Thomas Aulbach
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Thomas Aulbach has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Juliane Krämer
Universität Regensburg
5 shared publications - Fabio Campos
Hochschule Darmstadt - University of Applied Sciences
2 shared publications - Simona Samardjiska
Radboud University
2 shared publications - Soundes Marzougui
Technische Universität Berlin
2 shared publications - Ievgen Kabin
IHP—Leibniz-Institut für innovative Mikroelektronik, 15236 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
1 shared publication - Jean-Pierre Seifert
Technische Universität Berlin
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 199-231
SoK: On the Physical Security of UOV-Based Signature Schemes
- 15 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 199-231
SoK: On the Physical Security of UOV-Based Signature Schemes
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 240-259
HaMAYO: A Fault-Tolerant Reconfigurable Hardware Implementation of the MAYO Signature Scheme
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 240-259
HaMAYO: A Fault-Tolerant Reconfigurable Hardware Implementation of the MAYO Signature Scheme
- Open Access
- 9 June 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2023 (3) , 221-245
Separating Oil and Vinegar with a Single Trace
Due to recent cryptanalytical breakthroughs, the multivariate signature schemes that seemed to be most promising in the past years are no longer in the focus of the research community. Hence, the cryptographically mature UOV scheme is of great interest again. Since it has not been part of the NIST process for standardizing post-quantum cryptography so far, it has not been studied intensively for its physical security.In this work, we present a side-channel attack on the latest implementation of UOV. In the first part of the attack, a single side-channel trace of the signing process is used to learn all vinegar variables used in the computation. Then, we employ a combination of the Kipnis-Shamir attack and the reconciliation attack to reveal the complete secret key. Our attack, unlike previous work, targets the inversion of the central map and not the subsequent linear transformation. It further does not require the attacker to control the message to be signed.We have verified the practicality of our attack on a ChipWhisperer-Lite board with a 32-bit STM32F3 ARM Cortex-M4 target mounted on a CW308 UFO board. We publicly provide the code and both reference and target traces. Additionally, we discuss several countermeasures that can at least make our attack less efficient.
- 9 June 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2023 (3) , 221-245
Open AccessSeparating Oil and Vinegar with a Single Trace
Due to recent cryptanalytical breakthroughs, the multivariate signature schemes that seemed to be most promising in the past years are no longer in the focus of the research community. Hence, the cryptographically mature UOV scheme is of great interest again. Since it has not been part of the NIST process for standardizing post-quantum cryptography so far, it has not been studied intensively for its physical security.In this work, we present a side-channel attack on the latest implementation of UOV. In the first part of the attack, a single side-channel trace of the signing process is used to learn all vinegar variables used in the computation. Then, we employ a combination of the Kipnis-Shamir attack and the reconciliation attack to reveal the complete secret key. Our attack, unlike previous work, targets the inversion of the central map and not the subsequent linear transformation. It further does not require the attacker to control the message to be signed.We have verified the practicality of our attack on a ChipWhisperer-Lite board with a 32-bit STM32F3 ARM Cortex-M4 target mounted on a CW308 UFO board. We publicly provide the code and both reference and target traces. Additionally, we discuss several countermeasures that can at least make our attack less efficient.
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-169
On the Feasibility of Single-Trace Attacks on the Gaussian Sampler Using a CDT
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-169
On the Feasibility of Single-Trace Attacks on the Gaussian Sampler Using a CDT
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 348-368
Recovering Rainbow’s Secret Key with a First-Order Fault Attack
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 348-368
Recovering Rainbow’s Secret Key with a First-Order Fault Attack