Soundes Marzougui
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Soundes Marzougui has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jean-Pierre Seifert
Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
2 shared publications - Juliane Krämer
Universität Regensburg
2 shared publications - Mehdi Tibouchi
NTT Social Informatics Laboratories, Tokyo, Japan
2 shared publications - Thomas Aulbach
University of Regensburg
2 shared publications - Vincent Quentin Ulitzsch
Technical University Berlin
2 shared publications - Alexis Bagia
Technical University Berlin, Berlin, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- p. 367-392
Loop Aborts Strike Back: Defeating Fault Countermeasures in Lattice Signatures with ILP
At SAC 2016, Espitau et al. presented a loop-abort fault attack against lattice-based signature schemes following the Fiat–Shamir with aborts paradigm. Their attack recovered the signing key by injecting faults in the sampling of the commitment vector (also called masking vector) y, leaving its coefficients at their initial zero value. As possible countermeasures, they proposed to carry out the sampling of the coefficients of y in shuffled order, or to ensure that the masking polynomials in y are not of low degree. In this paper, we show that both of these countermeasures are insufficient. We demonstrate a new loop-abort fault injection attack against Fiat–Shamir with aborts lattice-based signatures that can recover the secret key from faulty signatures even when the proposed countermeasures are implemented. The key idea of our attack is that faulted signatures give rise to a noisy linear system of equations, which can be solved using integer linear programming. We present an integer linear program that recovers the secret key efficiently in practice, and validate the efficacy of our attack by conducting a practical end-to-end attack against a shuffled version of the Dilithium reference implementation, mounted on an ARM Cortex M4. We achieve a full (equivalent) key recovery in under 3 minutes total execution time (including signature generation), using only 5 faulted signatures. In addition, we conduct extensive theoretical simulations of the attack against Dilithium. We find that our method can achieve key recovery in under 5 minutes given a (sufficiently large) set of signatures where just one of the coefficients of y is zeroed out (or left at its initial value of zero). Furthermore, we find that our attack works against all security levels of Dilithium. Our attack shows that protecting Fiat–Shamir with aborts lattice-based signatures against fault injection attacks cannot be achieved using the simple countermeasures proposed by Espitau et al. and likely requires significantly more expensive countermeasures.
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- p. 367-392
Open AccessLoop Aborts Strike Back: Defeating Fault Countermeasures in Lattice Signatures with ILP
At SAC 2016, Espitau et al. presented a loop-abort fault attack against lattice-based signature schemes following the Fiat–Shamir with aborts paradigm. Their attack recovered the signing key by injecting faults in the sampling of the commitment vector (also called masking vector) y, leaving its coefficients at their initial zero value. As possible countermeasures, they proposed to carry out the sampling of the coefficients of y in shuffled order, or to ensure that the masking polynomials in y are not of low degree. In this paper, we show that both of these countermeasures are insufficient. We demonstrate a new loop-abort fault injection attack against Fiat–Shamir with aborts lattice-based signatures that can recover the secret key from faulty signatures even when the proposed countermeasures are implemented. The key idea of our attack is that faulted signatures give rise to a noisy linear system of equations, which can be solved using integer linear programming. We present an integer linear program that recovers the secret key efficiently in practice, and validate the efficacy of our attack by conducting a practical end-to-end attack against a shuffled version of the Dilithium reference implementation, mounted on an ARM Cortex M4. We achieve a full (equivalent) key recovery in under 3 minutes total execution time (including signature generation), using only 5 faulted signatures. In addition, we conduct extensive theoretical simulations of the attack against Dilithium. We find that our method can achieve key recovery in under 5 minutes given a (sufficiently large) set of signatures where just one of the coefficients of y is zeroed out (or left at its initial value of zero). Furthermore, we find that our attack works against all security levels of Dilithium. Our attack shows that protecting Fiat–Shamir with aborts lattice-based signatures against fault injection attacks cannot be achieved using the simple countermeasures proposed by Espitau et al. and likely requires significantly more expensive countermeasures.
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-169
On the Feasibility of Single-Trace Attacks on the Gaussian Sampler Using a CDT
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-169
On the Feasibility of Single-Trace Attacks on the Gaussian Sampler Using a CDT
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 348-368
Recovering Rainbow’s Secret Key with a First-Order Fault Attack
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 348-368
Recovering Rainbow’s Secret Key with a First-Order Fault Attack
- Open Access
Machine-Learning Side-Channel Attacks on the GALACTICS Constant-Time Implementation of BLISS
Due to the advancing development of quantum computers, practical attacks on conventional public-key cryptography may become feasible in the next few decades. To address this risk, post-quantum schemes that are secure against quantum attacks are being developed. Lattice-based algorithms are promising replacements for conventional schemes, with BLISS being one of the earliest post-quantum signature schemes in this family. However, required subroutines such as Gaussian sampling have been demonstrated to be a risk for the security of BLISS, since implementing Gaussian sampling both efficient and secure with respect to physical attacks is highly challenging. This paper presents three related power side-channel attacks on GALACTICS, the latest constant-time implementation of BLISS. All attacks are based on leakages we identified in the Gaussian sampling and signing algorithm of GALACTICS. To run the attack, a profiling phase on a device identical to the device under attack is required to train machine learning classifiers. In the attack phase, the leakages of GALACTICS enable the trained classifiers to predict sensitive internal information with high accuracy, paving the road for three different key recovery attacks. We demonstrate the leakages by running GALACTICS on a Cortex-M4 and provide proof-of-concept data and implementation for all our attacks.
Open AccessMachine-Learning Side-Channel Attacks on the GALACTICS Constant-Time Implementation of BLISS
Due to the advancing development of quantum computers, practical attacks on conventional public-key cryptography may become feasible in the next few decades. To address this risk, post-quantum schemes that are secure against quantum attacks are being developed. Lattice-based algorithms are promising replacements for conventional schemes, with BLISS being one of the earliest post-quantum signature schemes in this family. However, required subroutines such as Gaussian sampling have been demonstrated to be a risk for the security of BLISS, since implementing Gaussian sampling both efficient and secure with respect to physical attacks is highly challenging. This paper presents three related power side-channel attacks on GALACTICS, the latest constant-time implementation of BLISS. All attacks are based on leakages we identified in the Gaussian sampling and signing algorithm of GALACTICS. To run the attack, a profiling phase on a device identical to the device under attack is required to train machine learning classifiers. In the attack phase, the leakages of GALACTICS enable the trained classifiers to predict sensitive internal information with high accuracy, paving the road for three different key recovery attacks. We demonstrate the leakages by running GALACTICS on a Cortex-M4 and provide proof-of-concept data and implementation for all our attacks.