbarth, Gourjon, Faust, Orlt, and Seker thus proposed to use polynomial sharing against combined attackers (CRYPTO 2023). While they construct gadgets secure against combined attackers using only a linear number of shares, the overhead introduced might still be too large for practical scenarios.In this work, we show how the overhead of nearly all known constructions using polynomial sharing can be reduced by nearly half by embedding two secrets in the coefficients of one polynomial at the expense of increasing the degree of the polynomial by one. We present a very general framework that allows adapting these constructions to this new sharing scheme and prove the security of this approach against purely passive side-channel attacks, purely active fault attacks, and combined attacks. Furthermore, we present new gadgets allowing us to operate upon the different secrets in a number of useful ways.
- Open Access
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- p. 420-459
Provable Secure Parallel Gadgets
Side-channel attacks are a fundamental threat to the security of cryptographic implementations. One of the most prominent countermeasures against side-channel attacks is masking, where each intermediate value of the computation is secret shared, thereby concealing the computation’s sensitive information. An important security model to study the security of masking schemes is the random probing model, in which the adversary obtains each intermediate value of the computation with some probability p. To construct secure masking schemes, an important building block is the refreshing gadget, which updates the randomness of the secret shared intermediate values. Recently, Dziembowski, Faust, and Zebrowski (ASIACRYPT’19) analyzed the security of a simple refreshing gadget by using a new technique called the leakage diagram. In this work, we follow the approach of Dziembowski et al. and significantly improve its methodology. Concretely, we refine the notion of a leakage diagram via so-called dependency graphs, and show how to use this technique for arbitrary complex circuits via composition results and approximation techniques. To illustrate the power of our new techniques, as a case study, we designed provably secure parallel gadgets for the random probing model, and adapted the ISW multiplication such that all gadgets can be parallelized. Finally, we evaluate concrete security levels, and show how our new methodology can further improve the concrete security level of masking schemes. This results in a compiler provable secure up to a noise level of O(1) for affine circuits and O(1/√n) in general.
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- p. 420-459
Open AccessProvable Secure Parallel Gadgets
Side-channel attacks are a fundamental threat to the security of cryptographic implementations. One of the most prominent countermeasures against side-channel attacks is masking, where each intermediate value of the computation is secret shared, thereby concealing the computation’s sensitive information. An important security model to study the security of masking schemes is the random probing model, in which the adversary obtains each intermediate value of the computation with some probability p. To construct secure masking schemes, an important building block is the refreshing gadget, which updates the randomness of the secret shared intermediate values. Recently, Dziembowski, Faust, and Zebrowski (ASIACRYPT’19) analyzed the security of a simple refreshing gadget by using a new technique called the leakage diagram. In this work, we follow the approach of Dziembowski et al. and significantly improve its methodology. Concretely, we refine the notion of a leakage diagram via so-called dependency graphs, and show how to use this technique for arbitrary complex circuits via composition results and approximation techniques. To illustrate the power of our new techniques, as a case study, we designed provably secure parallel gadgets for the random probing model, and adapted the ISW multiplication such that all gadgets can be parallelized. Finally, we evaluate concrete security levels, and show how our new methodology can further improve the concrete security level of masking schemes. This results in a compiler provable secure up to a noise level of O(1) for affine circuits and O(1/√n) in general.
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 377-409
Combined Fault and Leakage Resilience: Composability, Constructions and Compiler
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 377-409
Combined Fault and Leakage Resilience: Composability, Constructions and Compiler
- 5 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 362-386
On the Related-Key Attack Security of Authenticated Encryption Schemes
- 5 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 362-386
On the Related-Key Attack Security of Authenticated Encryption Schemes