LWLynn Linghuan Wang

Lynn Linghuan Wang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Lynn Linghuan Wang has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Does Disclosure of Shadow Bank Exposures Affect Bank Risk Management?

    by Guoman She, Lynn Linghuan Wang, Luo Zuo

    This study examines whether disclosure regulation affects banks' risk management. In May 2024, U.S. regulators mandated enhanced disclosure of lending to shadow banks to facilitate monitoring of the loan risk. Using a difference-indifferences design, we find that affected banks strengthen risk oversight by increasing hiring in regulatory compliance, audit, and information technology. The enhanced risk management is concentrated among banks with greater shadow bank exposure, higher ex ante credit risk, and stronger incentives to demonstrate high quality of loans extended to shadow banks in public disclosures. We further document evidence suggesting positive spillover effects to shadow banks: nonbank mortgage lenders reduce risky loan origination and experience a significant decline in consumer complaints. Collectively, our findings indicate that disclosure regulation influences banks' risk management practices by inducing them to internalize the risks arising from their partnerships with shadow banks.

  • The Impact of Bank Financing on Borrowers’ Voluntary Disclosures and Real Investments

    by Mingyi Hung, Yupeng Lin, Lynn Linghuan Wang, Zilong Zhang

    This paper examines how an increase in bank lending affects firms’ investment disclosures and policies. Exploiting the unconventional liquidity injections by the European Central Bank in 2011–2012, we find that U.S. borrowers of European Union (EU) banks receive greater bank financing and issue more management capital expenditure (capex) forecasts following the liquidity injections. In contrast, we find no evidence of changes in bond financing or issuance of management earnings forecasts. We also find that EU banks’ U.S. borrowers on average receive negative market reactions to their capex forecasts and make no change in investment following the liquidity injection. Further, relative to firms with positive feedback, firms with negative feedback have a lower increase in investment but a higher increase in financial assets. Additionally, we find that the effect of increased bank lending on management capex forecasts is more pronounced among banks with weaker financial conditions and among borrowers with greater financial constraints, higher growth volatility, and more informed trading. These findings highlight the important role of capex forecasts in seeking market feedback following increased bank lending and suggest that market feedback helps explain why the transmission of bank credit to corporate investment did not occur following the liquidity injections. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00528 .


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    How government procurement shapes corporate climate disclosures, commitments, and actions

    by Omri Even-Tov, Guoman She, Lynn Linghuan Wang, Detian Yang

    This study examines how government procurement impacts firms’ environmental disclosures and whether they have tangible effects. Using a triple-difference research design that exploits the exogenous increase in federal funding allocations to counties based on population census revisions, we find that firms with high exposure to government contracts significantly increase climate disclosure following expanded procurement opportunities. We also document that enhanced disclosure is characterized by a positive tone that emphasizes firms’ green investment and commitment to climate adaptation. The effect is more pronounced in counties with a greater increase in procurement volume and when firms have lower ex ante sustainability performance. Finally, we find firms that increase climate disclosure are more likely to earn government contracts, and they undertake real actions by reducing toxic emissions and enhancing the development of green products. Overall our results suggest government procurement promotes corporate climate responsibility by incentivizing firms to undertake climate mitigation actions.


  • Open Access

    Firm Boundaries and Voluntary Disclosure

    by Thomas Bourveau, John D. Kepler, Guoman She, Lynn Linghuan Wang

    We study how vertical integration shapes firms’ public disclosures. Theory suggests that firms can use public disclosure to coordinate with supply chain partners and predicts a substitution between vertical integration and public disclosure of future strategic plans, since the internalization of production reduces the need to publicly coordinate. Using data on the extent of vertical integration, we find that firms that become more vertically integrated reduce their public disclosures about their product strategies and that the reduction is most pronounced for vertically integrated firms with greater internalization of production and those with the largest informational and strategic frictions along the supply chain. JEL Classifications: D83; G14; L14; M41.


  • Do Depositors Respond to Banks’ Social Performance?

    by Yi-Chun Chen, Mingyi Hung, Lynn Linghuan Wang

    We study whether and how banks’ social performance affects depositors, who hold demandable debt with pervasive government protection. Exploiting the regulatory releases of bank performance ratings for community development and a difference-in-differences design, we find a decline in deposit growth after the release of negative bank social performance. In addition, deposits that are impacted by the negative events flow to nearby banks with high social performance. Further analyses find that the results hold similarly among insured and uninsured deposits and are primarily driven by banks with a large proportion of deposits from high-trust and pro-social counties, and in poor information environments. Overall, we contribute to the literature by documenting the importance of social performance to nonshareholder stakeholders and providing implications for bank stability. JEL Classifications: D82; G21; M14.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Transmission Effects of ESG Disclosure Regulations Through Bank Lending Networks

    by Lynn Linghuan Wang

    This paper studies whether and how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations imposed on banks generate transmission effects along the lending channel. I use a setting of U.S. firms borrowing from non‐U.S. banks and exploit the staggered adoption of ESG disclosure regulations in banks’ home countries. I find that exposed borrowers of affected banks improve their environmental and social (E&S) performance following the disclosure mandate. Consistent with banks enhancing both their engagement and selection activities, affected banks impose more environmental action covenants in loan contracts, and they are more likely to terminate a borrower with bad E&S records following the regulation. Further evidence shows that the transmission effects are stronger when a disclosure regulation is well‐enforced (as indicated by a greater increase in banks’ disclosure) and among borrowers with greater switching costs. Collectively, the findings document the role of lending relationships in transmitting the real effect of ESG disclosure regulations from banks to borrowing firms.


  • Open Access

    The Politics of Underreporting Loan Losses: Evidence from the Mandatory Shift to Expected Credit Loss Provisioning in China

    by Mingyi Hung, Yi Ru, Guoman She, Lynn Linghuan Wang

    We investigate the role of politicians’ horizon incentives in banks’ response to the adoption of a forward-looking provisioning model. We argue that horizon incentives, defined as the tendency of politicians to focus on short-term performance in the late stage of an official term, motivate banks to use the discretion of provisioning to obfuscate the reporting system. Using the mandatory shift to the expected credit loss model in China, we find that the increases in the magnitudes and timeliness of loan loss provisions following the mandatory shift are smaller for state-owned banks with late-term local governors than other state-owned banks. Further, while the mandatory shift reduces the pro-cyclicality of lending during the COVID-19 recession for state-owned banks without late-term governors prior to the recession, it has little impact on state-owned banks with late-term governors prior to the recession. Overall, our findings suggest that politicians’ horizon incentives lead to opportunistic underreporting of provisions and dampen the effectiveness of financial reporting regulation in reducing lending pro-cyclicality.