CICharles Stewart Iii

Charles Stewart Iii

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Charles Stewart Iii has a total of 46 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The Day After: Threats and Guardrails in the 2026 Election

    by Charles Stewart

    The 2026 election will be conducted under extraordinary pressure because political actors aligned with the Trump Administration are attempting to delegitimize and, where possible, disrupt it. Despite the robust set of security features in place for American elections, the 2026 election will face a sustained effort to cast ordinary election practices—mail voting, voter registration maintenance, ballot counting, and certification—as evidence of fraud or illegitimacy whenever they produce unwelcome results. Nonetheless, the fact-based elements of election administration should hold, resulting in a 120th Congress consisting of members who legitimately won election. I focus on three flashpoints where election administration will be stressed: efforts before Election Day to challenge voter eligibility and constrain mail voting; postelection litigation and certification fights; and the possibility that congressional elections will be contested when the 120th Congress convenes. The administration's actions are serious and destabilizing, but they are not, by themselves, likely to prevent the lawful outcome from prevailing. American election administration remains decentralized, legally constrained, and rooted in evidence-based procedures. Courts still require proof, state and local officials still canvass and certify results, and regular credentials must be treated as authoritative when Congress seats its members.

  • Open Access

    Audits of the 2020 American election show an accurate vote count

    by Samuel Baltz, Fernanda Gonzalez, Kevin Guo, Jacob Jaffe, Charles Stewart

    After many elections, the accuracy of the vote count is assessed by retabulating a small percentage of ballots. These audits form one of the richest bodies of evidence regarding electoral legitimacy, which is particularly important in democracies where the accuracy of elections has been prominently questioned. In decentralized democracies such as the United States, however, there is tremendous variation in the conduct and reporting of audits, which are never compiled into one place to facilitate precise analysis of their results. Here, we introduce a nation-scale audit result dataset, which we use to estimate the error rate in vote counting during the 2020 U.S. election. The dataset includes all available postelection tabulation audits, spanning 856 regional governments across 27 states, with 71,702,471 individual votes and a further 1,210,528 ballots, including about 6.2% of all votes cast for Donald Trump and 6.9% of those cast for Joe Biden. We find that election audits shifted the net presidential vote count by only about 0.007%, with similarly minuscule errors across all major types of electoral contests. The construction of a nation-scale election audit dataset represents a novel approach to benchmarking electoral legitimacy and provides particularly direct and comprehensive evidence that Americans’ votes were counted correctly in 2020.


  • Open Access

    Cast vote records: A database of ballots from the 2020 U.S. Election

    by Shiro Kuriwaki, Mason Reece, Samuel Baltz, Aleksandra Conevska, Joseph R. Loffredo, Can Mutlu, Taran Samarth, Kevin E. Acevedo Jetter, Zachary Djanogly Garai, Kate Murray, et al.

    Ballots are the core records of elections. Electronic records of actual ballots cast (cast vote records) are available to the public in some jurisdictions. However, they have been released in a variety of formats and have not been independently evaluated. Here we introduce a database of cast vote records from the 2020 U.S. general election. We downloaded publicly available unstandardized cast vote records, standardized them into a multi-state database, and extensively compared their totals to certified election results. Our release includes vote records for President, Governor, U.S. Senate and House, and state upper and lower chambers, covering 42.7 million voters in 20 states who voted for more than 2,200 candidates. This database serves as a uniquely granular administrative dataset for studying voting behavior and election administration. Using this data, we show that in battleground states, 1.9 percent of solid Republicans (as defined by their congressional and state legislative voting) in our database split their ticket for Joe Biden, while 1.2 percent of solid Democrats split their ticket for Donald Trump.


  • Votes Can Be Confidently Bought in Some Ranked Ballot Elections, and What to Do about It

    by Jack R. Williams, Samuel Baltz, Charles Stewart

    We show that, in some ranked ballot elections, it may be possible to violate the secret vote. There are so many ways to rank even a handful of candidates that many possible rankings might not be cast by any voter. So, a vote buyer could pay someone to rank the candidates a certain way and then use the announced election results to verify that the voter followed through. We examine the feasibility of this attack both theoretically and empirically, focusing on instant runoff voting (IRV). Although many IRV elections have few enough candidates that this scheme is not feasible, we use data from San Francisco and a proposed election rule change in Oakland to show that some important IRV elections can have large numbers of unused rankings. There is no evidence that this vote-buying scheme has ever been used. However, its existence has implications for the administration and security of IRV elections. This scheme is more feasible when more candidates can be ranked in the election and when the election results report all the ways that candidates were ranked.


  • Open Access

    Voting Machines: Friend or Foe?

    by Charles Stewart Iii

    Over ninety-nine percent of all ballots cast in the 2020 presidential election were counted by a computer. It is hard to imagine that underlying such a ubiquitous use of technology lurks serious questions about the safety and security of elections conducted with the assistance of voting machines. And yet those questions persist. All this controversy boils down to two questions: first, do voting machines make it more likely that the choices of voters will be recorded correctly, and, second, should we trust the machines to count the votes correctly? I argue that the general answers to these questions are “yes” and “no,” although the full answers are much more nuanced than that. Computer technologies extend the capabilities of humans in voting, as they do in most other aspects of modern life. Expectations of voters and policymakers about the electoral system are such that voting in America would be impossible without the assistance of computerized voting machines. At the same time, the nature of computer programming is such that one cannot simply assume that they perform as expected. Election results arrived at using voting machines must be independently verified. Standard operating procedures in place strive to provide such verification. However, in most states, such verification relies on antiquated approaches and incomplete measures that demand improvement. This paper is organized in three sections. Section 1 is an overview of the voting technology ecosystem and how it is used to administer elections. The ubiquity of voting technology in election administration raises the obvious question of “why?” which is the focus of Section 2. Section 3 provides a conclusion that reflects a consensus among academic experts and most election administrators—that elections should not be conducted in a way that relies on the proper functioning of any technology, even pencil and paper. Rather, the security of elections depends on the ability to reconstruct independently the critical processes undertaken in an election and provide evidence that the results should be trusted within a previously agreed-upon margin of error.

  • Open Access

    Votes Can Be Confidently Bought in Instant Runoff Elections, and What to Do About It

    by Jack Williams, Samuel Baltz, Charles Stewart Iii

    We show that in Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) elections it is often possible to violate the secret ballot. There are so many ways to rank even a handful of candidates that most possible votes will not be cast in a typical IRV election, so a vote buyer could purchase these votes, and then use the announced election results to verify that they were successfully cast. We examine the feasibility of this attack both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we show that when voters can rank a reasonably large number of candidates, most possible votes in an IRV election will be unique. Under very conservative assumptions, we show that vote buyers should expect a very low probability that a vote they purchase will be coincidentally cast by someone other than the colluding voter. We then verify this finding using empirical data from 36 IRV contests, including Cast Vote Records from San Francisco. While there is no evidence that this vote-buying scheme has ever been used, its existence has immediate implications for the administration and security of IRV elections: this scheme is more feasible when more candidates can be ranked in the election, and when election results are reported at lower levels of aggregation.


  • Open Access

    Online Hostility Towards Local Election Officials Surged in 2020

    by Joelle Gross, Samuel Baltz, Mara Suttmann-Lea, Thessalia Merivaki, Charles Stewart Iii, Lia Merivaki

    One of the biggest success stories of the 2020 presidential election was the ability of election officials to conduct a smooth and safe election despite the many challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. This success story, however, brought a barrage of harsh rhetoric against election officials in online spaces, driven by false information about the legitimacy of elections. More election officials are now using social media to communicate with voters, but recent trends show that voters also use these channels to disrupt the provision of information by posting threats and negative rhetoric. Evidence from the 2020 election shows state election officials were subject to this behavior on Twitter. In this chapter, we investigate whether these trends exist at the local level by analyzing the content and sentiment of responses to local election official's tweets between 2012 and 2022. We collect and analyze tweets from all 258 Twitter accounts run by local election officials, analyzing their 264,905 tweets and the 133,199 replies to those tweets over the last decade. Considering the surges in resignations of local election officials since 2020, it is important to investigate how harsh language directed at them on social media adds to a hostile environment, making it difficult for election officials to administer elections.


  • Open Access

    American election results at the precinct level

    by Samuel Baltz, Alexander Agadjanian, Declan Chin, John Curiel, Kevin DeLuca, James Dunham, Jennifer Miranda, Connor Halloran Phillips, Annabel Uhlman, Cameron Wimpy, et al.

    We describe the creation and quality assurance of a dataset containing nearly all available precinct-level election results from the 2016, 2018, and 2020 American elections. Precincts are the smallest level of election administration, and election results at this granularity are needed to address many important questions. However, election results are individually reported by each state with little standardization or data quality assurance. We have collected, cleaned, and standardized precinct-level election results from every available race above the very local level in almost every state across the last three national election years. Our data include nearly every candidate for president, US Congress, governor, or state legislator, and hundreds of thousands of precinct-level results for judicial races, other statewide races, and even local races and ballot initiatives. In this article we describe the process of finding this information and standardizing it. Then we aggregate the precinct-level results up to geographies that have official totals, and show that our totals never differ from the official nationwide data by more than 0.457%.


  • Open Access

    The Confidence Earthquake: Seismic Shifts in Trust and Reform Sentiments in the 2020 Election

    by Jesse Clark, Charles Stewart Iii

    Using data from a variety of public opinion sources, we explore changes in trust in the vote count, attitudes about fraud, and support for election reform following the 2020 election. A historic gap in confidence between Democrats and Republicans has grown, caused by two reasons: (1) an unusually big increase in Democratic confidence coupled with a modest decrease in Republican confidence and (2) a pre-election trust gap that already placed Democrats more confident than Republicans. Looking at confidence that votes in one’s state were counted as intended, there is a sharp discontinuity in Republican responses at the 50% point in Trump two-party vote share. In addition, Republicans in states Trump lost were much less confident the more ballots in the state that were cast by mail. Republicans continued to believe that fraud of all types was common more often than Democrats, with this gap opening up primarily due to Democrats becoming more sanguine about the prevalence of fraud. Still, Republicans became even more concerned about absentee ballot fraud, tampering with ballots, and election officials falsely changing election results. Changes in Republican beliefs about absentee ballot fraud were greater in states that saw the biggest increase in mail-ballot usage since 2016. Finally, attitudes toward reform mostly remained stable compared to past years, although Democrats became slightly more favorable to reforms perceived to open up the process and Republicans became slightly less favorable. The main exception was reform related to voting by mail, where Democrats doubled their support for running all elections by mail. Both Republicans and Democrats were relatively more likely to support expanding voting by mail in states that expanded the use of mail balloting the most in 2020. However, the attitudes of Republicans toward vote-by-mail in the three legacy VBM states have become hostile.


  • Open Access

    Explaining the Blue Shift in Election Canvassing

    by Edward B. Foley, Charles Stewart Iii

    We conduct statistical analysis of a phenomenon identified by Foley (2013), the rise in the number of votes counted after Election Day (“overtime votes”) and the growing tendency of these votes to disproportionately favor Democrats in presidential elections (the “blue shift.”) We provide a historical description of these two time series, from 1948 to 2016, and establish that the timing of the persistent growth in the blue-shifted overtime vote began with the 2004 election. Changes in the time series are broadly consistent with changes in electoral practices, especially in recent years. We perform statistical analysis to better understand variability across states in the overtime vote and the blue shift in the 2016 presidential election. We discover that variation in the size of the overtime vote is associated with the number of mail and provisional ballots, and with the partisanship of the state. The blue-shift is associated with state partisanship, but not with the number of mail and provisional ballots. This analysis has relevance to post-Election-Day dynamics, especially in elections where a close election-night results that favor one candidate may yield to close final-canvass results that favor the other candidate. Among the concluding remarks, we discuss the conditions under which overtime votes counted in the 2020 presidential election could prove especially problematic.